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Abstract
Computer based voting brings up huge challenges for technology. On the one hand
an electronic voting system has to be transparent enough to allow verification of
its correct functioning; on the other hand, it must ensure that these verification
procedures do not allow an attacker to violate voter privacy.
Both requirements can be addressed by providing cryptographically secured voting
receipts. Each voter cast his or her vote in encoded form and receives a copy of the
recorded ballot as receipt. The voters can use these receipts to verify that their vote
is contained in the input of the tally. Furthermore, the encoded votes are publicly
processed, which allows voters and observers to check that the election outcome
has been determined correctly. However, to provide a private and free election, no
voter should be able to prove to someone else for whom he or she voted. This
must not only be prevented during the election, but also afterwards for an indefinite
period of time. Especially with respect to everlasting privacy this is not ensured
by most verifiable voting systems. If the receipt contains, for instance, the voting
decision encrypted using some public key cryptography, an attacker can determine
the candidates selected as soon as the underlying computational problem has been
solved for the key length chosen.
In this work we provide a summary of privacy weaknesses that may arise in verifi-
able electronic poll-site voting systems, and we identify and solve open issues. More
precisely, we concentrate on the following three questions: (1) How can we show
correct anonymization of votes in an efficient and privacy preserving manner using
a generic approach? (2) How can we introduce everlasting privacy to mixing and
homomorphic tallying based voting schemes? (3) How can we reduce the amount of
trust voters have to put in authorities regarding privacy?
In electronic voting so-called reencryption mix-nets are used to anonymize votes.
These mix-nets shuﬄes votes in a universally verifiable manner, i.e., they publish
some audit information allowing voters and observers to verify that the votes came
out as they went in. In practice, mostly generic verification procedures are used to
show correctness of this process. However, many of them do not provide an adequate
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level of privacy. To address (1), we investigate several proposals and introduce a
new protocol that combines existing approaches but improves them with respect to
privacy and efficiency.
Another drawback of mixing based voting schemes is that all implementations pro-
vide computational privacy only. We address (2) by presenting a mix-net that uses a
homomorphic and unconditionally hiding commitment scheme to encode the votes
and audit data, implying everlasting privacy. The correctness of the anonymiza-
tion process is guaranteed with overwhelming probability, even if all authorities
collaborate. An implication of our result is that many current voting systems that
use mix-nets can be upgraded to everlasting privacy. Subsequently, we show that
this protocol can be applied to Preˆt a` Voter and Split-Ballot imposing only minor
changes to current implementations.
The same approach is used to introduce everlasting privacy to homomorphic tal-
lying based schemes. The votes are encoded with an unconditionally hiding commit-
ment scheme, they are homomorphically tallied in public, and the result is decoded
afterwards. To show that our solution can be applied to poll-site voting, we describe
how the Scratch & Vote voting system can be improved using our tallying protocol.
Again only minor changes to the classical scheme are necessary.
To address (3), the approach of non-personalized receipts is analyzed. If the
receipts handed out to the voters do not contain a link to their vote cast, they
do not have to put their trust in authorities keeping this association secret. We
introduce an electronic ballot box that generates non-personalized receipts using
a process that is similar to the anonymization procedure carried out by mix-nets.
The correctness of the receipt generation is universally verifiable. Furthermore, our
approach improves on existing solutions with respect to correctness and privacy.
Finally, we compare all voting systems that are improved in this work, highlight
their advantages and disadvantages, and conclude with key issues for future work.
Zusammenfassung
Die Entwickelung elektronisch unterstu¨tzter Wahlsysteme stellt eine große Heraus-
forderung fu¨r die Forschung dar. Einerseits mu¨ssen die Systeme transparent genug
sein, um Wa¨hlern und Beobachtern die Mo¨glichkeit zu geben die Korrektheit der
Ergebnisermittlung zu u¨berpru¨fen. Andererseits darf das Verifizierungsverfahren
Angreifern nicht erlauben das Wahlgeheimnis zu verletzen.
Ein Ansatz fu¨r die Umsetzung beider Anforderungen ist die Generierung von
kodierten Belegen wa¨hrend der Stimmabgabe. Ein Beleg erlaubt dem Wa¨hler bezie-
hungsweise der Wa¨hlerin nach Schließung der Wahlurne zu u¨berpru¨fen, ob die eigene
Stimme richtig von dem System erkannt und hierin gespeichert wurde. Anschließend
werden alle kodierten Stimmen o¨ffentlich ausgeza¨hlt, wodurch sich Wa¨hler innen
und Beobachter innen vergewissern ko¨nnen, dass das Wahlergebnis richtig ermittelt
wurde. Um eine geheime und freie Wahl zu gewa¨hrleisten muss bei der Gestal-
tung des Belegs insbesondere darauf geachtet werden, dass kein e Wa¨hler in in
der Lage ist einem Dritten gegenu¨ber zu beweisen wie er oder sie gewa¨hlt hat.
Dies muss nicht nur wa¨hrend der Wahl verhindert werden, sondern auch im An-
schluß an die Wahl. Insbesondere in Bezug auf die dauerhafte Geheimhaltung der
abgegebenen Stimme wird das Wahlgeheimnis von vielen Systemen nicht ausre-
ichend gewa¨hrleistet. Ein weit verbreiteter Ansatz ist die Stimme mit einem asym-
metrischen Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren zu verschlu¨sseln. Dies erlaubt jedoch einem
Angreifer beziehungsweise einer Angreiferin die getroffene Wahlentscheidung zu er-
mitteln, sobald das Verfahren fu¨r die verwendete Schlu¨ssella¨nge gebrochen werden
kann.
Daher listen wir in dieser Arbeit zuna¨chst alle Angriffe auf das Wahlgeheim-
nis auf, denen ein verifizierbares Wahlsystem ausgesetzt sein kann. Im Anschluss
daran werden Lo¨sungen fu¨r einzelne Schwachstellen pra¨sentiert. In dieser Arbeit
haben wir uns dabei auf drei Fragestellungen konzentriert: (1) Wie kann die kor-
rekte Anonymisierung von Stimmen mit einem generischen Verfahren gezeigt werden
ohne dabei das Wahlgeheimnis zu verletzen? (2) Wie ko¨nnen Wahlsysteme, die die
abgegebenen Stimmen anonymisieren oder homomorph za¨hlen so verbessern werden,
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dass sie eine dauerhafte Geheimhaltung der Stimme garantieren? (3) Wie kann das
Vertrauen, welches ein e Wa¨hler in in Wahlhelfer innen und Wahlvorsta¨nde legen
muss reduziert werden?
Elektronische Wahlsysteme verwenden meist so genannte Mix-Netzwerke, um die
kodierten Stimmen zu anonymisieren. Wa¨hrend der Anonymisierung vero¨ffentlicht
das Mix-Netzwerk Daten, mit denen Wa¨hler innen und Beobachter innen kontrol-
lieren ko¨nnen, dass keine Stimme vera¨ndert wurde. Die in der Praxis verwendeten
generischen Ansa¨tze bieten jedoch keinen ausreichenden Schutz vor Angriffen auf das
Wahlgeheimnis. Um Frage (1) zu beantworten betrachten wir daher in dieser Arbeit
verschiedene Ansa¨tze und stellen ein neues Protokoll vor, welches auf bestehenden
Verfahren beruht und diese hinsichtlich Effizienz und Geheimhaltung verbessert.
Ein weiterer Nachteil von Wahlsystemen, die eine Anonymisierung der abgegebe-
nen Stimmen vorsehen ist, dass alle Mix-Netzwerke asymmetrische Verschlu¨sselungs-
verfahren verwenden und somit das Wahlgeheimnis lediglich fu¨r eine begrenzte Zeit
gewa¨hrleistet ist. Bezu¨glich Frage (2) stellen wir daher ein Verfahren vor, welches
die abgegebenen Stimmen mit einem Commitment-Verfahren kodiert und somit eine
informationstheoretische Sicherheit gewa¨hrleistet. Dies garantiert, dass ein e An-
greifer in selbst bei beliebig großer Rechenleistung nicht in der Lage ist, die solcher-
art geschu¨tzten Daten zu decodieren. Wie Mix-Netzwerke erlaubt auch unser Ver-
fahren die Korrektheit des Anonymisierungsprozesses zu verifizieren. Selbst unter
der Annahme, dass alle Wahlhelfer innen kooperieren, um das Ergebnis der Wahl zu
vera¨ndern, kann die Integrita¨t der abgegebenen Stimmen gewa¨hrleistet werden. Der
von uns entwickelte Anonymisierungsprozess ist dem klassischen Mix-Netzwerk sehr
a¨hnlich und kann dieses in vielen Wahlsystemen ersetzen. Dadurch ko¨nnen beste-
hende Systeme so angepasst werden, dass sie eine dauerhafte Geheimhaltung der
abgegebenen Wahlentscheidung gewa¨hrleisten. Um dies zu verdeutlichen zeigen wir
in dieser Arbeit wie unser Anonymisierungsprozess verwendet werden kann, um die
Wahlsysteme Preˆt a` Voter und Split-Ballot zu verbessern. In beiden Fa¨llen mu¨ssen
lediglich kleine A¨nderungen an den aktuellen Verfahren vorgenommen werden.
Ein a¨hnlicher Ansatz wird auch fu¨r Wahlsysteme erarbeitet, welche vorsehen die
abgegebenen Stimmen homomorph zu za¨hlen. Am Beispiel des Wahlsystems Scratch
& Vote zeigen wir, wie unsere Lo¨sung im Rahmen einer Pra¨senzwahl eingesetzt wer-
den kann. Auch hier sind lediglich kleine A¨nderungen an dem aktuellen Verfahren
notwendig.
Bezu¨glich Frage (3) untersuchen wir den Ansatz so genannter nicht personifizierter
Belege. In diesem Fall erha¨lt ein e Wa¨hler in einen Beleg, der die Stimme an-
derer Wa¨hler innen und nicht zwangsla¨ufig die eigene Stimme entha¨lt. Dadurch
stellen die Belege keine Verbindung zwischen einem Wa¨hler beziehungsweise einer
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Wa¨hlerin und seiner beziehungsweise ihrer getroffenen Wahlentscheidung her und
Wa¨hler innen mu¨ssen Wahlhelfer innen nicht vertrauen, dass sie diese Verbindung
geheim halten. Wir stellen eine elektronische Wahlurne vor, die nicht personifizierte
Belege erzeugt. Dabei wird ein Anonymisierungsprozess verwendet, der dem des
Mix-Netzwerkes sehr a¨hnlich ist. Die Erzeugung der Belege ist universell verifizier-
bar und unser System verbessert die bestehenden Ansa¨tze bezu¨glich Geheimhaltung
der Stimmen und Korrektheit des Wahlergebnisses.
Abschließend vergleichen wir die von uns verbesserten Wahlsysteme, arbeiten
deren Vor- und Nachteile heraus, und stellen eine Liste mit mo¨glichen ku¨nftigen
Arbeiten vor.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
During the last decades, the number of countries using electronic voting systems
for parliamentary elections increased constantly. Computerized solutions have been
deployed, for instance, in the United States, Estonia, Norway, and Belgium. In
the United States, voting machines were introduced in 1892 by mechanical lever
machines used in Lockport, New York [Jon03]. Several election authorities around
the country followed with a large variety of electronic voting systems, for instance,
optical scan systems, introduced in 1962 in Kern City, California, and Direct Record-
ing Electronic Voting Machines (DREs), introduced in 1976 in Illinois. In Europe,
Belgium became one of the first countries using electronic voting systems through
the introduction of DRE based systems in 1991. Eight years later, in 1999, they
were deployed on a large scale and during the Belgian federal election in June 2007
already 44% of the voters have cast their vote electronically [CP07]. Often named
advantages of electronic voting systems are savings in costs and a faster and more
accurate tallying process that needs less administrative effort.
In Germany, electronic voting systems for parliamentary elections were first de-
ployed in 1999. Voting machines produced by the company Nedap were sporadically
used on several election levels. After the federal elections in 2005, two complaints
were submitted to the Federal Constitutional Court and a judgement followed on
the 3rd of March 2009. According to the verdict the used voting machines did not
meet the requirements of the German Constitution. The court deduced from Article
38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 that it must be possible for citizens to
check the essential steps in the election act, including the accurate counting of votes
[Fed09, 39(71)].
Although the so-called “public nature of elections” is just a requirement for Ger-
man parliamentary elections, since 2004 research in the field of electronic voting
focuses on verifiability. Voters who are able to check, for instance, the accuracy of
the tallying procedure put more confidence in the correctness of the result. Thus,
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while developing electronic voting systems, transparency of the election process is
a very important design goal. So-called “end-to-end verifiable” voting systems en-
able a voter to verify all steps of an election, from the vote casting process to the
determination of the election result. Since these schemes allow checking the correct
counting of votes cast in all polling stations, they provide an even higher extent of
voter verifiability compared to the traditional voting system [HDV12].
Nevertheless, transparency also increases the risk of attacks regarding voter pri-
vacy. Thus, the deployment of an electronic voting system must pass not only the
hurdle of the public nature of elections, it must also be assured that the principle of
secret suffrage is not violated. This means that no one else but the particular voter
should know for whom he or she voted for.
This is not only of high importance for secret suffrage but also for free suffrage.
Suppose each voter receives proof that his or her vote was tallied as intended. In
this case voters can also prove to someone else whom they voted for, which exposes
them to external influences such as vote-selling or coercion. Furthermore, voting
would not be free if voters have to fear the disclosure of their voting decision on the
day of the election or afterwards.
1.2 High-Level Explanation of our Contribution
This work focuses on the evaluation and improvement of verifiable electronic vot-
ing systems with respect to privacy. We concentrate on solutions implemented for
polling stations because these systems do not force a radical departure from the vote
casting process the voter is used to. They do not require the ownership of a specific
device, like a personal computer or a mobile phone. Furthermore, privacy issues,
like family voting can be neglected because voters cast their vote in a controlled
environment. Nevertheless, a couple of weaknesses and improvements presented in
this work can be transferred to remote voting systems as well. Furthermore, our
efforts primarily concentrate on schemes that allow generating encoded votes by
filling out paper ballots. This prevents that voters have to interact with machines
and that malicious devices are able to learn their vote cast.
1.2.1 Privacy Weaknesses of Verifiable Voting Systems
The first electronic voting systems had a significant drawback compared to the tra-
ditional system. While a manual counting process can be observed, the correctness
of an electronic tallying procedure is harder to verify, especially for the average vot-
ers that do not have expert knowledge. Thus, the electronic voting systems of the
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first generation assumed that voters put their trust in the correct functionality of
the provided hard- and software.
To improve the transparency of electronically supported elections, in 1994 Be-
naloh and Tuinstra [BT94] introduced a voting system that is not only universally
verifiable, but also receipt-free. This means that during the vote casting process, the
voters receive a receipt and/or some additional information allowing them to verify
that the election outcome was computed correctly (universal verifiability). At the
same time the scheme prevents that voters can use this receipt and/or data and the
public information to prove to someone else whom they voted for (receipt-freeness).
However, their approach does not protect the voters from malicious authorities, that
are able to coerce a voter and prevent him or her from casting a vote. Thus, this
idea was further elaborated and new remote and poll-site voting systems were built.
In this work we concentrate on poll-site voting schemes and with respect to this
direction important improvements were SureVote [Cha04] presented by Chaum and
Neff’s MarkPledge [Nef04], both introduced in 2004.
Neff’s approach requires an interaction between the voter and an election author-
ity. Therefore, this scheme has been further developed to Direct Recording Electronic
Voting Machines (DREs) and remote voting systems, for instance, the scheme pro-
posed by Moran and Naor [MN06], VeryVote [JRF09], and EVIV [JFR13]. There
are further DRE based and remote voting schemes that use other approaches, for
instance, the protocol by Cramer et al. [CGS97] and STAR-Vote [BBE+13]. How-
ever, all these schemes require an interaction between the voters and a voting ma-
chine. The voting schemes Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05, RBH+09], Scratch & Vote [AR06],
Punchscan [PH06], and its successor Scantegrity [CEC+08, SFCC11] are based on
Chaum’s idea. The distinguishing feature of these systems is that voters can cast
encoded votes by filling out and scanning special ballot papers. This has a signifi-
cant advantage compared to DRE based schemes because if electronic devices record
the candidates selected by the voters, malicious code and hardware can be used to
violate voter privacy.
Preˆt a` Voter, Scratch & Vote, and Scantegrity differ with respect to the informa-
tion printed on receipts and how receipt-freeness is ensured. By filling-out the Preˆt
a` Voter ballot, the voter generates a vote that is encrypted with a homomorphic
public key encryption scheme. The encrypted vote is cast by scanning the ballot
and the voter receives a copy of the recorded information as receipt. Afterwards, the
votes cast must be anonymized to break the link to the respective receipt before they
can be decrypted and tallied. Scratch & Vote also uses homomorphic encryption
and the same receipts, but the votes cast are tallied homomorphically and decrypted
afterwards. Since only the election outcome is decrypted, no anonymization process
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is needed to preserve voter privacy.
In contrast, the election protocol of Scantegrity is based on confirmation codes
that are generated by an unconditionally binding commitment scheme. During the
vote casting process, codes for each marked candidate are revealed and serve as
receipt. The association between the codes and the candidates is stored in private
tables and must be kept secret to preserve voter privacy.
For many of these proposals the provided level of privacy has been well studied.
Thus, in Chapter 3, we first summarize all vulnerabilities that might violate voter
privacy or receipt-freeness in verifiable electronic voting schemes1. In a second step,
solutions for several identified weaknesses are introduced. More precisely, we first
provide a generic verification procedure for mix-nets that provides efficiency and
privacy. Second, we introduce everlasting privacy to mixing and homomorphic tal-
lying based schemes. And, third, analyze and improve voting systems that provide
non-personalized receipts.
1.2.2 Privacy Preserving Generic Verification Procedure of
Correct Shuﬄing
While verifiability of Scratch & Vote follows from the publicly performed tallying
procedure, the anonymization process used within Preˆt a` Voter and the correctness
of the Scantegrity tables must be verifiable. Most electronic voting systems use a
reencryption mix-net [PIK93] in combination with a proof of correct shuﬄing to
anonymize votes. Although a series of zero-knowledge proofs has been proposed, for
instance, by Groth [Gro10], Lipmaa and Zhang [LZ12], and Wikstro¨m [TW10], in
practice generic verification procedures are preferred. A legal analysis, for instance,
showed that the German principles inclines us towards verification procedures like
Randomized Party Checking [DHR+11]. This is due to the fact that the mechanism
of random sampling and checking are more intuitive and comprehensible to the
public, and in principle any observer can contribute to the random audit checks.
Especially Randomized Party Checking enjoys great popularity and is not only used
within Preˆt a` Voter [XCH+10], but also in online voting systems such as Civitas
[CCM08]. Even though the information published during the verification process
allows an attacker to map each voter to a subset of votes cast, other approaches,
like the cut-and-choose based approach proposed by Sako and Kilian [SK95], are
prevented because of their poor performance. Thus, one question we address in our
1Note that we do not discuss privacy problems specific to one system, for instance, the invisible
ink used for Scantegrity. Prior to the assignment of a certain voting system further evaluation
is needed, especially with respect to other electoral principles.
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work is how to develop a generic verification procedure that provides both efficiency
and privacy.
Message anonymization using a publicly verifiable reencryption mix-net works as
follows: Each voter i ∈ [1, K] encrypts his or her vote s using a homomorphic and
probabilistic public key cryptosystem. The resulting set of ciphertexts
{u(i)}Ki=1 = {Enc(s(i), t(i))}Ki=1
is the input to the mix-net, where t(i) is a random value. Then, each mix performs
the following operations on its input set:
1. Mix M reencrypts each ciphertext i by multiplying it with Enc(0, t′(i)), where
t′(i) is a value chosen uniformly at random.
u′(i) = Enc(s(i), t(i)) · Enc(0, t′(i)) = Enc(s(i) + 0, t(i) + t′(i))
= Enc(s(i), t(i) + t′(i)).
2. The set of reencrypted messages U ′ = {u′(i)}Ki=1 is permuted and the resulting
set of votes
U1 = pi(U
′)
is published.
3. M publicly proves in zero-knowledge fashion that the data has been processed
correctly.
4. The mix sends its output U1 to the next mix.
Mixing has been performed correctly if the reencryption u′(pi(i)) of u(i) encrypts
the same vote s
Dec(u′(pi(i))) = Dec(u(i)) = s.
Since a homomorphic encryption scheme is used, a simple and efficient approach
to verify correct mixing is to build the product over the set of input and output
ciphertexts and verify whether they encrypt the same value, i.e.,
Dec(
K∏
i=1
u′(pi(i))) ?= Dec(
K∏
i=1
u(i)) =
K∑
i=1
s(i).
This approach is known as Optimistic Mixing [GZB+02]. However, by replacing two
ciphertexts, one for the preferred candidate and one to balance out the product, a
malicious mix can violate correctness without being detected. This can be prevented
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by randomly assigning the input ciphertexts to L blocks and verifying the correct
reencryption of each block using optimistic mixing. More precisely, the following
steps are performed:
1. Each input element is assigned to one of the L blocks.
2. For each input block the mix has to show a corresponding output block that
consists of all elements of the input block in reencrypted form.
3. The correct reencryption of each block is verified by optimistic mixing.
The probability of an undetected coercion now depends on the chance that both
modified ciphertexts end up in the same block.
This approach was used in Norway in 2011 [Gov]. However, only if all mixes are
honest no information about the votes cast by individuals is revealed. Otherwise,
each encrypted vote can be assigned to a subset of output blocks and therefore to a
subset of votes cast. Furthermore, the mix-net verification process used in Norway
is vulnerable to an attack revealed by Khazaei et al. [KTW12]. To solve these
issues, we propose to carry out two mixing and two verification steps for each mix.
This allows carrying out the block assignment in a way that even if only one mix
is honest an attacker cannot assign one input ciphertext to one output block. More
precisely, in the first verification round the ciphertexts are assigned to an input
block at random. Afterwards, the elements of each output block generated in the
first round are assigned to input blocks such that each input block contains at least
one ciphertext of each output block. This is possible if each block has almost the
same size L and if L is chosen such that for K inputs L2 ≥ K. In addition, we
compare this approach with other common generic verification procedures and show
that our solution is compatible with respect to correctness and efficiency.
The voting system Scantegrity [CCC+09] also uses a verification process similar to
Randomized Partial Checking to prove that the confirmation codes and candidates
were correctly mapped during the tallying procedure. However, this scheme has
a further vulnerability: verifiability is implemented by confirmation codes shown
to the voters during the vote casting process and published on the bulletin board.
Thus, by making a photo of the filled-out ballot while the codes are shown next to
the candidates, the voter can generate a proof of his or her vote cast. Improving the
scheme such that it prevents this attack enforces large changes to the entire voting
system, from the ballot layout and receipt generation process up to the tallying
procedure. Thus, the modifications needed to ensure receipt-freeness for Scantegrity
are out of scope in this work.
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1.2.3 Everlasting Privacy
In Preˆt a` Voter and Scratch & Vote the votes cast depend on computational as-
sumptions since these schemes are based on homomorphic encryption and/or on
encryption mixes2.
The requirement of everlasting privacy dates back to 1988. In [Cha88] Chaum
presents the first protocol for elections with unconditionally-secret ballots. However,
his approach requires an interactive ballot issuing protocol between the voters and
the authorities and does not address receipt-freeness. Several protocols followed,
for instance, the remote voting protocol by Cramer et al. [CFSY96] that improves
Chaums approach with respect to efficiency. However, the first poll-site voting
scheme that provides receipt-freeness, universal verifiability, and everlasting privacy
was presented by Moran and Naor in 2006 [MN06]. Their approach uses generic
commitment schemes with homomorphic properties, but requires that the voter
uses a DRE to cast his or her vote, allowing a malicious device to violate voter
privacy.
This scheme was followed by two paper based approaches: ThreeBallot [Riv06]
and Bingo Voting [BMQR07]. However, in [Str06] and [ACG07] the authors showed
that the privacy of the ThreeBallot voting system can be violated by statistical
attacks. Furthermore, regarding Bingo Voting, the integrity of the recorded voting
decisions relies on a trusted random number generator. By comparison, in most
end-to-end verifiable voting systems the correctness of the election result can be
ensured, even if all authorities are malicious and collaborate.
Shortly after Bingo Voting, in 2007 Moran and Naor proposed a paper based
voting system providing everlasting privacy called Split-Ballot [MN07, MN10]. This
approach is strongly based on Punchscan, but has a very interesting extra twist.
The voter votes by splitting his or her choice over two ballots, which are sent to two
different authorities. Before the votes are decoded and counted, these two authorities
anonymize the vote shares using a mixing procedure similar to the process carried
out by mix-nets. Although they are able to determine the election outcome, they
cannot reconstruct an individual vote without conspiring. So there is no single point
of failure with respect to privacy.
In 2007, Essex et al. introduced Aperio [ECA10], a voting system based on Punch-
scan that can be used for elections held in environments with low computerized
support. In their paper the authors show that a verifiable voting system can be
obtained without the use of computers, scanners, internet access, and cryptography.
2This is also a vulnerability of Punchscan and Scantegrity since these schemes use unconditionally
binding, but only computationally hiding commitment schemes.
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Furthermore, Aperio provides (everlasting) privacy under the assumption that no
data is leaked during the ballot preparation and printing process. However, the
ballots are still manually counted and verified. Thus, in contrast to other verifiable
voting systems, the tallying and verification process is less efficient and needs a lot
of administrative effort. Furthermore, since no data is published for auditing, the
ability to verify the correctness of the election outcome depends on whether a voter
can attend the verification procedure.
In 2009, van de Graaf proposed to merge Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan using the
former’s ballot layout, and the latter’s bit commitment scheme [Gra09]. The re-
sulting voting system does not only provide verifiability and correctness but also
everlasting privacy. This was the first publication proposing to replace the un-
conditionally binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme used in the
standard Punchscan and Scantegrity version with a computationally binding and
unconditionally hiding scheme to obtain everlasting privacy.
In 2010, Essex. et al introduced Eperio [ECHA10] which is based on Aperio but
uses a simpler ballot layout and cryptographic setting to enable a computerized
tallying and verification process. Like Punchscan and Scantegrity, this scheme does
not provide everlasting privacy since computationally hiding commitment schemes
are used. However, as shown by van de Graaf in [Gra09], this can be improved by
replacing the cryptographic primitives.
An advantage of Eperio in comparison to the solution presented by van de Graaf
is that the tables used to link the encoded ballots to the candidates selected are
less complex. This scheme only uses a small set of cryptographic primitives to
simplify the verification procedure and improves the execution time. The tables are
generated and audited without any cryptography. Commitments are solely used to
commit to their setup to prevent subsequent modifications. Although Eperio is an
interesting solution since the auditing process is easier to understand for the average
voters, this approach has several drawbacks.
A verification procedure similar to cut-and-choose is used. To increase the prob-
ability of detecting a coercion, several tables have to be generated and verified.
Although the verification process is easy to understand and perform, this is a lot
of work even for elections with only 1000 voters and 5 tables. Thus, just as with
systems using cryptography, tool support during the verification procedure is in-
escapable. Furthermore, the cut-and-choose based verification procedure provides
correctness with high assurance and only after several rounds. For mixing based
schemes zero-knowledge arguments of correct shuﬄing can be applied which pro-
vide a stronger guarantee that the data was processed correctly. Furthermore, this
scheme does not allow for homomorphic tallying which would reduce the compu-
1.2 High-Level Explanation of our Contribution 9
tational and organizational effort for simple elections. Therefore, in this work we
discuss how everlasting privacy can be introduced to mixing and homomorphic tal-
lying based schemes.
Universally Verifiable Mix-Net Providing Everlasting Privacy
One solution that addresses everlasting privacy for universally verifiable mix-nets is
Split-Ballot. However, the anonymisation protocol of Split-Ballot is devised for a
very particular situation: two voting authorities which want to mix ballot shares of a
specific format, allowing them to jointly reveal the selected candidates and compute
the tally. In addition, their anonymization procedure makes intrinsic use of a very
specific, numerical representation of the ballot shares, and it is neither obvious
how to use their mixing protocol in other voting protocols, nor how to obtain a
general, unconditional mix-net for mixing messages of arbitrary format. Despite the
vast literature on mix-nets, we are not aware of any publication that accomplishes
everlasting privacy for mixing. Thus, in this work we show how messages can be
anonymized providing verifiability, but at the same time everlasting privacy.
A universally verifiable mix-net publishes information that allows observers and
voters to check that the encrypted votes were processed correctly. Usually this
audit information consists of the votes cast in encrypted form, the output of each
mix, and the proofs of correct mixing. In standard mix-nets, privacy of this data
is computational and anonymity of the sender is only guaranteed as long as the
cryptographic assumptions last.
Our solution to this issue is by using a homomorphic and unconditionally hiding
commitment scheme to encode the audit information. These commitments are com-
putationally binding, allowing that a prover can commit to a certain value without
being able to change his or her mind later on. Furthermore, they provide everlast-
ing privacy because an unconditionally hiding commitment can be a commitment
to any value of the message space with the same probability. One might argue that
the drawback of unconditionally hiding commitment schemes is that they provide
computational bindingness only. It follows that if the computational problem can
be solved for the key length used, the election result can be changed in case of a
recount. However, the integrity of the votes cast is guaranteed at the moment of
vote casting and tallying. Furthermore, an unlimited repetition of the ascertainment
of the results is not possible in the traditional voting system either. Till when the
election outcome can be recounted depends on the period of safekeeping the election
documents. In Germany, for instance, according to §90.3 Federal Electoral Code,
paper ballots can be destroyed 60 days prior to the next elections. Against this
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background, it is not necessary to require everlasting integrity.
In our solution the system commits to a vote cast s with a randomly chosen
decommitment value t0. Like with homomorphic encryption, each mix M can recode
(or rerandomize) a commitment u = Com(s, t0) by multiplying it with a commitment
to a rerandomization value t1, that is
u′ = u · Com(0, t1) = Com(s, t0) · Com(0, t1) = Com(s, t0 + t1).
Like for homomorphic encryption, recoding is possible without knowledge of the
votes encoded. Furthermore, due to the homomorphic property of the commitment
scheme the proof of correct shuﬄing is similar to the one used for standard reen-
cryption mix-nets.
However, when unconditionally hiding commitments are mixed a problem oc-
curs. To open them, one needs to know what the decommitment values t0 + t1 are.
Unlike conventional encryptions, in which the votes can be uniquely determined,
a rerandomized u′ can represent any message. Its interpretation depends on the
decommitment value.
Our solution is to send those decommitment values together with the vote s as
auxiliary information through a private mix-net to which the public has no access.
Any rerandomization u′ = u · Com(0, t1) has matching reencryptions
〈v′, w′〉 = 〈v · Enc(0), w · Enc(t1)〉,
where v = Enc(s), w = Enc(t0), and Enc is a suitable homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Essentially we use two tightly synchronized mix-nets run by the same mixes: one
which mixes commitments and is fully public, and a second mix-net to which the
public has no access to transport the opening values by processing the homomorphic
encryptions. Observe that the permutations and rerandomization values used in the
private mix-net must be identical to those used in public mix-net to be able to open
the commitments afterwards. Then, after the last mix Mn has published its data,
vn and wn are jointly decrypted, yielding s and t
∗ = t0 + t1 + · · · + tn, the opening
values of un = Com(s, t0 + t1 + · · ·+ tn).
The “simple” mix-net sketched in the above paragraphs already provides, verifi-
ability, correctness, robustness, and everlasting privacy towards observers. No data
published during the verification process reveals information which would enable a
computationally unbounded attacker to decrypt the votes or to map an encrypted
value to a decrypted vote. But it has one drawback: the first mix gets to see Enc(s).
So when the encryption scheme gets broken, this mix, if dishonest, could reconstruct
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the vote associated to a receipt. Thus, in addition we propose a more “complex”
protocol where the votes are split in two (or more) parts, and are submitted to
separate mix-nets. After the vote shares were anonymized, they are recombined,
decrypted, decoded, and published by a special publication authority.
Verifiable Mixing-Based Voting Systems Providing Everlasting Privacy
The mix-nets presented in this work can be used to introduce everlasting privacy to
existing voting protocols by replacing the encoding scheme and reencryption mix-
net. We show this using the example of Preˆt a` Voter and Split-Ballot. By adapting
Preˆt a` Voter such that it uses the simple mix-net the system can be upgraded
to provide everlasting privacy. However, since the authorities see the encrypted
opening values, certain organizational measures are needed to ensure everlasting
privacy towards them. In addition we show how the mix-net protocol that uses
secret sharing can be used together with Split-Ballot. Although the standard version
of Split-Ballot already provides everlasting privacy, two malicious authorities are
enough to reveal the association between a receipt and the respective vote cast. Our
version improves the scheme with respect to computational privacy. It allows scaling
the amount of malicious authorities needed to violate voter privacy as long as the
computational assumptions hold.
Homomorphic Tallying Schemes Providing Everlasting Privacy
For homomorphic tallying based schemes the same approach as for mix-nets can be
used. We replace the data published for auditing with an unconditionally hiding and
additively homomorphic commitment scheme. A vote for candidate i is represented
as a vector 〈s1, ..., sm〉 which is 0 everywhere, except in the ith position, where it
equals 1. Each entry of this vector is encoded using a commitment scheme ui =
Com(si, ti), while the corresponding opening values are encrypted to vi = Enc(si)
and wi = Enc(ti).
The total for candidate i can by computed by u∗i =
∏
j ui(j), where the j in
parenthesis denotes an index ranging over all voters. Because of the homomorphic
property, we obtain
u∗i =
∏
j
Com(si(j), ti(j)) = Com(
∑
j
si(j),
∑
j
ti(j)) = Com(s
∗
i , t
∗
i ).
To publish s∗i , that is the total of votes candidate i received, and show its correctness,
the voting system needs to reveal s∗i and t
∗
i . This is possible because it knows the
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homomorphically encrypted values si and ti. By computing
v∗i =
∏
j
Enc(si(j)) = Enc(
∑
j
si(j)) = Enc(s
∗
i )
and
w∗i =
∏
j
Enc(ti(j)) = Enc(
∑
j
ti(j)) = Enc(t
∗
i )
and decrypting the results, the voting system finds s∗i and t
∗
i , respectively. To deter-
mine the tally, this procedure is applied to each candidate. Opening the commitment
u∗i = Com(s
∗
i , t
∗
i ) by publishing the values s
∗
i and t
∗
i is sufficient to show correctness
and to provide universal verifiability towards the public.
To some extend this protocol can be seen as a simplification of the remote voting
system proposed by Cramer et al. [CFSY96]. However, their approach is designed for
a multiple-authority election and uses secret sharing, while our protocol can also be
run with only one authority. This allowed us to improve the remote voting system
Helios with unconditionally privacy, as presented in [DGA12]. Furthermore, we
show how our process can be applied to homomorphic tallying based poll-site voting
systems using the example of Scratch & Vote. The homomorphic counters used in
the classic scheme are encoded with an unconditionally hiding and homomorphic
commitment scheme. By multiplying the commitments the votes per candidate are
incremented. The opening values are privately processed and published at the end
of the tallying procedure to prove correctness of the election result.
1.2.4 Towards a Voting Scheme Providing Non-Personalized
Receipts
In 2007, Arau´jo et al. [ACG07] and Rivest et al. [RS07] introduced a different ap-
proach to issue receipts. This is, instead of receiving a receipt of his or her own vote,
each voter gets one or more receipts that correspond to previously cast votes. To
achieve this, the scheme uses a special ballot box that is publicly initialized with a
certain number of votes prior the election (i.e., the initial votes). The tally is com-
puted by subtracting the initial votes from the votes cast. While Rivest et al. discuss
this type of receipt more as a possible enhancement of existing voting schemes, in
[AR08] Araujo et al. develop a verifiable voting system that is based on the Farnel
scheme [Cus01].
Non-personalized receipts have several advantages regarding privacy. Since voters
do not receive a receipt of their own vote, they are not linked to their cast voting
decision. Consequently, they do not have to put their trust in key holders and
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authorities participating in the anonymization and tallying process. Furthermore,
this approach has several advantages regarding verifiability. Usually the voters check
whether their vote is included in the input batch of the tally by themselves. This
allows attacks where malicious parties selectively replace votes of voters that most
likely do not carry out this verification process, such as elderly or disabled people.
Benaloh and Lazarus, for instance, described in [BL11] this weakness of verifiable
electronic voting schemes as Trash Attack. But if each receipt contains a subset of
votes cast, each vote may be verified by several people. Furthermore, the receipts are
non-personalized and do not pose a risk to voter privacy; not even in the presence
of distrusted authorities. Thus, voters that do not want to carry out the verification
process by themselves can pass their receipt to helping organizations that check the
correctness of the tallying procedure.
However, this approach also has some drawbacks. Each time a voter casts a vote
in the special ballot box, a receipt is generated by spinning the box and scanning a
subset of its content. This is time consuming and raises the amount of organizational
work. Furthermore, using this simple approach, the probability of a vote being
printed on a receipt depends on the time when the vote was cast, which allows
attacks regarding privacy and correctness. By collecting some receipts an attacker
can map a voter to a subset of votes cast. All votes that appear on receipts before
the voter submitted his or her vote can be ruled out. Furthermore, the order in
which votes are cast also determines the probability of each vote being handed out
as a receipt and being verified by other voters. Thus, in this work we first introduce
an electronic ballot box that efficiently generate receipts and second improve the
receipt generation procedure with respect to correctness and privacy.
Non-personalized receipts can be generated electronically by a process that is
similar to the anonymization procedure of mix-nets. All votes cast are reencrypted
and mixed with a random permutation before they are printed on the receipt. To
show correctness of this procedure standard proofs of correct shuﬄing can be applied.
However, it would be very inefficient to carry out a shuﬄing and verification process
each time a voter cast a vote. Thus, the device “preshuﬄes” all possible voting
decisions during the setup process and marks the votes cast by setting flags. In
addition, all filled out ballots are collected in a conventional ballot box. This allows
verifying the correctness of the flags set by the electronic ballot box, i.e., if all votes
cast were marked.
After the electronic ballot box holds the proofs and spot tests, all data stored
is erased. Under the assumption that the secret permutation and the private val-
ues used to reencrypt the votes have been irrevocably deleted, the link between a
vote cast and its anonymized version, printed on the receipts, is destroyed. Thus,
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the output of the electronic ballot box, the set of anonymized votes cast, can be
decrypted without violating voter privacy. Afterwards, the votes cast during the
initialization are subtracted and the remaining votes are tallied.
In standard schemes the probability of a vote being printed on a receipt (and
verified by a voter) depends on the time when the vote was cast. Therefore, we
introduce weighted random selection to the receipt generation process carried out
by the electronic ballot box. All votes cast receive a weight and for each vote printed
on a receipt its weight is reduced decreasing its probability to be selected for the next
one. To evaluate the impact of weighted random selection on privacy, correctness,
and efficiency, we implemented the electronic ballot box and simulated the receipt
generation process for several parameters. The results show that our proposal is
efficient and improves existing solutions with respect to correctness and privacy.
1.2.5 Structure
The structure of this work is as follows: In Chapter 2 the security requirements
and cryptographic primitives are introduced. In Chapter 3 the privacy weaknesses
of poll-site voting schemes are summarized. Building on this, in Chapter 4 we
describe a generic verification procedure of correct shuﬄing that provides privacy
and efficiency. Afterwards, in Chapter 5, we introduce two universally verifiable
mix-nets that provide everlasting privacy and in Chapter 6 apply them to the voting
systems Preˆt a` Voter and Split-Ballot. In Chapter 7, we describe a homomorphic
tallying protocol that provides universal verifiability and everlasting privacy, and
we show how this tallying procedure can be used to improve the voting system
Scratch & Vote. Finally, in Chapter 8 we analyze and improve voting systems that
provide non-personalized receipts, using the Farnel voting system as an example.
We conclude in Chapter 9 with a comparison of all improved voting systems and
open issues that are left for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this chapter we describe the security requirements and cryptographic primitives
which are particularly important for our work.
2.1 Security Requirements
In the literature on electronic voting a vast amount of security requirements has
been determined. While some definitions are established (e.g., verifiability), the
specification of others (e.g., privacy) differs between several publications. Thus, in
this section we review existing literature and define the requirements addressed in
this work.
More precisely, we evaluate and improve voting systems with respect to privacy
and analyze whether our proposals provide verifiability, correctness, and robustness.
In this work we only look at poll-site voting schemes. Thus, we do not address
properties like democracy, fairness, and coercion-resistance that are ensured by the
organizational measures for polling stations defined by the German legal regulation.
Furthermore, in this work we propose no substantial modifications of voting systems
with respect to the ballot layout and vote casting process. Therefore, we do not
consider properties like usability, election versatility, and accessibility.
2.1.1 Privacy Requirements
In our work we address the privacy requirements voter privacy, with respect to
computational and everlasting privacy, and receipt-freeness.
A voting system provides voter privacy if it keeps the association between voters
and their vote secret during all steps of an election, namely the election setup, vote
casting, and tallying process. The latter election step also includes the verification
procedure of end-to-end verifiable voting systems.
To analyze our schemes, we will use the following definition by Moran and Naor
[MN06]. Voter privacy is preserved if an attacker cannot gain any information
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about the votes cast by individuals apart from the final tally3. A voting system
where voter privacy depends on computational assumptions is said to offer com-
putational privacy. If even a computationally unbounded attacker cannot gain
any information that helps him or her to violate voter privacy, the voting system
provides everlasting privacy.
We define receipt-freeness as introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra in [BT94].
An electronic voting system is receipt-free if either voters cannot create a proof of the
content of their vote cast, or they are able to generate both proofs for real (tallied)
and fake (not tallied) votes indistinguishable from each other. In a traditional paper
based voting system, for instance, a voter could generate a proof by taking a picture
of the filled out ballot paper. However, an attacker cannot distinguish whether this
ballot has been cast or discarded. This holds true for passive attackers, as well
as active attackers that coerce a voter prior to the vote casting process and force
him or her to follow his or her instructions. However, also in the traditional voting
system receipt-freeness has its restrictions. If the voter films the entire vote casting
process, he or she can prove his or her voting decision towards an attacker. Thus,
we concentrate here on providing the same level of receipt-freeness ensured by a
traditional paper based voting system.
2.1.2 Correctness
A voting system provides correctness (or integrity [RBH+09]) of the election re-
sult if each valid vote is counted (completeness) and only valid votes are counted
(soundness) [Pie08]. In other words it must be ensured that the vote generation,
casting, and tallying procedure are carried out correctly without changing the vot-
ing decisions as they were intended by the voters. This is provided if votes are
cast as intended, recorded as cast, and counted as recorded. In our work we further
subdivide cast as intended in encoded as intended and cast as encoded. To pre-
vent that a machine is able to learn how a voter voted, in many verifiable poll-site
voting schemes the voter generates an encoded vote by filling out a special ballot
paper that is scanned afterwards. In this case it is necessary to evaluate the cor-
rectness of the ballot and the scanning process separately. Therefore, such a more
fine-graded distinction is appropriate. This leads to our definition of correctness,
which is guaranteed if the following four requirements are fulfilled.
Encoded as Intended The filled out ballot reflects the voting decision intended by
the voter.
3Note that it is impossible to prevent that if a candidate did not receive any vote, then a coercer
can conclude that all voters did not cast a vote for him or her.
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Cast as Encoded The voting system records (i.e., scans) the ballot correctly.
Recorded as Cast The recorded vote is stored and becomes input to the tally with-
out being modified.
Counted as Recorded All stored votes are tallied correctly.
2.1.3 Verifiability
Verifiability is closely related to correctness and describes the ability to verify the
correctness of the election result and especially the correct processing of votes. With
respect to the scope of the provided auditing procedure a distinction is made between
individual and universal verifiability [RBH+09].
Individual Verifiability A voting system provides individual verifiability if the voter
can verify that his or her vote is encoded as intended, cast as encoded, and
recorded as cast.
Universal Verifiability Universal verifiability is provided if all voters and observers
can verify that all recorded votes are tallied as recorded.
End-to-End Verifiability So-called end-to-end verifiable voting systems provide both
individual and universal verifiability.
2.1.4 Robustness
An electronic voting system provides robustness (or resilience) if an election can be
run successfully, also in the presence of random faults and attempts to disrupt the
election processes [RBH+09]. Thus, this property consists of two aspects. First, the
ability to detect and resolve attempts to cheat and, second, the ability to run an
election even in the presence of a minority of dishonest election authorities.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
The cryptographic primitives used in this work are homomorphic encryptions, com-
mitment schemes, and universally verifiable mix-nets.
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2.2.1 Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
A homomorphic encryption scheme is defined by a triple of algorithm (Gen,Enc,Dec)
such that
1. Gen(1κ) generates two separate keys, a public key pk and a private key sk,
with respect to a security parameter κ. The private key is presumed to be
shared among a set of key trusteed using threshold decryption (see, for instance,
[GJKR99, Ped91] for ElGamal and [FS01, DK01] for Paillier).
2. Enc(s, r) = v denotes the encryption of message s ∈ G with randomness r ∈ H
and public key pk.
3. Dec(v) = s denotes the decryption of ciphertext v to message s ∈ G using
private key sk.
4. The algorithm provides semantic security.
5. The algorithm is homomorphic in s and in r, meaning that for all s, s′ ∈ G
and for all r, r′ ∈ H :
Enc(s, r) · Enc(s′, r′) = Enc(s+G s′, r +H r′),
where +G and +H are operations in group G and H. As a consequence,
reencrypting a ciphertext v = Enc(s, r) without changing the message s is
possible by multiplying it with an encryption of the neutral element 0G of
group G, i.e.,
ReEnc(v, r′) = v · Enc(0G, r′) = Enc(s, r) · Enc(0G, r′) = Enc(s, r + r′).
Observe that reencryption is possible without knowledge of the message s.
For legibility, we will interpret a batch of votes from different voters as a vector,
denoted by a capital letter. For instance, the batch of plaintext votes submitted is
represented as S = 〈s(1), . . . , s(K)〉 = 〈s(i)〉Ki=1. Operations on the entries of vectors
carry over to the vectors, so we can write
V = Enc(S,R) = 〈Enc(s(i), r(i))〉Ki=1 and
ReEnc(V,R′) = 〈ReEnc(v(i), r′(i))〉Ki=1 = 〈Enc(s(i), r(i)) · Enc(0G, r′(i))〉Ki=1.
In this case it is implicitly understood that the r(i) and r′(i) are elements chosen
uniformly random from the appropriate set. The Perm operation permutes the
entries of a vector:
S ′ = Permpi(S) = Permpi(〈s(i)〉Ki=1) = 〈s(pi(i))〉Ki=1.
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2.2.2 Homomorphic Commitment Scheme
A (non-interactive) commitment scheme is a triple (GenCom,Com,Unv) such that
1. GenCom(1κ) generates the public commitment key ck for security parameter
κ. Note that the security parameter defines the message space M and the
randomization space R. We will suppose implicitly the presence of ck in the
remainder, leaving it out of the notation.
2. u = Com(s, t) ∈ C takes as input a message s ∈ M and a uniformly chosen
decommitment value t ∈ R, resulting in a commitment u ∈ C.
3. Unv(u, s, t) returns s if u = Com(s, t) and ⊥ if not.
The commitment scheme has to provide the following properties:
Correctness For any s ∈M, t ∈ R : Unv(Com(s, t), s, t) = s.
Non-Interactive All communication goes from the sender to the receiver.
Computationally Binding Given a commitment u = Com(s, t), for any PPT A
the probability to find a second opening pair (s′, t′) with s 6= s′ such that
Com(s, t) = Com(s′, t′) is negligible in the defined security parameter κ.
Unconditionally Hiding For any pair s, s′ ∈M the distribution of the randomized
values Com(s, t) and Com(s′, t′) must be identical when t, t′ ∈ R are chosen
uniformly random4.
Homomorphic For all s, s′ ∈M and t, t′ ∈ R
Com(s, t) ·C Com(s′, t′) = Com(s+M s′, t+R t′).
In the following, we will denote the neutral element 0M of M and 0R of R as 0.
Furthermore, we will refer to the group operations +M and +R by +.
2.2.3 Universally Verifiable Mix-Nets
Mix-nets were introduced by David Chaum in 1981 [Cha81] to allow anonymous
communication within a network. Its basic functionality is to process a set of in-
put messages, so that any link between a single input and its associated output is
4This property can be weakened to statistically hiding, but for ease of exposition we do not
explore this.
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removed while the content remains unchanged. In the context of electronic voting,
mix-nets are used to anonymize cast votes before they are decrypted and tallied.
Chaum’s original approach is the so-called decryption mix-net, which makes use
of public key cryptography. The reencryption mix-net introduced in 1993 by Park
et al. [PIK93] is based on reencryption and takes advantage of the homomorphic
properties of some public key encryption schemes. An important feature of this
type of mix-nets is that its correctness can be verified by any third party, i.e., it can
be shown by publishing additional audit information that each message that comes
in, goes out.
Thus, an additional ingredient of reencryption mix-nets are proofs of correct
shuﬄing. Each mix has to prove, in zero-knowledge fashion, that the data has been
processed correctly, such that the set of output values is a valid shuﬄe of the set of
input values. These proofs are made public, thus providing universal verifiability.
After the introduction of reencryption mix-nets in 1993 by Park et al., a large
variety of shuﬄing proofs have been proposed, leading from generic verification
procedures, like Randomized Partial Checking [JJR02] to zero-knowledge arguments
of correct shuﬄing, like proposed by Groth [Gro10] and Lipmaa and Zhang [LZ12].
3 Privacy Weaknesses of Verifiable
Poll-Site Voting Schemes
In this chapter we summarize privacy weaknesses of verifiable poll-site voting schemes.
We do so with respect to voter privacy, in terms of computational and everlasting
privacy, and receipt-freeness. A definition of these properties can be found in Sec-
tion 2.1.1. Such an analysis allows us to identify open issues in the field of voting
security and is the bases of our improvements presented in Chapter 4 to 8. The
content of this chapter is published in [DH12] and [DHR+11].
3.1 Voter Privacy
Voter privacy is a very important requirement to guarantee a secret and free election.
If voters fear that their voting decision may become public, they cannot vote freely
and without influence. Furthermore, an attacker might exploit this situation to
bribe or coerce voters to cast a vote for his or her favored candidate.
In the following sections we will discuss vulnerabilities that may arise during the
election setup, vote casting, and tallying process and violate computational privacy.
Everlasting privacy is addressed separately in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 Possible Violation During the Election Setup and Vote
Casting Process
In this section we describe potential weaknesses of electronic voting systems that may
occur during the election setup and vote casting process. In these election phases
especially the electronic equipment poses a risk to voter privacy. If an adversary
successfully manipulates some devices, he or she might be able to collect enough
data that allows him or her to link a voter to the vote cast.
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Figure 3.1: Ballot paper layout used in Preˆt a` Voter. Filled out ballot (left), scanned
information (middle), and information published on the bulletin board (right).
Printer Knowledge: Some end-to-end verifiable voting systems propose the use of
an adapted ballot paper which allows the voters to generate a receipt during the
vote casting process. This receipt can be used to verify whether his or her own vote
is included in the tally as cast.
In Preˆt a` Voter, for instance, the ballot paper consists of two halves which can be
separated by a perforation down the middle. On the left hand side the candidates
are listed in an arbitrary order. The right hand side contains a space against each
name where the voters mark their choice and an ID that links to the secret candidate
order in encrypted form (see Figure 3.1).
After the voter filled out the ballot, he or she detaches and destroys the hu-
man readable candidate list before leaving the secret polling booth. Subsequently,
the right hand side is cast by scanning the ID and the marked positions. Each
voter receive a receipt containing a copy of his or her recorded vote. Furthermore,
the scanned information is published, for instance, on a publicly accessible bulletin
board. Since all voters know the secret candidate order to their receipt, they can
associate the marked positions with the respective candidates and verify that their
own vote is included in the tally.
In this approach, voter privacy can be violated if an intruder manipulates the
printer and reveals the association between candidate lists and IDs [RP10]. Since
the positions marked on the ballots are published next to the IDs, an attacker can
reconstruct for whom the owner of a receipt cast his or her vote. This weakness is
also a vulnerability of other electronic voting systems where secret information is
printed on ballots, such as Scantegrity and Scratch & Vote.
Information Leakage: When electronic devices are used, electromagnetic radiation
and sometimes even transmissions from the inside of an electronic circuit can be ob-
tained and analyzed [RP10]. Such electromagnetic emanations can, for instance,
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come from the display or touch screen of a Direct Recording Electronic Voting Ma-
chine (DRE) [Kuh04, Sek10]. Important for the success of this attack is the strength
of compromising radiation and to what extent this information can be isolated from
other signals, like electronic noises [Kuh07]. In electronic voting, voters choose their
candidates out of a limited set of voting options, which leads to a limited set of
distinct signals and simplifies this attack.
The voting machines produced by the company Nedap, for instance, have been
found prone to eavesdropping [GHB+06]. For devices of a special construction type
signals that allow conclusions regarding the candidate selected can be received from
a distance up to 25 meter. These signals are in the radio frequency and can be
received using basic radio receiver equipment.
Electronic emanation is a vulnerability of many hardware components, for in-
stance, screens, as shown for the Nedap machines, keyboards [VP09], and serial
cables [Smu90]. Furthermore, the developers of a voting system should be aware of
optical emanation caused by reflections in objects [BCD+09] and acoustic emana-
tions caused by printers [BDG+10].
Storing Sensitive Information: Many electronic voting systems are designed to
record votes electronically during the vote casting process. This may be achieved
by a DRE or by scanning filled out ballot papers. In both cases voter privacy can
be violated if the system additionally stores the sequential order of votes cast or
the instant of time when a vote was submitted (accidentally, by poor design, or on
purpose, by malicious software). If an adversary gets access to the machine, all he or
she has to do is to observe the order in which voters cast their vote and allocate this
information to the sequence of votes stored [KMHU04]. This vulnerability can occur
in all electronic voting systems where the vote is recorded in clear (non-encrypted
form) and in the presence of the voter.
Fingerprints: Many DREs list the candidate names in a constant order to offer
identical ballots to all voters. If they provide a touchscreen or keys as user interface,
fingerprints or fatty residues can reveal information about the candidates chosen by
predecessors [Pie09]. This is a weakness of all electronic voting systems making use
of an electronic device as user interface.
Information Added to Printouts: Sensitive data, like the instant of time when a
vote is cast or the order in which votes were recorded can violate voter privacy. A
malicious device that generates printouts can add such information by small dots,
a modified ciphertexts, or an adapted barcode [KSW05] without being detected by
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the voters. Collecting all printouts allows an attacker to get access to secret data
without gaining physical access to the device. Such manipulations can occur in all
electronic voting systems that record votes and generate printouts.
Single Point of Failure: As already pointed out by Moran and Naor [MN07],
electronic voting systems should be developed in a way that they do not have a
single point of failure with respect to security. If voters, for instance, use a DRE to
fill out and cast their ballots, the machine and all authorities that have access to the
device are able to reveal the votes cast. Thus, a malicious authority who observed
the order or instant of time when the voters used the DRE is able to violate voter
privacy. This is a vulnerability of all voting systems where the voters fill out and
cast their votes using an electronic device.
3.1.2 Possible Violation During the Tallying Procedure
In this section we summarize privacy threats that may arise during the tallying
procedure. In a traditional voting system the link between a voter and his or her
vote gets broken at the moment when the vote is cast in the ballot box. However, this
is not the case for verifiable voting systems that offer a receipt to the voter containing
a link to his or her cast voting decision. Furthermore, the audit information that is
published to show correct processing of votes may be a risk to voter privacy, too.
Authority Knowledge: As within a traditional voting system, it has to be ensured
that privacy and functionality do not depend on only one person in authority. Thus,
the private key to decrypt votes cast or to access secret information should not be
handed out to one official only. This person could be bribed or threatened and
compromising information can be revealed, for instance, by decrypting votes before
the link to the voter has been removed.
Thus, so-called threshold cryptosystems are used. These schemes require two
separate keys, one public and one private, whereas the private key consists of several
key shares. In practice they could be stored on trusted devices, e.g., smartcards, and
distributed among several persons in authority. As a result, a predefined number of
officials has to be present to decrypt or access secret data. Nevertheless, regarding
privacy, voters still have to trust that a threshold number of authorities act honestly
and keep their key shares secret.
Another example for a shared responsibility are reencryption mix-nets, which are
used in verifiable voting systems, such as Preˆt a` Voter, to anonymize votes cast.
A reencryption mix-net consists of several mixes which are serially connected. The
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first mix, for instance, a server controlled by a person, takes a batch of votes, changes
the appearance by reencrypting the secret and by shuﬄing the order with a secret
permutation. Afterwards, the output data is passed to the next mix which processes
the votes the same way until the whole mixing process is completed. Each mix knows
the association between its input and output batches. Therefore, the link between
a voter and his or her vote cast is destroyed only when at least one mix is honest
and keeps the permutation used secret. Summarized, all electronic voting systems
using threshold-cryptography (e.g., Preˆt a` Voter and Scratch & Vote), using mix-
nets (e.g., Preˆt a` Voter), and managing access to secret data (e.g., the tables used
in Scantegrity) assume trust in a threshold number of officials.
Vote Clustering: Some voting systems publish data during the auditing procedure
that allows to reveal information about the votes cast by individuals. This happens,
for instance, if a polling station provides more than one electronic device that records
votes and the outcome for each device is determined separately. In this case an
intermediate result can be mapped to a specific device and consequently to its users.
This leads to an additional association between a subgroup of voters and a subset
of votes cast.
More precisely, imagine two scanners, S1 and S2, are used in a polling station. In
this case the voters are grouped into two blocks: one block consists of the voters
who cast their vote at scanner S1 and the other block contains the voters who used
scanner S2. Assume just one of the two scanners recorded a vote for candidate
“Alice”, let’s say S1. In this case it is possible to say that a subset of voters, all
that cast their vote at S2, did not cast a vote for “Alice”. Although the voting
decision is not revealed, the assortment of possible candidates gets smaller. This is
unacceptable because if a voter has been coerced into voting for “Alice”, the coercer
knows that he or she did not follow the instruction.
Such a fragmentation could also occur during the verification of a mix-net, de-
pending on the verification method used. In [Cha02] Chaum describes this problem
for mix-nets verified with Randomized Partial Checking [JJR02]. Summarized, vote
clustering is a vulnerability of electronic voting systems where either: votes are cast
and tallied at several devices; devices sign votes or receipts; or the votes are grouped
during the verification procedure.
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3.2 Receipt-Freeness
Verifiable electronic voting systems offer each voter the opportunity to revise all
steps of an election regarding integrity. However, if receipts or audit information
reveal secret data that allows conclusions regarding their vote cast, voters could be
exposed to external pressures such as vote-selling or coercion.
Unique Ballots: A coercer can, for instance, force voters to take a picture of
themselves and their filled out ballot paper. End-to-end verifiable voting systems
offer a receipt during the vote casting process that is associated to a recorded ballot
paper containing a unique ID. To allow individual verifiability, the voter can use
this ID to verify whether his or her own vote is contained in the tally. However, this
also enables the coercer to check whether the vote, shown on the photo, has been
cast. Conversely, in the traditional voting system voters can ask for a new ballot
since the ballot papers are not unique.
In Scantegrity, for each candidate marked by the voter, a unique confirmation
code is revealed. To verify that the vote has been recorded as intended, the voter
has to write down these codes and check on the bulletin board whether they appear.
The codes disappear5 before the ballot is scanned. However, if the voter takes a
picture while they are still visible, for instance, in the secret polling booth, he or she
can prove the association between a unique confirmation code and the corresponding
candidate. Furthermore, if the codes appear on the bulletin board, the coercer can
be sure that this ballot was cast.
To guarantee that voters cannot be bribed or coerced, they should not be able to
generate a proof of their vote cast. Thus, verifiable voting systems may not bring
the voting decision in clear words and the matching ID on one ballot. As the receipt
used for verifying the own voting decision is handed out to the voter, the information
printed on it cannot be classified as private. A coercer could force the voter to hand
out the receipt or he or she shows it to another person voluntarily. Although it
does not reveal any provable details about the voter (e.g., name or address), the
possession of it signalizes to whom it belongs to.
5The codes and bubbles are printed with invisible ink. The color used for the confirmation codes
has a shorter reaction time than the ink used for the bubbles. Thus, after marking a bubble,
the codes turn black and are visible for some minutes. Afterwards, the bubbles turn black and
hide the codes.
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3.3 Everlasting Privacy
The requirement of vote secrecy is fulfilled if an electronic voting system keeps the
association between a vote cast and the voter secret during all steps of an election. To
that end, many voting systems make use of encryption to protect secret information,
for instance, votes cast that are published for auditing. However, the security of an
encryption scheme can be ensured just for a limited (and not assessable) duration of
time. It is possible at any moment that an effective attack or technical innovations
(e.g., quantum computers) allow breaking the underlying computational problem for
the key length chosen. An exact period of validity cannot be determined but data
encrypted with RSA and a key length of 2048 bit, for instance, could be disclosed in
approximately 20 to 30 years [Kal03, FS03]. In addition, since storage is becoming
cheaper every day, we must assume that the data on the bulletin board will be stored
forever. This means that as soon as the the encryption scheme gets broken for the
key length used, it will be possible to decrypt all published information.
In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, for instance, an arbitrary candidate order is shown
on each ballot. During vote casting, the voter receives a receipt containing the po-
sitions marked and a link to the published candidate order in encrypted form. As
a consequence, as soon as the cryptosystem is broken for the key length chosen,
the attacker can reveal the associated candidates the owner of a receipt voted for.
As already mentioned in Section 3.2, the possession of a receipt refers to a specific
person what allows the attacker to violate voter privacy. The same applies to sys-
tems that provide universal verifiability by publishing some audit information in
encrypted form. The overwhelming majority of these voting protocols is based on
homomorphic encryption and/or on reencryption mixes, so what all these protocols
have in common is that they provide computational privacy only.
In the context of electronic voting computational privacy is not sufficient. The
disclosure of filled out ballots, even decades later, can still be highly embarrassing.
For instance, think of a 65-year old presidential candidate whose voting behavior
when he or she was 20 becomes public. It might ruin his or her chances. Also
for elections that are not on state level voter privacy is of interest. If a university
or company elects a new director it would be unpleasant for each candidate, also
several years after the election, to detect which co-worker voted against him or her.
Furthermore, computational privacy could increase the possibility for some nasty
scenarios, for instance, a dictator who has come to power goes after people who
have voted against him or her (or his or her ancestors) several decades ago.
Already in 1985 Chaum argued, in the context of credential mechanism [Cha85],
that privacy should be everlasting, since individuals cannot be expected to assess
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the strength of cryptographic mechanisms. Furthermore, a legal analysis of privacy
weaknesses in poll-site eVoting systems showed that only if the secrecy of the vote is
ensured for an indefinite period of time, a voting system is in accord with the prin-
ciple of free suffrage [DH12]. Already the mere possibility of this type of disclosure
could have a negative effect on the voting behavior because individuals might feel
constrained about the content of their ballots submitted.
3.4 Evaluation of Identified Privacy Weaknesses
There are already several approaches to prevent the attacks described in Section
3.1.1. Ryan et al. [RP10], for instance, proposed a distributed ballot preparation and
printing process to address printer knowledge. Regarding information leakage,
it is possible to evaluate the emission prior to the election by an independent institute
and implement security preventive measures according to the results. Also regarding
the single point of failure, there are several proposals addressing this vulnerability.
In Scratch & Vote, Preˆt a` Voter, and Split-Ballot, for instance, encrypted votes are
generated by filling out paper ballots that are scanned afterwards. Together with
a distributed printing process and threshold decryption, they avoid a single point
of failure and ensure that electronic devices are not able to violate voter privacy.
Since the scanners only record public and no secret information, this approach also
prevents attacks based on fingerprints, storing of sensitive information, and
information added to printouts.
As described in Section 3.1.2, there are mainly two vulnerabilities that can occur
during the tallying process: vote clustering and authority knowledge. Vote clus-
tering caused by the use of several technical devices can be prevented by publishing
the overall outcome only. Furthermore, verification procedures that are vulnerable
to this attack should not be used. However, with respect to generic verification
procedures, the existing solutions either provide privacy and a poor efficiency, or
they have a good efficiency but lead to vote clustering. Thus, further research is
necessary to find an appropriate solution (see Chapter 4).
Although authority knowledge might be acceptable if a secret is shared among
several persons in authority, systems with weak trust assumptions should be pre-
ferred. There are already some approaches, like Twin [RS07] and the verifiable
version of the Farnel voting scheme [ACG10] that address this issue. However, be-
fore these schemes can be used, further research with respect to the provided level
of correctness and privacy is needed (see Chapter 8).
As discussed in Section 3.2, problems with unique ballots generally arise when
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voting systems use ballot papers marked with IDs. However, if the voter does not
have to write down confirmation codes which are shown to him or her during the
vote casting process, like proposed for Scantegrity, this problem is somewhat easy
to solve.
A simple solution is to hide all information that allows identifying one single ballot
paper, like the ID, by a scratch strip or invisible ink (like proposed for Preˆt a` Voter
in [RP05]). Thus, a photo would prove how the voter filled out a ballot but not that
this ballot has been cast. In this case additional organizational measures are needed
to ensure that characteristics determining one specific vote are not disclosed as long
as the ballot paper is under the ownership of the voter. The poll workers have to
ensure, for instance, that the ID is not revealed before the ballot is scanned.
As shown in Section 3.3, many of the current schemes, like Preˆt a` Voter and
Scratch & Vote do not provide everlasting privacy. The main problem is that all
votes cast are publicly processed and that the voter receives a receipt containing his
or her vote in encrypted form. Thus, for mixing and homomorphic tallying based
schemes, verifiability processes should be designed such that all information pub-
lished for auditing provide information-theoretical security (see Chapter 5, Chapter
6, and Chapter 7).

4 Privacy Preserving Generic Verifi-
cation Procedure of Correct Shuf-
fling
For parliamentary elections it is very important that voters and observers are con-
vinced that the election outcome has been determined correctly. Therefore, one
of the German principles, the public nature of elections, requires that all essen-
tial steps of the elections are subject to public observation [Fed09]. To solve this
issue, several universally verifiable reencryption mix-nets have been proposed (see
Section 2.2.3). However, as was shown in Section 3.1.2 it must be prevented that
the verification procedure used leads to vote clustering. Thus, after an introduction
to reencryption mix-nets, the existing generic verification procedures are evaluated,
and an improved process, Random Block Verification, is proposed which is efficient
and fulfills the requirement of voter privacy. The content of this chapter is published
in [DJV12].
4.1 Reencryption Mix-nets
This section describes how standard reencryption mixing works. Furthermore, we
give an overview of the assumptions made and the properties achieved. For more
information see, for instance, [SK95] or [JJR02].
4.1.1 Parties Involved
The following parties are involved in the anonymization process:
Voters We have K voters that will submit a vote, for instance, by scanning a filled-
out ballot, which is published in encrypted form. We will write the indexes i
of the voters between parenthesis.
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Mixes The mix-net consists of n mixing authorities called mixes, M1,M2,. . . ,Mn.
Authorities The set of authorities consists of all private authorities, for instance,
the key trustees, which participate in the reencryption mixing process.
Key Trustees The set of key trustees is a subset of authorities who hold shares of
private or access keys, needed to decrypt data or access hardware.
Bulletin Board There exists a secure append-only public bulletin board, i.e., one
to which only authorized entities can append, nothing can be deleted, and
everyone has a consistent read access. This is a fairly standard assumption.
See, for instance, [HL08] for more details.
Random Beacon We assume that all random challenge bits used in the verification
steps come from a trusted beacon. This assumption is fairly standard. See,
for instance, [MN10].
Auditors Auditors are experts who run the verification process, check the published
proofs, and certify the output. Furthermore, they execute and verify the
random beacon’s generation of random bits.
Observers Observers are interested parties, such as voters, political parties, author-
ities, international observers, and third parties who verify the correctness of
the mixing process.
4.1.2 Assumptions
For a reencryption mix-net to be secure the following assumptions have to be made:
Assumption M.1 The authorities cannot break the computational problem of the
encryption scheme.
Assumption M.2 At least one mix is honest and keeps the association between its
input and output values secret.
Assumption M.3 Using (k, n)-threshold decryption at least (n−k+1) key trustees
act honestly and keep their key share secret.
Assumption M.4 All random challenge bits used in the mixing and verification
steps produced by the random beacon are unpredictable.
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4.1.3 Reencryption Mixing Process
Reencryption mixing is based on a homomorphic public key encryption al-
gorithm which allows reencryption of encrypted messages, as described in Section
2.2.1. The purpose of the mixing process is to reencrypt and shuﬄe the batch of
encrypted votes, such that at the end all votes can be decrypted without being able
to link any of them to a receipt handed out to a voter. Furthermore, each mix has
to publicly show that all votes contained in the input set are part of the output.
In the following we will provide a detailed description of the mixing process. As
defined in Section 2.2.1 the operation ReEnc reencrypts an encrypted vote v(i) =
Enc(s(i), r(i)) with a random value r′(i):
ReEnc(v(i), r′(i)) = Enc(s(i), r(i)) · Enc(0G, r′(i)) = Enc(s(i), r(i) + r′(i))
and the operation Perm permutes the entries of a vector with a random permutation
pi:
Permpi(〈v(i)〉Ki=1) = 〈v(pi(i))〉Ki=1.
Phase I: Vote submission Suppose a set V of encrypted votes has been generated.
The ciphertext v(i) = Enc(s(i), r(i)) denotes an encryption of vote s ∈ M,
encoded with randomness r, cast by voter i.
All submitted ciphertext v(i) are published on the bulletin board, together
with the receipt identification i. The input batch for the first mix is defined
as V = Enc(S,R).
Phase II: The mixing process Let V be M1’s input batch. Then M1 chooses a
random permutation pi1, reencrypts and shuﬄes V :
V1 = Permpi1(ReEnc(V,R1)),
where the random values R1 are uniformly generated by M1.
The output of mix M1 is input to the next mix M2 which processes the data
the same way:
V2 = Permpi2(ReEnc(V1, R2));
and so forth.
In addition each mix has to publicly prove towards the auditors and observers
that it has knowledge of the reencryption values and permutation used.
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Phase III: Decoding and publication of the messages After the last mixMn pro-
cessed the data and the correct functioning of each mix has been checked, the
ciphertexts are decrypted with the help of the key trustees and the set of votes
S is published.
Phase IV: Certification of the output The auditors verify whether all public proofs
of knowledge hold and certify the output. Table 4.1 summarizes the mixing
process.
Table 4.1: Summary of the mixing process
input from users Mix i, for i ∈ [1, n] output decoding
public V = Enc(S) Vi = Permpii(Vi−1 · Enc(0)) Vn S = Dec(Vn)
4.1.4 Properties
Under the assumptions listed in Section 4.1.2, reencryption mix-nets have the fol-
lowing properties:
Individual Verifiability All voters can convince themselves that their vote is in-
cluded in the input batch.
Privacy The identity of the sender of each vote remains secret as long as Assump-
tions (M.1), (M.2), and (M.3) hold.
Correctness Even if all authorities conspire, they cannot change the contents of
any vote without being detected with overwhelming probability, as long as
Assumptions (M.1) and (M.4) hold.
Universal Verifiability Any interested observer can verify that the mixing process
was performed honestly by checking the published proofs of correct mixing.
Robustness If all authorities follow the protocol correctly, then the protocol always
terminates successfully.
4.2 Evaluation of Existing Generic Verification
Procedures
In this section we give an introduction to existing generic verification procedures and
analyze whether they provide voter privacy. In mix-nets, privacy is the question of
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how traceable a given ciphertext is. More precisely, looking at one input ciphertext
there are some output ciphertexts which may be its reencryption while there are
others that can be ruled out. The size of the group containing all possible outputs,
the “anonymity group” (AG), determines how much privacy is achieved by the
mix-net. In general, as motivated in Section 3.1.2, we require that the size of the
anonymity group is K for K input elements. Since mix-nets should provide voter
privacy, even if only one authority is honest, we will determine the anonymity group
for this case.
The generic verification procedures existing in the literature can be assigned to
two basic directions: Optimistic Mixing [GZB+02] and Cut-and-Choose [SK95].
Optimistic Mixing The verification procedure proposed by Golle et al. [GZB+02]
is the first optimistic mixing approach. The input of a reencryption mix-net needs
to be encrypted using a homomorphic public key cryptosystem. So, the idea is
to use this property to prove the correct shuﬄing for the whole set of input and
output elements. After the mix-net processed the data, for each mix two products
are computed, one by multiplying all input ciphertexts and one by multiplying all
output ciphertexts. Subsequently, the mixes are asked to prove that both results
encrypt the same message, i.e., sum or product of the encrypted votes.
The input of the mix-net proposed by Golle et al. consists of a double encrypted
vote and a hash value over the single encrypted vote. The hash values are used to
ensure that votes cannot be changed without being detected since input Enc(4) ·
Enc(6) = Enc(4 + 6) and output Enc(3) · Enc(7) = Enc(3 + 7) leads to the same
encrypted message. If a manipulation is detected, the double encryption allows for
“back-up” mixing. The outer layer can be revealed and the inner layer can be input
to a slower and more fine-graded verification process, for instance, a zero-knowledge
argument of correct shuﬄing. However, multiple flaws were identified by Wikstro¨m
[Wik03] and Abe and Imai [AI03]. The use of hash values, for instance, allows to
violate voter privacy in the presence of a malicious voter.
Proof of Subproduct The verification procedure Proof of Subproduct [BG02] pro-
posed by Boneh et al. is an improved optimistic mixing based process that is resistent
against the weaknesses shown for the classic approach. For the verification process,
a security parameter α ≤ 5 is defined which declares the number of subsets (which
in the following we will refer to as blocks) to be checked. Afterwards, α blocks
are generated, each of size of K
2
for a total number of K ciphertexts. Each input
ciphertext is included in block Pi independent at random with probability
1
2
. To
demonstrate that the input was processed correctly, the mix has to show for each
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block the corresponding output ciphertexts and prove that the product of both sets
encrypt the same message.
A higher value for α results in a stronger guarantee of correct mixing but also
offers less privacy because the votes are grouped in smaller blocks. The authors
show that the average anonymity group size is K
2α
. However, even for a small α
this verification process divides the K inputs at least in two sets violating voter
privacy. Furthermore, the probability to cheat, estimated by the authors, is still
around (5
8
)α. Therefore, Boneh et al. recommend the use of a slower verification
protocol in parallel to guarantee correctness.
Cut-and-Choose Another approach to show correct shuﬄing is to use a cut-
and-choose based verification process, as described in [SK95]. After the mix-net
anonymized the encrypted votes, each mix must show that it knows permutation pi
and rerandomization values R such that V2 = Permpi(ReEnc(V1, R)) for input V1 and
output V2. This is accomplished by breaking the permutation pi in pi1 and pi2 and
correspondingly split the rerandomization values R in R1 and R2 such that
V ′2 = Permpi1(ReEnc(V1, R1)) and
V2 = Permpi2(ReEnc(V
′
2 , R2)).
The intermediate batch V ′2 is published together with commitments to pi1 and pi2 on
the bulletin board. To check correct mixing, the verifier publicly issues a challenge,
Left or Right. If Left, then the mix opens pi1 and R1, if right, then the mix opens
pi2 and R2. The verifier checks the correctness of the output and continues with the
next mix. Malicious mixes are able to generate an intermediate batch but cannot
open it to both sides since they must either compute pi1 and R1 out of pi2, R2, pi,
and R or the other way round.
It follows that a malicious mix still has a chance of 1
2
to replace all encrypted
votes without being detected. Therefore, this process needs to be repeated for
different permutations, decommitment values, and challenges until the probability
of a successful coercion is below a certain value, defined by a security parameter.
Randomized Partial Checking The primary drawback of the standard cut-and-
choose verification process is that it is inefficient in terms of computation and com-
munication. Furthermore, not only the auditors but also the observers, like voters,
have to verify each round making this approach impractical, especially for large-scale
elections.
Randomized Partial Checking reduces the communication and computational
costs by generating only one additional set. The basic idea is that each mix shuﬄes
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its input two times and after the mix-net has completed its computations, it shows
for each element in the intermediate batch either its correct association to one input
element or to one output element (e.g., decided by random coin) [JJR02].
However, this approach has two drawbacks. First, the probability of modifying a
small amount of votes is still quite high. The chance that l replaced votes pass the
verification process without being detected is 1
2l
because just the half of the associ-
ations is checked. Second, as already identified by Chaum in [Cha02], this approach
does not provide voter privacy due to vote clustering. Depending on a coin flip,
the verification procedure either reveals the link between an intermediate ciphertext
and the input (left), or its link with an output ciphertext (right). Assuming, the
coin is fair, 50% of the left associations is opened, and similarly 50% of the right as-
sociations. Hence, on the average K
2
“right” links are not revealed and must belong
to the input ciphertexts whose “left” link was opened and checked. Thus, each vote
is hidden in an anonymity group of size about K
2
.
Furthermore, an analysis of Randomized Partial Checking carried out by Khazaei
et al. [KW13] showed that this approach is vulnerable to several attacks against
both privacy and correctness.
Norwegian Mix-Net Puiggal´ı et al. combined in [AC10] the advantages of Opti-
mistic Mixing and Randomized Partial Checking to improve the existing schemes in
terms of correctness while maintaining voter privacy. Their work was incorporated
into the Norwegian Evote Project[Gov] and used for a limited number of municipal-
ity elections in Norway. The Norwegian Mix-Net works as follows:
1. An independent verifier chooses a permutation at random and applies it to the
set of input votes.
2. The list of votes is divided into n
√
K equally-sized blocks, where n denotes the
number of mixes and K the number of input ciphertexts.
3. For each input block, the first mix shows the corresponding output block,
containing all elements of the associated input block in reencrypted form. The
mix needs knowledge of the permutation used to answers this challenge.
4. All elements of the input block and all elements of the corresponding output
block are multiplied. To show correct shuﬄing, the mix proves that the prod-
uct of the output block is a correct reencryption of the product of the input
block using a zero-knowledge proof. Thus, any observer can verify that the
sum or product of votes encrypted in both sets is equal.
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5. The verifier checks the proofs published by the mix.
6. This process is carried out for each mix. Apart from the first mix, the assign-
ment of input ciphertexts to blocks depends on the previous node’s assignment
ensuring an equal distribution of input ciphertexts over all final output blocks
of the mix-net (similar to the improved Randomized Partial Checking proposed
by Chaum [Cha02]).
To replace votes without being detected, a malicious mix has to modify two votes:
one vote to the preferred candidate and a second vote so that the product remains
the same. Furthermore, the mix has to hope that both ciphertexts end up in the
same block. It follows that the probability of modifying two votes without being
detected is
n√K−1
K−1 (see [AC10] for details).
Regarding privacy, Puiggal´ı et al. state that each output block of the last mix
node is composed of at least one ciphertext of each input block of the first mix
node. However, optimal privacy in the Norwegian Mix-Net is only ensured if all
mixes are honest. But this is not the idea of a mix-net where privacy should already
be provided if at least one single mix is honest. In this case, the size of the anonymity
group is only n
√
K. Furthermore, by carrying out a cryptoanalysis of this approach,
Khazaei et al. identified several flaws [KTW12] which allow replacing some inputs
without being detected and violate privacy of a few voters. Some of the threats result
from the dependency between the output blocks of one mix and the assignment of
the input blocks of its successor.
4.3 Random Block Verification
To prevent the flaws identified for the Norwegian Mix-Net each mix should be verified
independently. Furthermore, to provide optimal voter privacy, an anonymity group
of size K has to be provided. Consequently, the block fragmentation should not
help to associate one output element of the mix-net to a subset of mix-net inputs,
even if only one mix is honest. Thus, first, we propose to build single mixes similar
to Randomized Partial Checking where each mix shuﬄes twice. Consequently, the
verification process is split in two steps: the correct reencryption of the input batch
and the correct reencryption of the intermediate batch. We will refer to this as the
“first” and “second” shuﬄing step. This allows us to build the blocks in the second
shuﬄing step in a way that already for one mix an anonymity group of size K is
provided. Second, we require that each ciphertext is assigned to exactly one block
to prevent overlapping of subsets.
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Notation Using Random Block Verification (RBV) the mix-net has to shuﬄe its
set of input values V = {〈v(i)〉}Ki=1 two times. The output of the first mix M1 is V ′
after the first and V1 after the second shuﬄing step. The output of M1 is the input
to mix M2 which correspondingly outputs V
′
1 after the first and V2 after the second
shuﬄing step.
Verification Process Note that this verification process takes place after each mix
has shuﬄed its input and published its output.
1. After each mix has completed its computations, the set of input ciphertexts is
permuted
V ∗ = Permσ1(V ),
using a randomly chosen permutation σ1.
2. The set of permuted input ciphertexts V ∗ is divided into L := b√Kc blocks
denoted as P In1 , . . . , P
In
L . It follows that we have R := K −L2 blocks of L+ 1
elements and L−R blocks of L elements (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Verification procedure for 8 votes after Step 2
3. For each block P Inl with l ∈ [1, L], mix M1 has to show the corresponding
output block POutl that is composed of the ciphertexts contained in the input
block in reencrypted form (see Figure 4.2). As a consequence, the product
over the elements contained in the output block encrypts the same value than
the product over the elements contained in the input block. More precisely,
assume the input block P Inl contains three ciphertexts u1 = Enc(s1, r1), u2 =
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Enc(s2, r2), and u3 = Enc(s3, r3) encrypting message s1, s2, and s3. Then the
output block POutl , if generated correctly, contains the same three messages,
permuted using permutation pi and reencrypted using some random values
r∗1,r
∗
2, and r
∗
3, i.e., u
∗
pi(1) = Enc(spi(1), rpi(1)+r
∗
pi(1)), u
∗
pi(2) = Enc(spi(2), rpi(2)+r
∗
pi(2)),
and u∗pi(3) = Enc(spi(3), rpi(3) + r
∗
pi(3)). Then, the product over the input blocks
u1·u2·u3 = Enc(s1+s2+s3, r1+r2+r3) encrypts the same value than the product
over the output blocks u∗1 ·u∗2 ·u∗3 = Enc(s1 + s2 + s3, r1 + r∗1 + r2 + r∗2 + r3 + r∗3).
It follows that the product over the output block is a reencryption of the
product over the input block with reencryption value RInl = r
∗
1 + r
∗
2 + r
∗
3.
The association between the input and output blocks is published to provide
universal verifiability.
Figure 4.2: Verification procedure for 8 votes after Step 3
4. M1 has to prove for each block that it has knowledge of the reencryption value
RInl using a zero-knowledge proof of correct reencryption. If, for instance, the
encryption scheme ElGamal is used, possible instantiations are the Chaum-
Pedersen protocol [CP92] and Schorr’s signature scheme [Sch91].
5. After each block has been verified, the output of the second shuﬄing step V1
needs to be checked. Furthermore, the blocks must be assigned such that the
reencryption of each input of the mix can be contained in each output block.
Thus, in the second verification step the division of the input ciphertexts
always depends on the blocks built in the first verification step. More precisely,
the set of input values V ′ is divided into L blocks in a way that each input
4.4 Analysis and Comparison 41
block P In
′
l contains at least one ciphertext of each of the L output blocks P
Out
l
(see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Verification procedure for 8 votes after Step 5
6. Mix M1 proves for each output block P
Out′
l that there is an input block P
In′
l
such that the product of the ciphertexts contained in each block encrypt the
same set of votes and that it has knowledge of the corresponding reencryption
value RIn
′
l (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Verification procedure for 8 votes after Step 6
7. Step 1 to 6 are repeated for all mixes.
4.4 Analysis and Comparison
In this section we analyze Random Block Verification with respect to correctness,
privacy, and efficiency and compare our approach with Randomized Partial Check-
ing, Proof of Subproduct, and the Norwegian Mix-Net.
4.4.1 Correctness
The Random Block Verification procedure is not perfect since an error (e.g., changing
a 1 to a 3) can be counterbalanced (e.g., 1 + 4 = 3 + 2) and pass without being
detected. However, to achieve an undetected corruption, a malicious mix has to
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change (drop, alter, insert) at least two ciphertexts to ensure that the introduced
error is balanced. This will remain undetected only if both adapted ciphertexts end
up in the same block. Since the assignment to blocks is not known during shuﬄing,
a malicious mix cannot ensure this. Below, we investigate the probability that 2
modified ciphertexts end up in the same block by chance.
Correctness of our approach can be estimated similarly to the Norwegian Mix-
Net since the only difference is the blocksize used which is
√
K instead of n
√
K for
n mixes and K ciphertexts. It follows that the probability of a malicious mix to
modify 2 votes without being detected is around
√
K−1
K−1 . Note that in reality, it is
slightly better as some blocks are smaller than others.
Thus, Random Block Verification provides a better correctness than Randomized
Partial Checking and Proof of Subproduct. With respect to the Norwegian Mix-Net
the size of the blocks in our verification process does not depend on the number of
mixes n and is larger for n > 1 (which is usually the case). Thus, the Norwegian
Mix-Net is slightly better with respect to correctness since for smaller blocks it is
less likely that two ciphertexts end up in the same block.
4.4.2 Privacy
In Random Block Verification, each mix shuﬄes twice and during verification the K
ciphertexts are assigned to
√
K blocks. So, after the first verification step, the size
of the anonymity group (AG) is around
√
K. However, the blocks for the second
verification step are built such that they include at least6 one ciphertext of each of
the output blocks of the first verification step. Therefore, to trace the ciphertext
through the second verification step, all input blocks need to be considered and the
anonymity group has size K.
Compared to common generic verification procedures, like Randomized Partial
Checking, Proof of Subproduct, and the Norwegian Mix-Net, Random Block Veri-
fication is the only verification process that prevents vote clustering. Furthermore,
since in Random Block Verification the assignment for different mixes is indepen-
dent from each other, this solution is not prone to the attacks identified by Khazaei
et al.
6If
√
K 6∈ N, exactly one ciphertext per block is not possible. However, our approach remains as
close as possible to that ideal.
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4.4.3 Efficiency
In this section the different approaches are compared regarding efficiency. The
computational costs of the verification procedure highly depend on the encryption
scheme and zero-knowledge proof of correct reencryption used. In general, the more
elements to be checked, the higher the number of operations needed. Thus, the
computational costs per mix are estimated by the number of zero-knowledge proofs
of correct reencryption that have to be carried out. It follows that Proof of Sub-
product is the most efficient scheme since here the correct reencyption of maximal
five blocks have to be shown.
Using Randomized Partial Checking half the links of each shuﬄing step are
checked leading to K zero-knowledge proofs. Since we do not show the correct
reencryption of each element but of blocks, our approach is more efficient. More
precisely, the number of blocks checked using Random Block Verification depends on
the size of the input set and is 2 Kb√Kc for K inputs and both verification steps. Note
that many implementations reveal the reencryption value used instead of proving
their knowledge. This is a possible speed up for our approach as well. Nevertheless,
the impact of this approach on the security of the verification procedure has not
been elaborated so far which is why we do not consider this here. In the Norwegian
Mix-Net the efficiency depends on the number of mixes and input ciphertexts. For
n mixes and K inputs Kn√K blocks are generated and corresponding
K
n√K reencryption
proofs are needed. This makes our scheme also more efficient than the Norwegian
Mix-Net (if more than one mix is used).
4.4.4 Summary
Random Block Verification and cut-and-choose are the only generic verification pro-
cedures that prevent vote clustering. Although our approach enforces that each mix
has to shuﬄe, reencrypt, and show correct processing of its input set two times,
Random Block Verification is still significantly more efficient than cut-and-choose
and can also be used for large scale elections. For 1000 votes 31 blocks are generated
and thus only 62 proofs of correct reencryption have to be carried out during the
verification process. This makes our approach even more efficient than Randomized
Partial Checking and the Norwegian Mix-Net.
Furthermore, our approach provides strong assurance that the input batch was
processed correctly, i.e., all votes are contained in the output batch. Having, for
instance, 1000 votes, a malicious mix will be detected with a probability of 0.9697.
Table 4.2 provides and overview of the comparison of Random Block Verification
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Table 4.2: Comparison for K ciphertexts and a total number of n mixes regarding cor-
rectness (1 ciphertext for RPC and 2 for the other, optimistic mixing based, approaches),
privacy, and efficiency per mix node
RPC PoS NM RBV
Correctness (P (undetected)) 1
2
5
8
α n
√
K−1
K−1
√
K−1
K−1
Privacy (|AG| for one honest mix) ∼ K
2
K
2α
n
√
K K
Efficiency (# ZK-proofs) K 5 2 Kn√K 2
K
b√Kc
(RBV) with Randomized Partial Checking (RPC), Proof of Subproduct (PoS), and
the Norwegian Mix-Net (NM) with respect to correctness, privacy, and efficiency.
5 Universally Verifiable Mix-Net Pro-
viding Everlasting Privacy
In all known proposals for universally verifiable mix-nets, the audit information is
encrypted using some public key encryption algorithm, like ElGamal or Paillier,
that are assumed to be computationally hard. However, when the underlying cryp-
tographic assumption is broken for the key length chosen, perhaps decades later, all
the audit information can be decrypted and privacy is violated: each output message
published can be traced back to its input. With current trends in technology, like
quantum computers, such a scenario is realistic. Furthermore, the costs for storing
information are decreasing making it virtually impossible to remove (encrypted) in-
formation that has been published on the internet. In addition, processing power
increases continually following Moore’s law. So all an attacker has to do is to wait
until the cryptographic assumption for the parameters used is broken, download
the audit information from some internet archive, and decrypt it. In other words,
the privacy offered by current implementations of mix-nets has an (often unknown)
expiration date.
To address this problem, in this chapter we show how the standard shuﬄing
process, described in Section 4.1, can be upgraded to provide everlasting (or uncon-
ditional) privacy. The underlying idea is to replace the homomorphic encryptions in
the public audit trail with unconditionally hiding and homomorphic commitments.
These commitments are rerandomized and permuted by each mix in a publicly ver-
ifiable manner. In parallel, their opening values are encrypted with a compatible
homomorphic algorithm, reencrypted, permuted, and sent between the mixes over
a private channel. Since an unconditionally hiding commitment can be a commit-
ment to any value of the message space with the same probability, such auxiliary
information is needed to open the commitments. Thus, for robustness it must be
ensured that the permutations and rerandomization values used in the public and
in the private channel are the same. The content of this chapter is published in
[BDG13].
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5.1 Mixing with Everlasting Privacy Towards the
Public
5.1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Our mix-net uses the following cryptographic schemes and zero-knowledge proofs.
Homomorphic Commitment with Matching Encryption Scheme
The protocol uses two cryptographic primitives. First, a commitment scheme
(GenCom,Com,Unv), as defined in Section 2.2.2, in order to provide everlasting pri-
vacy and universal verifiability towards the public. Second, a matching encryption
scheme (GenEnc,Enc,Dec), as defined in Section 2.2.1, that allows opening the com-
mitment at the end of the reencryption mixing process and at the same time provides
privacy towards the authorities.
Note that, because both the vote s ∈ M and the decommitment value t ∈ R
have to be sent over the private channel, we need two instances of the encryption
scheme. One, denoted as (GenEncM,EncM,DecM), which must be homomorphic
over the message space M. The second one, denoted as (GenEncR,EncR,DecR),
whose message space is homomorphic over group R of the commitment scheme.
It follows that, having two commitments u = Com(s, t) and u′ = Com(s′, t′) and
the corresponding opening values in encrypted form v = EncM(s), w = EncR(t), v′ =
EncM(s′), and w′ = EncR(t′), then the encrypted opening values of two multiplied
commitments
u · u′ = Com(s+ s′, t+ t′)
can be computed by multiplying the encryptions, i.e.,
v · v′ = EncM(s) · EncM(s′) = EncM(s+ s′)
w · w′ = EncR(t) · EncR(t′) = EncR(t+ t′)
This allows us to rerandomize a commitment
ReRand(u, t′) = u · Com(0M, t′) = Com(s, t) · Com(0M, t′) = Com(s, t+ t′)
and adapt the encrypted opening values correspondingly
ReEnc(v) = v · EncM(0M, r′′) = EncM(s, r) · EncM(0M, r′′) = EncM(s, r + r′′)
ReAdj(w, t′) = w · EncR(t′, r′′′) = EncR(t, r′) · EncR(t′, r′′′) = EncR(t+ t′, r′ + r′′′).
5.1 Mixing with Everlasting Privacy Towards the Public 47
There are some instantiations that satisfy these properties. Moran and Naor, for
instance, show in [MN10, Appendix A] that Paillier encryptions can be used in
combination with slightly modified Pedersen commitments.
However, because of Paillier this instantiation is impractical for large elections.
More interesting is therefore the recent suggestion of Cuvelier et al. [CPP13] for an
efficient unconditionally hiding commitment scheme with matching homomorphic
encryption scheme based on elliptic curves. Used in combination with the non-
interactive proof (or rather, argument) techniques, proposed by Groth [Gro10] or
Lipmaa and Zhang [LZ12] this leads to a very efficient instantiation.
Proof of Correct Shuﬄing and Consistency
In addition to the proofs of correct shuﬄing (see Section 2.2.3) this mix-net uses
proofs of consistency: each mix has to privately prove that the encrypted informa-
tion and the commitments contained in the output are consistent. More precisely, it
has to show that the same permutation and random values have been used to reran-
domize the published commitments and to reencrypt the corresponding encrypted
opening values. Note that in order to provide everlasting privacy, the published
proof showing correct shuﬄing of the commitments has to be perfect or statistical
zero-knowledge. More precisely, it must be guaranteed that if the proof of correct
shuﬄing published by the prover is correct, even a computationally unbounded au-
ditor cannot learn more than that. The requirements for the proof of consistency
can be weakened to computational zero-knowledge because the verification process
is carried out in private and used to show consistency between commitments and
encryptions.
The concrete proofs of correct shuﬄing and consistency depend on the used instan-
tiations of the encryption and commitment schemes. As mentioned before, for some
instantiations correct shuﬄing can be shown using the perfect zero-knowledge argu-
ments proposed by Groth or Lipmaa and Zhang. Furthermore, also the generic proof
presented in Chapter 4 is applicable. Care must be take that the zero-knowledge
proof of correct reencryption used to show correct processing of each block is per-
fect zero-knowledge as well. This can be accomplished by applying, for instance,
the “Zero-Knowledge Proof That Two Commitments Are Equivalent” presented in
[MN10, Appendix B.1]. This proof can also be used to show consistency between
the commitments and encryptions. If u = Com(s, t) is a commitment to vote s
with opening value t and v = EncM(s, r) and w = EncR(t, r′) are the corresponding
opening values in encrypted form, then consistency can be shown by the following
verification process:
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1. The prover privately chooses random values s′ ∈ M, t′ ∈ R, and r′′, r′′′ ∈ R′.
Then he or she generates a second set
u′ = Com(s+ s′, t+ t′)
v′ = EncM(s+ s′, r + r′′)
w′ = EncR(t+ t′, r′ + r′′′)
and sends the triple 〈u′, v′, w′〉 to the auditor.
2. The auditor challenges “0” or “1”.
3. If “0”, then the prover reveals s′, t′, r′′, and r′′′. Now the auditor checks
whether:
u′ ?= u · Com(s′, t′)
v′ ?= v · EncM(s′, r′′)
w′ ?= w · EncR(t′, r′′′)
4. If “1”, then the prover reveals s+ s′, t+ t′, r+ r′′, and r′+ r′′′ and the auditor
verifies whether:
u′ ?= Com(s+ s′, t+ t′)
v′ ?= EncM(s+ s′, r + r′′)
w′ ?= EncR(t+ t′, r′ + r′′′)
If two different values for s or t were used in u, v, and w, then this will be de-
tected with probability 1
2
unless the prover can solve the computational problem of
the cryptographic primitives used. This process is repeated several times until the
probability of not being detected is below a certain threshold value. To reduce the
communication between the prover and the auditor, a non-interactive version of this
process can be obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir technique [FS86].
5.1.2 Additional Assumptions and Roles
The roles are the same listed in Section 4.1.1: Users, Mixes, Key Trustees, Author-
ities, Auditors, and Observers. Like the standard verifiable reencryption mix-net,
this protocol makes use of a bulletin board to publish the audit information and a
trusted Random Beacon to generate the random challenge bits.
Apart from Assumptions (M.1) to (M.4) presented in Section 4.1.2, we make the
following additional assumptions:
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Assumption M.5 The authorities cannot break the computationally binding prop-
erty of the commitment scheme for the parameters chosen before the whole
mixing process is completed, that is, the votes have been published and certi-
fied.
Assumption M.6 There exists a private channel between the voters and the first
mix M1 of the mix-net, between each mix and its successor in the mix-net,
and between the last mix and the key trustees.
Assumption M.7 After the protocol has been certified all authorities destroy all
information private to them.
5.1.3 Improved Reencryption Mixing Process
In this section we describe how the standard reencryption mixing process can be
upgraded to provide everlasting privacy.
Phase I: Vote submission To submit a vote s ∈ M encoded with randomness t,
during the vote casting process a triple
(u, v, w) = (Com(s, t),EncM(s),EncR(t))
is generated. In addition, for each vote, it must be ensured that the s and
t used in all three components are the same by a proof of consistency (see
Section 5.1.1). The triple (u, v, w) is sent over a private channel to M1.
The input batch of the first mix consists of all triples received ordered in some
canonical way (e.g., lexicographical order) and is denoted as (U0, V0,W0). The
public part of the input batch, U0, is published on the bulletin board.
Phase II: The mixing process We now describe the shuﬄing procedure for K in-
puts and a mix-net consisting of n mixes M1,M2, . . . ,Mn. The input batch of
Mj is defined as the output batch of the preceding mix Mj−1, except that the
input to the first mix are the votes submitted by the voters. In addition, the
output batch of the last mix, Mn, will be sent to the key trustees. In other
respects, the shuﬄing procedure for each mix is identical.
1. Let the input batch of mix Mj be (Uj−1, Vj−1,Wj−1). Then Mj reran-
domizes the commitment vector
U ′j = ReRand(Uj−1, Tj) = Uj−1 · Com(0, Tj),
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it reencrypts the vector of encryptions of the votes
V ′j = ReEnc(Vj−1) = Vj−1 · Enc(0, R),
and, through homomorphic encryption, updates the decommit value
W ′j = ReAdj(Wj−1, Tj) = Wj−1 · EncR(Tj, R′).
2. To obtain the output batch, Mj chooses a random permutation pij and
sets
(Uj, Vj,Wj) = Permpij(U
′
j, V
′
j ,W
′
j).
3. The commitments Uj are sent to the bulletin board, whereas the cor-
responding encryptions Vj and Wj are sent to Mj+1 through a private
channel.
4. Mj proves, in a publicly verifiable way, that Uj is a recoding and per-
mutation of Uj−1. This proof of correct shuﬄing can be verified by the
auditors and any observer.
5. Mj provides a proof of consistency and correct shuﬄing to Mj+1 showing
that the output batch is a consistent rerandomization and permutation
of the entire input batch, i.e., it shows that it knows some permutation
pij and some vector of random values R, R
′ ∈ R and Tj ∈M such that
(Uj, Vj,Wj) = Permpij(U
′
j, V
′
j ,W
′
j)
= Permpij(Uj−1 · Com(0, Tj), Vj−1 · Enc(0, R),Wj−1 · EncR(Tj, R′)).
Note that the key trustees verify the output of the last mix Mn.
Phase III: Decoding and publication of the votes The key trustees compute and
publish S∗ = Dec(Vn) and T ∗ = Dec(Wn).
Observe that due to the homomorphic properties and to the fact that the same
permutations pij have been used in the public and private network, we have
that S∗ and T ∗ are the values to open Un, that is, Un = Com(S∗, T ∗).
Phase IV: Certification of the output The auditors verify whether Un = Com(S∗, T ∗).
If this condition holds, and all public proofs of correct shuﬄing hold, then they
certify the output. Table 5.1 summarizes the improved mixing process.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the mixing process providing everlasting privacy towards the
public with commitment scheme C and encryption algorithm EM and ER.
input from voters Mix j, for j ∈ [1, n] output decoding
public U0 = C(S0, T0) Uj = Permpij(Uj−1 · C(0, Tj)) Un Un ?= C(S∗, T ∗)
private V0 = EM(S0) Vj = Permpij(Vj−1 · EM(0)) Vn S∗ = DM(Vn)
private W0 = ER(T0) Wj = Permpij(Wj−1 · ER(Tj)) Wn T ∗ = DR(Wn).
5.2 Properties and Proofs
5.2.1 Correctness, Individual and Universal Verifiability
For proving correctness, we need to show that the mixes did not change any of
the votes. In other words, we need to show that S0 ≡ Sn, where ≡ stands for
the existence of a permutation that maps S0 to Sn. In our case, correctness does
not follow straightaway from existing proofs of mixing schemes since these are all
based on encryption, implying that the vote s is unambiguously defined. whereas
our scheme uses unconditionally hiding commitments to encode the votes. Since
we want correctness to be universally verifiable while preserving everlasting privacy,
only the public information can be used. The auxiliary information sent over the
private channels only serves to help the key trustees to decode, but are not open to
the public.
We will show that, as long as the key trustees can open the commitments that are
published by the last mix, i.e., the values S∗ and T ∗ such that Un = Com(S∗, T ∗),
then S0 ≡ Sn. In other words, we show that for correctness it is completely irrelevant
how the key trustees obtained S∗ and T ∗. This is a consequence of the fact that
the commitment scheme used is computationally binding. Our prove is by way
of contradiction, showing that if after running the protocol the output Sn 6≡ S0,
then there exists an efficient algorithm violating the binding property by computing
a commitment u that can be opened to two distinct values: u = Com(τ1, σ1) =
Com(τ2, σ2).
Theorem 1. Let S0 = 〈s0(1) . . . s0(K)〉 be the batch of votes as submitted by the
voters, and let Sn = 〈sn(1) . . . sn(K)〉 be the set of votes published by the last mix
Mn. Then, under Assumption M.5, and with overwhelming probability, S0 ≡ Sn,
even if all authorities conspire to act maliciously.
Proof: Let us first consider the case that there is only one mix, so n = 1. Suppose
that M1 has a strategy A allowing it to create an output batch U1 such that S0 6≡ S1.
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We show how A can be used to create an algorithm B that on input τ0 returns
u, σ0, τ1, σ1 such that u = Com(τ0, σ0) = Com(τ1, σ1).
B, on input τ0, creates an input batch by committing to τ0 using K different values
t0(i), that is, U0 = 〈Com(τ0, t0(i))〉. Recall that Com is unconditionally hiding, so
a poly-time restricted A cannot distinguish this specially constructed input from
any arbitrary input. So by assumption, S1 now contains at least one τ1 such that
τ1 6= τ0. Let i1 be the index of τ1 in S1. Then we have ui1 = Com(τ1, σ1). Since we
know that M1 on executing its strategy A passed a proof of knowledge successfully,
M1 must know (must be able to extract from A), except with negligible probability,
a permutation pi1 between U0 and U1, which it can make available to B. Define
i0 = pi
−1
1 (i1), the preimage of i1 under pi1. Again because of the proof of knowledge,
B knows a random number t1(i0) such that u1(pi1(i0)) = u0(i0) · Com(0, t1(i0)) =
Com(τ0 +0, t0(i0)+ t1(i0)). But at the same time, u1(pi1(i0)) = u1(i1) = Com(τ1, σ1).
So by setting σ0 = t0(i0) + t1(i0), poly-time B has found a commitment u that can
be opened in two different ways, contradicting Assumption (M.5).
This argument for one mix can be generalized to a mix of arbitrary size n and
an arbitrary coalition of cheating mixes. B can perfectly simulate the behavior of
the honest mixes, implying that for each mix Mj, honest or corrupted, the permu-
tation pij and the random values Sj can be computed. Let in be the index with
uin = Com(τ1, σ1) such that τ1 6= τ0. Trace τ1 back through the mix-net by defining
recursively ij−1 = pi−1j (j). So ij is the index of τ1 in mix Mj. This means that
σ0 = t
∗(in) =
∑n
j=0 tj(ij) can be computed, and we have found τ0, σ0, τ1, σ1 such
that uin = Com(τ0, σ0) = Com(τ1, σ1), again a contradiction.2
Note that, because of the audit information published during all the mixing steps,
any observer can perform the checks. This, together with the fact that the ran-
domness of the challenge bit is guaranteed by the auditors, means that the protocol
is universally verifiable. Furthermore, individual verifiability follows, simply
because of the fact that all voters can check that their input u0 appears on the
bulletin board.
5.2.2 Privacy
Theorem 2. Under Assumption M.2, the public view, consisting of all the input and
output batches of the respective mixes together with the proofs and the information
published by the key trustees, reveals no information that allows to link a receipt to
a vote cast.
Proof: If at least one mix is honest and keeps the used permutation secret, then
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privacy follows from the fact that the output batch Sn is an unknown permutation
of the input batch, S0. Even a computationally unbounded attacker cannot obtain
any additional information, since the commitments used to encode the votes are
unconditionally hiding and all used proofs provide perfect zero-knowledge.
5.2.3 Robustness
Theorem 3. The output of the mix-net can be decoded as long as the consistency
of the ballots and the private output set of each mix has been verified.
Proof: It is clear from the construction that if everybody is honest, then the
process must always succeed. Now let us first assume that all the ballots are con-
structed correctly. Each mix processes its input set and proves correctness of the
output to the successor. More precisely, each mix shows that it has knowledge of
the permutation and the values used for reencrypting and rerandomizing the input
set. Furthermore, they prove that the same recoding values have been used to reran-
domize the commitments on the public channel and the encryptions on the private
channel. If cheating is detected, the malicious mix or the whole mix-net can simply
be replaced.
To avoid that a mix can lie about its private input towards the verifiers, we
ask each mix to sign its output. Thus, a verifier can check the authenticity of
the input batch. Note that the digital signature scheme used does not need to
be information-theoretically secure. In addition to the signature, after the ballot
preparation process, the consistency of the public data, i.e., the ballots, and the
private data, i.e., the encrypted opening values, must be verified.
5.3 Everlasting Privacy Towards the Authorities
The purpose of the protocol presented in the last section is to introduce a reencryp-
tion mix-net that provides everlasting privacy towards the public. However, a weak
point in this protocol is the following: the mixes process the triple (u, v, w), where v
is an encryption of the vote s. Although private channels are used to communicate
the encrypted opening values, this protects the voters from outsiders, but not from
the first mix, who will be able to recover s once the computational assumption is
broken.
If this is unacceptable, a possible solution is to have several mix-nets in parallel
(instead of just one) and have the voters split their votes in various parts and submit
each part to a different mix-net. As long as none of the first mixes nor any of their
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verifiers share their information with one mix of each mix-net, the privacy of the
submitted vote is guaranteed unconditionally.
A problem that arises here is how to match shares that come out of the various
mix-nets, needed to recombine the complete vote. We solve this by supposing that
a voter submits each share labeled with the same, randomly chosen identification
number r, which should be chosen large enough to avoid collision. Since these rs
cannot be public (to prevent any of the first mixes or its verifier from tracing back a
vote), the vote s and the random identity r are encoded in separate commitments.
These are published on the bulletin board and the decommitment values are sent,
together with the opening values of the corresponding votes, towards the private
mix-nets. After all data have been anonymized by the mix-nets, a new authority Z
matches the shares with the help of the key trustees and the rs.
The same identification number should appear in each of the output batches of the
various mixes and Z should therefore be able to match shares coming from the same
voter, reconstruct the vote, and publish it. In addition, Z can use the published
commitments to convince the auditors and observers that the tuples were matched
correctly by using a proof of knowledge of the corresponding value r.
5.3.1 Mixing Process Providing Everlasting Privacy Towards the
Authorities
We describe the protocol for K inputs and m mix-nets consisting of n mixes with
mix-net l ∈ [1,m] denoted as Ml,1,Ml,2, . . . ,Ml,n.
Phase I: Vote submission An encoded vote s consists of the tuple
(u, v, w, x, y) = (Com(s, t),EncM(s),EncR(t),Com(r, t′),EncR(t′)),
where u is the commitment to the vote, v and w the corresponding opening
values in encrypted form, x a commitment to the identification number r, and
y its encrypted decommmitment value t′.
1. The voter generates a random number r ∈M.
2. During the vote casting process, the voter splits vote s and the decom-
mitment values t and t′ in m shares such that:
t = t1 + t2 + · · ·+ tm
t′ = t′1 + t
′
2 + · · ·+ t′m
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s = s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sm
Note that prior to the vote casting process, a subset of ballots must be
checked to ensure that r and the shares of s, t, and t′ are consistent in
the commitments and encryptions.
3. The input to mix l
(ul, vl, wl, xl, yl) = (Com(sl, tl),EncM(sl),EncR(tl),Com(r, t′l),EncR(t
′
l))
is sent to the first mix Ml,1 using a private channel.
The input batch of the first mixMl,1 of mix-net l is denoted as (Ul, Vl,Wl, Xl, Yl)
and the public part Ul and Xl is published together with some receipt identi-
fication number on the bulletin board. The voters can and should verify that
all shares of their vote appears unmodified, exercising their right to individual
verifiability.
Phase II: Mixing Each mix-net l mixes its input batch, consisting of K inputs,
similar to the process described in Section 5.1.3.
1. The input batch of mix j of mix-net l is (Ul,j−1, Vl,j−1,Wl,j−1, Xl,j−1, Yl,j−1).
Mix Ml,j generates (U
′
l,j, V
′
l,j,W
′
l,j, X
′
l,j, Y
′
l,j) by computing:
U ′l,j = ReRand(Ul,j−1, Tl,j)
V ′l,j = ReEnc(Vl,j−1)
W ′l,j = ReAdj(Wl,j−1, Tl,j)
X ′l,j = ReRand(Xl,j−1, T
′
l,j)
Y ′l,j = ReAdj(Yl,j−1, T
′
l,j)
2. To obtain the output batch, Ml,j chooses a random permutation pil,j and
shuﬄes the data
(Ul,j, Vl,j,Wl,j, Xl,j, Yl,j) = Permpil,j(U
′
l,j, V
′
l,j,W
′
l,j, X
′
l,j, Y
′
l,j).
3. The pair of commitments (Ul,j, Xl,j) is published on the bulletin board,
whereas the corresponding private encryptions Vl,j, Wl,j, and Yl,j are sent
to the next mix Ml,j+1 through a private channel.
4. Ml,j−1 uses a proof of correct shuﬄing to prove towards the public that
both sets, Ul,j and Xl,j, are a correct rerandomization and permutation
of the corresponding input batch Ul,j−1 and Xl,j−1, respectively.
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5. Ml,j−1 privately proves knowledge of the permutation pil,j and the random
values used to reencrypt the commitments and encryptions such that
(Ul,j, Vl,j,Wl,j, Xl,j, Yl,j) = Permpil,j(U
′
l,j, V
′
l,j,W
′
l,j, X
′
l,j, Y
′
l,j)
= Permpil,j(ReRand(Ul,j−1, Tl,j),ReEnc(Vl,j−1),ReAdj(Wl,j−1, Tl,j),
ReRand(Xl,j−1, T ′l,j),ReAdj(Yl,j−1, T
′
l,j)).
Phase III: Decoding and publication of the votes The tuple
(Ul,n, Vl,n,Wl,n, Xl,n, Yl,n) is considered the final output of mix-net l.
1. With the help of the key trustees, Z decrypts:
S∗l = Dec(Vl,n)
T ∗l = Dec(Wl,n)
T ′∗l = Dec(Yl,n)
Afterwards, Z computes R∗l = Xl,n · Com(0,−T ′∗l ) for l ∈ [1,m] which
should decrypt to K equal sets of random numbers R∗, showing the cor-
respondence between tuples coming from the same voter.
2. Z publishes this correspondence on the bulletin board in the form of a
permutations σl from (U1,n, X1,n) to (Ul,n, Xl,n).
3. Z privately computes
S∗ = S∗1 + σ2(S
∗
2) + · · ·+ σl(S∗l )
T ∗ = T ∗1 + σ2(T
∗
2 ) + · · ·+ σl(T ∗l )
which are the values to open
U∗ = U1,n · σ2(U2,n) · . . . · σl(Ul,n)
= Com(S∗1 , T
∗
1 ) · Com(σ2(S∗2), σ2(T ∗2 )) · . . . · Com(σl(S∗l ), σl(T ∗l ))
= Com(S∗1 + σ2(S
∗
2) + . . .+ σl(S
∗
l ), T
∗
1 + σ2(T
∗
2 ) + . . .+ σl(T
∗
l ))
4. For l ∈ [2,m], Z also publishes a proof that the commitments
X1,n, . . . , σl(Xl,n)
commit to the same identification number R∗1, i.e.,
X1,n = Com(R
∗
1, T
′∗
1 ), . . . , σl(Xl,n) = Com(R
∗
1, σl(T
′∗
l )).
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This can be done by proving knowledge of “rerandomization value” σl(T
′∗
l )−
T ′∗1 and permutation σl, because
X1,n = Com(R
∗
1, T
′∗
1 ) · Com(0, σl(T ′∗l )− T ′∗1 )
= Com(R∗1 + 0, T
′∗
1 + σl(T
′∗
l )− T ′∗1 )
= Com(R∗1, σl(T
′∗
l ))
= σl(Xl,n)
Phase IV: Certification of the output The auditors verify whether
U∗ ?= Com(S∗, T ∗).
If this condition holds, and all public proofs of correct shuﬄing hold, then
they certify the output. Table 5.2 shows the mixing process for two mix-nets
containing of three mixes.
5.3.2 Properties
Correctness, Individual Verifiability, and Universal Verifiability can be shown
similar to the proof in Section 5.2.1. The only difference is that Z has to prove that
votes coming from the same voter have been matched correctly. As mentioned, this
is accomplished by a proof of knowledge which shows that when Z matches, shares
coming from different mixes have the same r (see Phase III Section 5.3.1).
With respect to privacy, we claim that under the additional assumption that the
publication authority Z does not share its information with any of the first mixes
or its verifiers, nor does one of the first mixes or its verifier collaborate with one mix
of each mix-net, privacy is also unconditional towards the authorities. But if they
do share information then, as long as a sufficient number of key trustees are honest,
they still need to break the encryption algorithm Enc.
For robustness, if all parties are honest then the protocol terminates successfully,
unless for two ballots the same r is chosen, which is an extremely unlikely event.
Furthermore, for poll-site voting schemes this can be prevented because the rs are
generated by the authorities during the ballot preparation process. Observe that
when secret sharing is used, inconsistent IDs can be submitted, for instance, u1 =
Com(r, t′1) to the first mix of the first mix-net and ui = Com(r
′, t′i) to the remaining
i−1 mix-nets, where r 6= r′. However, note that in poll-site voting systems the ballot
papers are generated by the authorities and a set of ballots is publicly audited. Thus,
if inconsistent ballots were generated, this would most likely be detected during the
auditing procedure.
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Table 5.2: Mixing process for two mix-nets Mj , where j ∈ [1, 2], containing of three
mixes Aj , Bj , and Cj with commitment scheme C, encryption algorithm EM and ER, key
trustees K, matching authority Z, and bulletin board BB.
private channel public channel public channel private channel
Voter privately splits s = s1 + s2, t = t1 + t2, and t
′ = t′1 + t
′
2
v1 = EM(s1) u1 = C(s1, t1) u2 = C(s2, t2) v2 = EM(s2)
w1 = ER(t1) w2 = ER(t2)
y1 = ER(t′1) x1 = C(r, t
′
1) x2 = C(r, t
′
2) y2 = ER(t
′
2)
send to A1 send to BB send to BB send to A2
A1’s input batch A2’s input batch
v1, w1, y1 u1, x1 u2, x2 v2, w2, y2
vA1 = v1EM(0) uA1 = u1C(0, tA1) uA2 = u2C(0, tA2) vA2 = v2EM(0)
wA1 = w1ER(tA1) wA2 = w2ER(tA2)
yA1 = y1ER(t′A1) xA1 = x1C(0, t
′
A1) xA2 = x2C(0, t
′
A2) yA2 = y2ER(t
′
A2)
send to B1 send to BB send to BB send to B2
B1’s input batch B2’s input batch
vA1, wA1, yA1 uA1, xA1 uA2, xA2 vA2, wA2, yA2
vB1 = vA1EM(0) uB1 = uA1C(0, tB1) uB2 = uA2C(0, tB2) vB2 = vA2EM(0)
wB1 = wA1ER(tB1) wB2 = wA2ER(tB2)
yB1 = yA1ER(t′B1) xB1 = xA1C(0, t
′
B1) xB2 = xA2C(0, t
′
B2) yB2 = yA2ER(t
′
B2)
send to C1 send to BB send to BB send to C2
C1’s input batch C2’s input batch
vB1, wB1, yB1 uB1, xB1 uB2, xB2 vB2, wB1, yB2
vC1 = vB1EM(0) uC1 = uB1C(0, tC1) uC2 = uB2C(0, tC2) vC2 = vB2ER(0)
wC1 = wB1ER(tC1) wC2 = wB2ER(tC2)
yC1 = yB1ER(t′C1) xC1 = xB1C(0, t
′
C1) xC2 = xB2C(0, t
′
C2) yC2 = yB2ER(t
′
C2)
send to Z send to BB send to BB send to Z
Z’s input batch
vC1, wC1, yC1 uC1, xC1 uC2, xC2 vC2, wC2, yC2
K and Z privately decrypt K and Z privately decrypt
yC1 → t′∗1 = t′1 + t′A1 + t′B1 + t′C1 yC2 → t′∗2 = t′2 + t′A2 + t′B2 + t′C2
Z privately decodes xC1 → C(r, 0) Z privately decodes xC2 → C(r, 0)
Z privately matches the random identities C(r, 0)
Z publishes the correspondence as permutation σ
Z proves correct matching by showing knowledge of t′∗2 − t′∗1
Z privately computes u∗ = uC1σ(uC2)
Z privately computes v∗ = vC1σ(vC2)
Z privately computes w∗ = wC1σ(wC2)
K and Z privately decrypt v∗ → s∗
K and Z privately decrypt w∗ → t∗ = t1 + tA1 + tB1 + tC1 + t2 + tA2 + tB2 + tC2
Z publishes uC1, σ(uC2), s∗, t∗
Z and the auditors verify that u∗ = uC1σ(uC2) = C(s∗, t∗)
6 Mixing Based Voting Schemes Pro-
viding Everlasting Privacy
In this chapter we show how a mixing based voting system can be upgraded to
provide everlasting privacy. We do so by describing how the mix-nets presented in
Section 5 can be applied to the voting systems Preˆt a` Voter and Split-Ballot. The
results of this section were partially published in [DHG+13].
We start in Section 6.1 with Preˆt a` Voter because this is one of the best explored
electronic voting systems which provides verifiability on the one hand but a familiar
and easy way of paper voting one the other hand. Furthermore, this system is
planned to be used in the Victoria State Election in Australia in 2014 [BCH+12a,
BCH+12b].
With the mix-net described in Section 5.1 Preˆt a` Voter can be improved such that
it provides everlasting privacy towards the public. However, to ensure this towards
the authorities as well, additional organizational measures are needed. Thus, in Sec-
tion 6.2 we discuss how Split-Ballot can be used together with the mix-net described
in Section 5.3. Since the ballot paper layout of this scheme allows for secret sharing,
we can build a voting system that offers everlasting privacy towards both the public
and the authorities.
6.1 Preˆt a` Voter Providing Everlasting Privacy
Since its introduction in 2004 [RB04], Preˆt a` Voter has been continuously developed
and improved. In [RBH+09], for instance, Ryan et al. describe the key elements and
compare two approaches that use different cryptographic primitives. In [RP10] a
threat analysis is carried out and enhancements are proposed and in [XCH+10] Xia
et al. show how various election methods can be handled. Furthermore, the authors
of [DHR+11] analyze the feasibility of Preˆt a` Voter for German Federal Elections
from a technical and legal point of view. However, despite the numerous publications
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about Preˆt a` Voter, this is the first work addressing the aspect of everlasting privacy.
When using a paper based poll-site voting system the mix-net cannot be simply
replaced. In this case it is necessary to elaborate how the ballots are generated
and printed and how the votes cast can be decoded and counted. Thus, in this
section a technical solution for Preˆt a` Voter is described and evaluated regarding
the properties verifiability, everlasting privacy, and robustness.
6.1.1 System Overview of the Classic Scheme
Roles
In addition to the roles listed in Section 4.1.1, the following parties participate in
the election process.
Head of the election committee The head of the election committee is responsi-
ble for the correct execution of the election procedures. He or she, for instance,
opens and closes the vote casting process, overviews the counting of votes, and
announces the election result of the constituency.
Poll workers The poll workers (also called election committee) assist the head of the
election committee during the election procedures, for instance, by checking
the eligibility of the voters, handing out ballot papers in the polling station,
and supervising the vote casting and auditing process.
Help Organization Help organizations support voters in performing the verification
processes.
Clerks The set of clerks is a subset of authorities that generate the ballot data in
distributed fashion.
Authorities The set of authorities consists of all private authorities: the head of the
election committee, poll workers, key trustees, auditors, and clerks.
System Overview
This section provides a high-level overview of the system and the voter’s view. For
more information please consult [BCH+12b] or [RP10].
Ballot Form Layout The Preˆt a` Voter ballot form consists of two halves which
can be separated by a perforation down the middle. The lefthand side shows the
candidates in random order. The righthand side contains a box against each name
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where the voters can mark their choice and includes a link to the used encrypted
candidate order (see Fig. 6.1). This can, for instance, be a hash or a serial number
which refers to corresponding data published. The information on the righthand
side, which allows reconstruction of the candidate order, is hidden by a scratch
field.
Figure 6.1: Ballot Paper Layout used in Preˆt a` Voter.
Auditing of Ballot Forms Before the vote casting process, the poll workers pub-
licly audit the well-formedness of a set of randomly selected ballots. This is per-
formed by revealing the scratch fields and verifying that the printed candidate list
matches with the encrypted candidate order. In addition, voters should be able to
perform their own checks. Thus, each voter receives two or more ballots from which
he or she chooses one for vote casting while the remaining ballots are opened and
audited.
Vote Casting and Vote Capture The voter authenticates him- or herself, receives
a set of ballot papers, and audits all ballots except one. Then, the voter enters
the polling booth and votes for a subset of candidates, for instance, by marking
the corresponding boxes with an “x”. To cast the vote, only the righthand side
containing the selected positions and the link to the encrypted candidate order have
to be scanned. Thus, before the voter leaves the secret polling booth, he or she
detaches and destroys the left hand side, showing the candidate list. Before the
ballot is scanned, the poll worker checks whether the scratch field is still intact. If
the unique code is revealed during the vote casting process the voter can take a
picture of the filled out ballot and prove his or her cast vote towards a coercer. If
the scratch field is still intact the poll worker reveals the information at the bottom
of the righthand side and scans the ballot paper. Then the scanner displays the
digitalization of the receipt (i.e., the righthand side of the ballot) and asks the voter
to confirm whether the vote has been recorded correctly. Thus, the voter can cast a
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fresh ballot if the information shown does not reflect his or her vote. If the scanned
information is correct, the voter confirms. Then his or her encrypted vote is added
to the list of votes cast and the voter receives a receipt containing a record of the
scanned information signed by the electronic ballot box. In addition, the filled out
righthand side is cast to a conventional ballot box allowing to re-scan in case of a
malfunction or breakdown. There are also other specifications of Preˆt a` Voter where
the voter keeps the righthand side as a receipt. However, to provide robustness, we
recommend to collect them in a conventional ballot box.
Anonymization and Tallying After the vote casting process, all cast encrypted
votes, composed of the marked positions and the encrypted candidate order, are
anonymized followed by decrypting and tallying. The anonymization process is
usually performed with the help of a mix-net (see Section 2.2.3). The input set
consists of all published encrypted votes. Then, each mix of the mix-net successively
reencrypts the encryptions, i.e., by changing the random values of the ciphertexts,
and shuﬄes its input batch. The output of the mix-net is a set of anonymized
encrypted votes which is then decrypted and tallied. For a detailed description of
the process please consult Section 4.1.
Verification After the voters received their receipt, they should check the validity
of the signature of the scanner7, for instance, by using a smart phone application
or a device which is made available in the polling station. After the vote casting
process, all encrypted votes cast are published and each voter can check whether
his or her encrypted vote, printed on the receipt, appears. Furthermore, the whole
tallying process can be verified by any interested party. More precisely, during
mixing, each mix of the mix-net publishes enough information so that the observers
are able to check whether the mixing process was performed correctly, i.e., that
the input and the output batch encrypts the same set of votes. There are several
approaches to prove correct mixing, for instance, by using a non-interactive zero-
knowledge argument (see, for instance, [Gro10] or [LZ12]) or a generic verification
method (see, for instance, Section 4). In addition, the voting system publishes
enough information to allow any observer to verify that the output of the mix-net
was decrypted and tallied correctly.
7The voters can verify the signature by themselves. Nevertheless, they should have the opportu-
nity to ask poll workers for help.
6.1 Preˆt a` Voter Providing Everlasting Privacy 63
6.1.2 Technical Details of Preˆt a` Voter Providing Everlasting
Privacy
This section describes the technical details of the proposed voting scheme. The early
Preˆt a` Voter approaches use reencryption mix-nets and support only cyclic shifts of
candidate lists [CRS05, RS06]. However, if the voter selects more than one candi-
date per ballot, the distance between various marks reveals information about the
vote cast. Thus, later developments [Hea07, XSH+07, XSHT08] provide arbitrary
permutations requiring one encrypted information per candidate. For legibility, we
will describe the improved scheme only for ballots containing a shifted candidate
order. However, as elaborated for the original approach [XCH+10, SSC+11] the
described process can easily be adjusted so that other tallying methods and ballot
papers with arbitrary candidate lists are supported.
Additional Roles
If Preˆt a` Voter is enhanced such that it provides everlasting privacy, there is one
additional party that is involved in the election procedure:
Key Server There exists a private key server, for instance, a hardware security
module8 that provides only limited access to authorities. The access key is
shared among several key trustees such that no single authority has access to
the device. The key server is used to store some key material and is not needed
during the vote casting process. Thus, it can be stored safely, for instance, in
the town hall.
Assumptions Regarding the Operational Environment
Apart from the assumptions listed in Section 4.1.2 and Section 5.1.2, we make the
following assumptions regarding the operational environment.
Assumption O.1 The electoral roll is accurately maintained and voters can cast
their vote in a secret polling booth.
Assumption O.2 A non-trivial subset of authorities acts honestly, meaning that
they follow the process correctly and do not reveal information private to
them, for instance, access or private key shares (compare to Assumption (M.3)
8For more information see, for instance, Payment Card Industry (PCI): PCI Hardware Security
Module (HSM);https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents.
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Section 4.1.2). Furthermore, they should be chosen in a way that the proba-
bility of collaboration can be kept low, for instance, by selecting members of
different parties.
Assumption O.3 The authorities choose the parameters (e.g., keys) for the used
cryptographic primitives in a way that the underlying computational problem
cannot be broken before the election result has been announced (compare
to Assumption (M.1), see Section 4.1.2, and Assumption (M.5), see Section
5.1.2). The public keys for the encryption and commitment scheme should be
published on the bulletin board to allow any interested party to verify that
the parameters have been chosen properly.
Assumption O.4 All hardware devices need a certification, must be protected by
a chain of custody, and have to be tested before use. Furthermore, all elec-
tronic systems are prone to “information leakage” (compare to Section 3.1.1).
Therefore, the emanations should be evaluated prior to the election by the
technique authority and corresponding preventive security measures should
be implemented.
Assumption O.5 All private data is safely stored in a key server that is protected
by access control, where the keys are shared among a set of key trustees.
Furthermore, the device is sealed and stored in a way that it is secure against
any access of unauthorized persons.
Assumption O.6 A member of the election committee has to remove the auditing
strip and immediately destroy it before the ballot is handed out to the voter.
Furthermore, it has to be ensured that the scratch field is intact after the voter
left the polling booth.
Assumption O.7 All random values used during the ballot preparation, tallying
and, verification phase are unpredictable and random and are produced by a
random beacon (compare to Assumption (M.4), see Section 4.1.2).
Assumption O.8 The IT environment provides private channels (compare to As-
sumption (M.6) Section 5.1.2), which are modification proof and secure against
side channel attacks, between
1. the private key server and the first printer,
2. the private key server and the first mix of the mix-net, and
3. successive mixes in the mix-net.
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Assumption O.9 After each printing step, the ballot papers are shuﬄed before they
are loaded to the next printer to ensure that neither poll workers nor printers
learn the association between IDs and candidate lists.
Assumption O.10 At least one mix of the mix-net is honest and keeps the per-
mutation, used to shuﬄe its input set, secret (compare to Assumption (M.2)
4.1.2).
Assumption O.11 After processing encrypted data, all hardware components de-
stroy the information private to them (compare to Assumption (M.7) Section
5.1.2).
Assumption O.12 A threshold subset of key trustees attend the tallying process
so that the private key server can be accessed and encrypted data can be
decrypted.
All election steps, from the ballot preparation to the auditing of the election out-
come, should be carried out in public to allow any interested party to observe that:
• Only persons in authority and no single authority access the key server.
• The printing process is performed correctly (Assumption (O.9)).
• Private channels, like direct cable connection, are used for the communication
(Assumption (O.8)), and are not subject to manipulation.
• The auditing procedures are carried out and the revealed decommitment values
are derived from an appropriate uniform distribution.
• The encrypted opening values are anonymized by a mix-net before they are
decrypted.
• All information private to the hardware components are deleted, for instance,
by destroying their memory (Assumption (O.11)).
Technical Details
Key generation To provide everlasting privacy and universal verifiability, we need
to encode the published auditing information. For this purpose a homomorphic
and unconditionally hiding commitment scheme (GenCom,Com,Unv) with matching
encryption schemes (GenEncM,EncM,DecM) and (GenEncR,EncR,DecR), as defined
in Section 5.1.1, are used. Note that for Preˆt a` Voter the commitment scheme Com
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and encryption scheme EncM must be additively homomorphic with respect to the
message space. Furthermore, the message space must be large enough to prevent an
exhaustive search on the possible shift and commitment values published.
Prior to an election, parameters for the commitments and two key pairs are gen-
erated by executing GenCom, GenEncM, and GenEncR. The public keys pkM and
pkR are published while the corresponding private keys skM and skR are distributed
in threshold fashion among several key trustees. During the ballot printing process
three printers are used. The second printer generates a key pair (skR′ , pkR′) and the
third printer a key pair (skM′ , pkM′) using (GenEncR) and (GenEncM) respectively.
The public keys are published together with the other key material.
Ballot Preparation For the Preˆt a` Voter voting system providing everlasting pri-
vacy, the conventional ballot layout is adopted but instead of the encrypted shift
value Enc(s) the ballot refers to a commitment Com(s, t) of the used candidate order.
Furthermore, the ballot is extended by an “auditing” strip, containing the decom-
mitment value t, which can be detached by a perforation (see Figure 6.2). After the
Figure 6.2: Ballot Paper Layout of the new version.
voter audited some ballots and selected one for vote casting, a member of the elec-
tion committee removes the auditing strip of the remaining ballot and immediately
destroy it. If the voter would be able to detach and keep the auditing strip, he or
she can reveal the used decommitment value and prove a certain candidate order
towards an attacker.
After vote casting, all scanned ballots are published showing the position marked
by the voter and a unique commitment to the shifted candidate list. To provide vote
secrecy, no single authority or electronic device must be able to reconstruct the as-
sociation between the published information and the corresponding secret candidate
order. Thus, similar to the original approach, the ballot data (i.e., shifted candidate
order, commitment, and encrypted opening values) is generated in distributed fash-
ion by several clerks. To generate a set of K ballots, each clerk j ∈ [1, L] performs
the following steps:
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1. Generate a batch of random seeds
〈
sji ∈M
〉K
i=1
denoting a cyclic shift of the
candidate names. The position of the candidate with respect to the initial
candidate ordering can be determined by computing modulo m, where m is
the number of candidates. The seeds are drawn uniformly at random from the
message space.
2. A commitment to each seed i is generated:
〈
Comck(s
j
i , t
j
i )
〉
, using a randomly
chosen decommitment value tji ∈ R.
3. The opening values are encrypted with the public keys pkM and pkR of the
key trustees, 〈EncM(sji ),EncR(tji )〉, and the public keys pkR′ and pkM′ of the
second and third printer, 〈EncM′(sji ),EncR′(tji )〉.
Each clerk sends its output to the key server and proves consistency between the
commitments and encryptions using a “proof of consistency” (see Section 5.1.1). If
the proofs hold, the private key server does the following operations on its input:
1. It generates the “full” encrypted information (ΘCi ,Θ
E
i ,Θ
S
i ,Θ
T
i ) for ballot i by
multiplying the output of various clerks:
ΘCi =
L∏
j=0
Comck(s
j
i , t
j
i )
ΘEi =
〈
L∏
j=0
EncM(s
j
i ),
L∏
j=0
EncR(t
j
i )
〉
ΘSi =
L∏
j=0
EncM′(s
j
i )
ΘTi =
L∏
j=0
EncR′(t
j
i ).
2. The private key server generates a link, IDi, for each ballot i ∈ [1, K] and
publishes the IDs together with the commitments {ΘCi }Ki=1 and a commitment
to the corresponding encrypted opening values on the bulletin board.
3. Then the set of IDs, {IDi}Ki=1, is sent together with {ΘSi }Ki=1 and {ΘTi }Ki=1
to the first printer while the corresponding opening values {ΘEi }Ki=1 are kept
secret by the key server.
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Ballot Printing The generated ballot data is printed by a quorum of printers (see
Figure 6.3), similar to the process described in [RP10]. Another possibility is to
print the ballots on demand in the polling-station. However, a legal analysis showed
that printing should be carried out in advance [DHR+11].
1. The first printer prints the encrypted seed ΘS on the lefthand side of the ballot
paper, the link ID to the commitment ΘC at the center, and the encrypted
decommitment value ΘT on the righthand side.
2. The printed ID is covered by a scratch field, the ballot papers are shuﬄed, and
loaded into the next printer.
3. The second printer scans and decrypts ΘT = EncR′(t) and prints the decom-
mitment value t at the bottom of the righthand side. Then t is covered by a
scratch field, ΘT is removed, the ballot papers are shuﬄed, and loaded into
printer three.
4. The last printer scans and decrypts the seed ΘS = EncM′(s) and prints the
candidate list shifted by −s (mod m) on the lefthand side. Furthermore, it
prints the seed value on the auditing strip next to t. Finally, s is covered by
a scratch strip, and the encrypted seed value ΘS is removed.
Note that to ensure voter privacy, Assumption (O.2), (O.8), (O.9), and (O.11)
must hold. Furthermore, the ballots should be printed in public to assure that
the described process is performed correctly. If, for instance, the printing process is
not observable, a printer could remove all scratch fields, read and store the encrypted
information, and use this data to violate voter privacy. Even worse is if this attack
is carried out by the third printer, since this machine is able to decrypt the seed
values and thus does not have to wait until the cryptosystem is broken.
Even though the organizational measures ensure voter privacy if only one printer
is used, the ballots should be printed in distributed fashion. By doing so, the
relevant information is not located on one device and a successful attack is harder
to carry out. To manipulate a printer successfully, one either needs to have access
to the device within the limits of the certification, or has to get possession of the
printer in the polling station. This is more difficult in case more than one printer
is used. To make successful attacks even harder, additional technical measures can
be considered. The replacement of printed ballots, for instance, can be made more
difficult by watermarks or fingerprints9 on the ballots which allow verifying their
integrity.
9Note that if fingerprints are used which make the ballot papers unique, the corresponding infor-
mation must be hidden or destroyed before the ballots are handed out to the voters.
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Figure 6.3: Ballot printing process.
Auditing Process Auditing of ballot forms is very important for the robustness of
the voting system. If the ballot papers were not generated properly, the votes cast
are not decoded correctly afterwards. To check the well-formedness of a ballot paper,
one just has to reveal the opening values s and t and the link to the commitment
Com(s, t) hidden under the scratch fields. Then, the verifier can check whether the
value s modulo m was used to shift the candidate names and that s and t open the
commitment Com(s, t). This proves integrity of the ballot due to the computational
bindingness of the commitment scheme used.
Before the vote casting process, the authorities choose a subset of ballots at ran-
dom that is publicly audited. Besides the well-formedness, the auditors should check
that the revealed shift and decommitment values were derived from an appropriate
uniform distribution. Furthermore, the key server has to reveal the encrypted open-
ing values. By decrypting the ciphertexts the authorities can verify that the ballot
provides consistency between the commitments and encryptions.
Note that the commitments printed on the ballot forms are published during the
tallying process. Thus, if voters get to see the decommitment and shift value, they
can use this information to open the commitment, prove the candidate order of their
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ballot, and thus whom they cast their vote for. Therefore, if a ballot paper is used to
cast a vote, the auditing strip, containing the hidden opening values s and t, must
be detached and destroyed by the poll workers before the voter enters the secret
polling booth. Furthermore, ballot papers used for auditing must not be used for
vote casting.
Anonymization, Tallying, and Verification Process Like in the conventional Preˆt
a` Voter tallying process the marked position pi on each cast ballot i ∈ [1, K] is
publicly encoded and homomorphically added to the commitment, that is
Com(si, ti) · Com(pi, 0) = Com(si + pi, ti) = Com(s′i, ti).
Note that the marked position and the shift value add up to the position of the
chosen candidate with respect to the initial, unshifted candidate list modulo m.
Then the commitment to the vote cast Com(s′i, ti) is published next to the scanned
ID and marked position on the bulletin board. In addition, the private key server
adapts the securely stored encrypted shift values accordingly:
EncM(si) · EncM(pi) = EncM(si + pi) = EncM(s′i).
Afterwards, the votes are anonymized with the help of the mix-net introduced
in Section 5.1.1. The public commitments, U = Com(S ′, T ), and the privately
stored opening values consisting of the encrypted votes, V = EncM(S ′), and the
encrypted decommitment values, W = EncR(T ), are sent to the first mix using a
private channel. The mix-net publicly outputs a set of mixed commitments, U∗ =
Com(S∗, T ∗), and privately outputs a set of associated anonymized encrypted votes,
V ∗ = EncM(S∗), and encrypted decommitment values, W ∗ = EncR(T ∗). Note
that correctness of the mixing process can be universally verified. After the mixing
process, the votes can be decoded and published without violating voter privacy,
because the link between single inputs and single outputs has been removed. To
determine the election outcome, first, the key trustees decrypt and publish the votes
S† = DecM(V ∗) and decommitment values T † = DecR(W ∗). Then any interested
party can verify that these are the opening values to the published commitments:
U∗ = Com(S∗, T ∗) ?= Com(S†, T †) = Com(DecM(V ∗),DecR(W ∗)).
Second, the chosen candidates are determined by publicly computing S† (mod m),
revealing the position marked with respect to the initial, unshifted candidate or-
dering. Finally, the number of votes each candidate received are counted and the
election outcome is announced.
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6.1.3 Security Properties
Similar to the classic Preˆt a` Voter voting scheme, the improved voting protocol
provides robustness, correctness, verifiability, computational privacy, and receipt-
freeness. Furthermore, our version provides everlasting privacy towards the public
and, with the help of certain organizational measures, also towards the authorities.
Robustness
Regarding robustness, the only difference between the classic Preˆt a` Voter voting
scheme and the solution proposed here is the use of a key server to store the open-
ing values. Without this information and the presence of a sufficient number of
key holders (Assumption O.12) the votes cast cannot be determined. Therefore,
a backup and recovery concept must be developed which provides a high security
standard. However, in some applications even a small probability that the ongoing
election might be disturbed is unacceptable. For such cases a two layer ballot paper,
as proposed for Punch Scan [FCS06], can be used. The upper layer shows the secret
candidate order and the bottom layer contains the ID that links to the encoded
shift value. The voters cast their choice on the top sheet and the marked positions
are recorded by the bottom due to holes punched in the upper layer (see Figure
6.4). After filling out the ballot, the top layer reflects the vote in plain text and is
Figure 6.4: Two layer ballot paper with filled out top (l) and bottom layer (r).
collected in a conventional ballot box. The bottom sheet contains the same vote in
encoded form and is scanned and publicly processed. Thus, in case of a malfunction
or breakdown of the key server, the ballots cast on the conventional ballot box can
be used to determine the election result.
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Correctness and Verifiability
The proposed voting system provides correctness under the assumption that the
computational problem of the used commitment scheme cannot be broken before
the outcome has been computed (Assumption O.3) and that the challenges for the
performed verification procedures are random and unpredictable (Assumption O.7).
Furthermore, the system allows all voters to verify that their vote was encoded as
intended, cast as encoded, recorded as cast, and tallied as recorded (see Section
2.1.2 and 2.1.3). If the voter successfully audited some ballots, correctness of the
ballot preparation process is ensured with high probability, i.e., the candidate order
matches the information the ID refers to. The auditing process also allows them
to ascertain themselves that using these ballots the vote is encoded as intended.
After scanning the encoded vote, the scanner shows its interpretation to the voter
and prints a receipt if he or she confirms. Thus, the voter can check that the filled
out ballot matches the vote printed on the receipt and therefore that the vote is cast
as encoded. Furthermore, after the vote casting process, the entire input of the
tally is published. Thus, each voter can verify that his or her encoded vote printed
on the receipt is stored as cast, i.e., that it is included in the input batch of the
tallying process.
Furthermore, the used mix-net provides correctness and universal verifiability (see
Section 5.2.1) and after the anonymization process, the decoded votes are publicly
tallied. Thus, any interested party can recount the election outcome and ascertain
itself that the votes were tallied as recorded.
Note that we only require integrity to be guaranteed at the moment of vote casting
and tallying. However, as discussed with respect to robustness, in the case of Preˆt
a` Voter the ballot layout can be designed in a way that a plaintext vote and a vote
in encoded form are generated simultaneously. This allows to collect the filled-out
ballots representing the plaintext vote in a conventional ballot box for recount.
Privacy
To analyze the privacy of the proposed system, we will distinguish between receipt-
freeness, privacy towards the public, and privacy towards the authorities (see Section
2.1.1). An overview of the addressed vulnerabilities described in Section 3 is given
in Table 6.1.10
10Note that we do not discuss the so called Randomization attack or Italian attack, where voters
are forced to mark one or more specific positions on the ballot. This attack has a similar effect
than to force a voter to abstain from voting why this violates the principle of free suffrage and
not of the principle of secret suffrage. Furthermore, this attack can be confronted by offering
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Receipt-freeness The auditing strip is destroyed before the ballot is handed out
to the voter and it is checked that the remaining scratch field is intact after the voter
left the secret polling booth (Assumption O.6). Thus, he or she cannot reveal the
opening values used and prove a certain candidate order to a coercer. Furthermore,
the voter cannot disclose the unique code and take a photo of the filled out ballot
to prove his or her voting decision cast towards an attacker.
Privacy Towards the Public The proposed voting system provides everlasting
privacy towards observers because only the voter gets to see the secret candidate
order (Assumption O.1). Furthermore, all data printed on the receipts and published
on the bulletin board for auditing, like commitments and zero-knowledge proofs,
provide unconditional privacy.
Privacy Towards the Authorities Computational privacy towards the author-
ities is achieved by the encryption schemes used. Their parameters are chosen such
that the opening values cannot be decrypted during the election (Assumption O.3)
except by the key holders. To minimize the risk of a manipulated authority, the pri-
vate keys are shared among several persons in authority. Furthermore, to prevent
that they conspire to act maliciously, they are chosen in a way that the probability
of collaboration can be kept low (Assumption O.2). Furthermore, a single point of
failure during the printing or anonymization procedure is prevented (Assumption
O.9 and O.10).
Under the organizational assumptions listed in Section 6.1.2, this voting system
also provides everlasting privacy towards authorities. They prevent that an at-
tacker is able to access and store the ciphertexts until he or she is able to break the
encryption scheme used for the key length chosen. More precisely, the encrypted
opening values are safely stored in a key server (Assumption O.5) which is protected
by access control. Furthermore, only private channels11 are used for communication
what protect the encryptions from eavesdropping (Assumption O.8).
The printers and scanners see the opening values in encrypted form, which only
provides computational privacy. Therefore, all hardware devices are tested, certi-
fied and protected by a chain of custody (Assumption O.4). This prevents that
voters the chance to ask for a new ballot form. In Germany, according to § 56.8 FEC, the
returning committee is permitted to hand out a new ballot paper. Thus, voters would be able
to cast their vote for the focused candidate as well as for the positions the intruder wants them
to select.
11Note that if CDs are used, they must be publicly destroyed immediately after the first printer
or mix read out the data.
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they contain unauthorized soft- or hardware that allows information to be leaked or
data to be manipulated. After they processed the data, all information private to
the hardware components is deleted (Assumption O.11), for instance, by physically
destroying the memory. This prevents that an intruder can get access to the en-
cryptions after the election. Note that a legal evaluation showed that making these
assumptions to provide everlasting privacy is acceptable from a legal point of view.
For more information see [DHG+13].
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Table 6.1: Overview of addressed privacy vulnerabilities presented in Section 3
Vulnerability Addressed by Assumptions
(Computational) Voter Privacy
Printer
Knowledge
Distributed printing process system and orga-
nizational
Information
Leakage
- (votes are processed in encoded form) -
Storing Infor-
mation
- (votes are processed in encoded form) -
Fingerprints - (ballots are used for vote casting) -
Printouts - (votes are recorded in encoded form) -
Single Point
of Failure
- (votes are processed in encoded form) -
Authority
Knowledge
Threshold decryption system
Distribution of access keys system
Selecting key trustees from different parties organizational
Vote All cast votes are mixed before decrypting system
Clustering Usage of privacy preserving shuﬄing proofs system
Receipt-Freeness
Unique
Ballots
Scratch field system
Poll workers remove auditing strips before
handing out a ballot paper for voting
organizational
Poll workers check scratch fields before scan-
ning a filled out ballot paper
organizational
Everlasting Privacy
Towards Ob-
servers
Publishing unconditionally hiding commit-
ments and perfect zero-knowledge proofs only
system
Towards
Authorities
Encrypted data is stored in a certified key
server
organizational
Key server is securely stored and protected by
access control
organizational
Encrypted data is sent over private channels organizational
Electronic devices delete all information pri-
vate to them
organizational
All used electronic devices are certified organizational
Chain of custody for electronic devices organizational
All electronic devices are tested prior to using organizational
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6.2 Improving the Split-Ballot Voting Scheme
As Chapter 6.1.3 showed, to provide everlasting privacy towards authorities, certain
organizational measures are needed. A comparison with traditional paper based
elections and the interpretation of the relevant jurisdiction of Germany showed that
such procedural controls are acceptable from a legal point of view (for a detailed
legal analysis of this aspect please consult [DHG+13]).
However, there might be other elections whose legal regulations enforce that ever-
lasting privacy towards the authorities must be fulfilled by the voting system itself.
For this purpose, we propose a solution that is based on the Split-Ballot voting sys-
tem. This approach enforces a more complex vote casting procedure but prevents a
single point of failure with respect to everlasting privacy.
Although the classic scheme already provides everlasting privacy, the election
outcome is jointly computed by two authorities only. Thus, voter privacy is provided
under the assumption that at least one of these two authorities act honestly and do
not reveal information private to him or her. This is a drawback compared to other
verifiable voting systems where the number of authorities sharing secret information
is scalable12.
Thus, in this section we propose an improved voting system that provides not
only everlasting privacy but also scalability with respect to computational privacy.
6.2.1 The Classic Split-Ballot Voting Scheme
In this section we start with an introduction to the classic Split-Ballot voting sys-
tem from the voters’ point of view, i.e., the ballot layout and vote casting process.
Later, we provide technical details about the ballot preparation, vote recording, and
tallying procedure and, finally, summarize its properties and drawbacks with respect
to privacy.
The Voters’ View
Like Preˆt a` Voter, the Split-Ballot voting system encodes votes by recording the
position marked in a permuted list of candidates. To provide voter privacy, the
permutation value used is kept secret. We assume that only one vote is cast per
ballot since this scheme only allows shifted candidate lists. How the ballot layout
can be generalized to an arbitrary candidate order is out of scope and part of future
work.
12Note that the vote itself is not shared.
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Ballot Layout The ballot paper consists of three separate pages, the top page, the
middle page, and the bottom page.
Bottom Page The bottom page is used to record the encoded votes and con-
tain boxes for each candidate where the voters can mark their choice (see
Figure 6.5). When all three pages are overlayed, these bubbles are visible
through holes punched in the middle and top page.
Figure 6.5: Bottom page for three candidates.
Middle Page The middle page contains a hole showing the boxes printed on
the bottom page. Furthermore, it shows m distinct lists of candidates,
where m is the number of candidates and each list is a permutation of
the initial candidate ordering using a random shift value. To optimize
the space needed for the lists, shortcuts for each voting option, letters or
symbols, are printed instead of the full identifier (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: Middle page for three candidates.
Top Page The top page contains two holes: one showing the boxes printed
on the bottom sheet and one which selects one candidate list printed on
the middle page. Furthermore, the top page provides an overview of the
shortcuts used on the middle page and the associated voting options (see
Figure 6.7).
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Figure 6.7: Top page for three candidates.
Vote Casting Process Each polling station receives a set of top and middle pages.
The bottom pages are generated on demand.
1. The voter enters the polling station and authenticates him- or herself.
Afterwards, he or she receives two envelopes, one marked with “top”
containing a top page and one marked with “middle” containing a mid-
dle page. Each envelope is provided with an ID, printed on a sticker, that
links to a commitment published on the bulletin board. More precisely,
the “top” envelope links to a commitment that commits to the position
of the hole punched in the top page. The commitment the “middle” enve-
lope refers to commits to the shift values used to generate the candidate
lists on the middle page.
2. If the voter wants to audit the ballot, then the envelopes are opened, the
top and middle page are scanned, and the voter keeps the pages. After
the vote casting process, the voting system publishes the opening values
to the audited ballots on the bulletin board and the voter can verify the
correctness of the ballots13.
3. If the voter wants to use the ballots to cast a vote, the poll worker removes
the stickers from the two unopened envelops and affixes them to a bottom
page.
4. The voter enters the secret polling both, opens all envelopes, and overlays
the pages. Figure 6.8 shows the voters’ view using the top page shown
in Figure 6.7 and the middle page shown in Figure 6.6. Afterwards, the
voter fills out the ballot by marking the box next to the candidate of his
or her choice.
13If the commitments are inconsistent with the values used to generate the top and middle page,
the voting system would not be able to open them due to the computational binding property
of the commitment scheme.
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Figure 6.8: Complete ballot paper containing of top, middle, and bottom page.
5. The voter destroys the top and middle page and leaves the secret polling
booth. Figure 6.9 shows the filled out bottom layer of the ballot (Figure
6.8) reflecting a vote for Bob.
6. The bottom page, that consists of the IDs referring to the used top and
middle page and the position marked by the voter, is scanned. Further-
more, the voter receives a printout of the encoded vote cast as receipt.
Figure 6.9: Filled out bottom page.
As long as it is unknown which values were used to generate the candidate
lists printed on the middle page and which list was chosen by the top page,
the position marked by the voter reveals no information about the candidate
selected. It follows that the vote cast by the voter is secretely shared among
two authorities, authority A1 that generated the top page and authority A2
that generated the middle page.
Technical Details
In this section we provide technical details of the ballot preparation, vote recording,
and tallying procedure.
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Ballot Preparation The voting system Split-Ballot uses the same primitives as the
improved Preˆt a` Voter scheme and the mix-net proposed in Section 5: The
public audit trail is encoded with a commitment scheme Com(s, t), where
s ∈M is a vote share and t ∈ R a random decommitment value. Furthermore,
two matching homomorphic encryption schemes, EncM and EncR are used
to privately process the encrypted opening values s and t. Note that the
commitment scheme Com and the encryption scheme EncM must be additively
homomorphic with respect to the message space.
For each top page,
1. A1 chooses a shift value s1 ∈M that denotes which list from the middle
page is selected.
2. It commits to this value by calculating Com(s1, t1), using a randomly
chosen decommitment value t1 ∈ R.
The commitment is considered to be public and will be published next to the
marked position on the bulletin board. The used shift value s1 must be kept
secret to ensure voter privacy and will be shown to the voter only. Figure 6.10
provides an overview of all possible top pages generated for three candidates.
The second authority A2 creates the data for the middle pages. Having m
candidates it draws up m distinct candidate lists by
1. choosing a permutation value s2 at random,
2. generating list j ∈ [1,m] by shifting the initial list with shift value s2 + j,
and
3. calculating a commitment Com(s2 + j, tj) for each list, where tj denotes
a value chosen uniformly at random.
Figure 6.11 shows all possible middle pages for an election with three candi-
dates.
Vote Recording Assume the voter uses the ballot shown in Figure 6.8 and the
initial candidate ordering is (Alice # 0, Bob # 1, Carl #2). The second hole
on the top page is punched leading to the shift value s1 = 1. Furthermore, the
first list on the middle page (Carl, Alice, Bob) was generated by shifting the
initial candidate ordering using permutation value s2 = 1.
It follows that the shift value needed to reconstruct the initial ordering out of
the list shown to the voter can be computed by
s ≡ −s1 − s2 (mod m).
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Figure 6.10: Possible top pages for three candidates selecting the first list (top), second
list (middle), and third list (bottom) printed on the middle page.
For the shift values used in our example s is
1 ≡ −1− 1 (mod 3).
After the voter filled out the ballot by marking the box at position p, the
selected candidate with respect to the initial candidate ordering s′ can be
calculated by
s′ ≡ p+ s (mod m).
If the voter chooses p = 0, as shown in Figure 6.9, s′ is
1 ≡ 0 + 1 (mod 3),
a vote for Bob with respect to the initial candidate ordering (Alice # 0, Bob
# 1, Carl #2).
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Figure 6.11: Possible middle pages for three candidates using permutation value 1
(mod 3) (top), 2 (mod 3) (middle), and 0 (mod 3) (bottom) to generate the first list.
Vote Tallying After the vote casting process has ended, both authorities, A1 and
A2, jointly compute the election outcome without disclosing each other the
corresponding shift values. This can be accomplished by using the two en-
cryption algorithm, EncM and EncR, to privately process the opening values.
For a detailed explanation of the tallying procedure please consult [MN10].
Properties
In the classic Split-Ballot voting system the ballot papers are jointly generated
and tallied by two authorities. While the correctness of the election outcome is
independent of the trustworthiness of them, for voter privacy certain assumptions
are made. As stated by Moran and Naor in [MN10], under the assumption that both
authorities are honest and keep their private information secret, the system provides
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receipt-freeness14 and everlasting privacy. If only one authority is honest, the
system still provides computational privacy but may no longer be receipt free.
In the case that both authorities are corrupt, privacy is no longer guaranteed.
It follows that, comparing this scheme with other verifiable poll-site voting sys-
tems, Split-Ballot has a drawback regarding the ability to violate voter privacy
as long as the computational assumptions hold. In Split-Ballot two authorities are
enough to reveal the association between the receipt IDs and votes cast. Conversely,
in many other verifiable poll-site voting schemes, the subset of malicious authorities
needed to break computational privacy is scalable. In Preˆt a` Voter15 the number of
dishonest authorities required for an attack depends, for instance, on the number
of key holders needed to decrypt information, the number of clerks that participate
in the ballot generation process, and the size of the mix-net. Using (k, n)-threshold
decryption n− k + 1 honest authorities out of n key holders are needed to prevent
that encrypted data can be disclosed unauthorized. Furthermore, only one trust-
worthy clerk is enough to prevent that the association between the IDs and the shift
values can be revealed during the ballot generation process. The same holds true
for mixing. One honest mix out of all mixes is enough to prevent that receipts can
be linked to encrypted and counted votes.
It follows that, assuming the participation of a set of l clerks and a mix-net of
size m, at least min(k, l,m) malicious authorities are needed to violate voter privacy
as long as the computational assumptions hold. Note that, although everlasting
privacy is a very important design goal, it is more harmful to reveal the association
between receipts and votes cast during or shortly after the election.
Furthermore, scalability with respect to the number of authorities has several
advantages. First, it allows choosing the authorities is a way that the probability of
collaboration can be kept low and, second, allows distributing trust among different
political parties. In Germany § 9.2 sent 4 Federal Electoral Act regulates, that
the election committee shall represent the parties of the respective electoral district
(see legal analysis in [DHG+13]). Consequently, the set of authorities should be
composed of members of all political parties. This is in conflict with Split-Ballot
where privacy relies on the trustworthiness of two authorities only.
14Since the IDs are not printed on the middle and top page, they do not have to be hidden by
scratch fields. The voters can make a photo of the filled out ballot but can fake this proof by
using another set of middle and top pages for vote casting.
15We assume that a version is used where the ballots are printed in distributed fashion. Further-
more, we assume that the execution of the election procedures are carried out in public such that
authorities and observers can verify that the processes are carried out correctly, i.e., Assumption
A, D, F, and I hold.
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6.2.2 Improved Split-Ballot Voting Scheme
To improve Split-Ballot, we propose to replace the tallying procedure with the mix-
net introduced in Section 5.3.1. With respect to the ballot preparation and vote
casting process only minor changes are needed.
Ballot Preparation We use the standard Split-Ballot paper layout. The top and
middle page should be independently generated and printed in distributed
fashion, as described for Preˆt a` Voter in Section 6.1.2.
Similar to the standard Split-Ballot voting system, for each middle page, a
set of authorities A2 chooses a shift value s2 uniformly at random. This value
is used to generate the shuﬄed candidate lists. Independently a second set
of authorities A1 generates the data for the top pages. This is another batch
of shift values, where each value s1 determines at which position the hole is
punched in the top layer and consequently which candidate list of the middle
page is shown to the voter. Furthermore, each envelope containing a top or
middle page is marked with an internal ID that helps to match vote shares
after the anonymization process (compare to Section 5.3.1).
Summarized, the public information for each top (i = 1) and middle page
(i = 2), contains of
• commitment ci = Com(−si, ti) to the shift value si and random decom-
mitment value ti,
• commitment Com(ri, t′i) to the internal ID ri and random decommitment
value t′i, and
• IDs, where each IDi refers to a commitment ci.
Furthermore, to be able to open the unconditionally hiding commitments, the
opening values have to be processed in private. For the top page this data
is stored in a key server K1. Analogously, the information needed for the
commitments associated to the middle pages are managed by a second key
server K2. This includes the following data:
• The encrypted opening values EncM(−si) and EncR(ti) for each commit-
ment ci and
• the decommitment value t′i for each internal ID ri in encrypted form
EncR(t′i).
Vote Casting After the voter filled out the ballot, the position p of the box marked
and ID1 and ID2 are scanned. Afterwards, a commitment to p with decom-
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mitment value 0 is publicly generated and homomorphically added to the shift
value associated to the top page:
Com(p, 0) · Com(−s1, t1) = Com(p− s1, t1).
The key server K1 adapts its stored information accordingly by calculating
EncM(p) · EncM(−s1) = EncM(p− s1).
Vote Tallying The vote shares, consisting of Com(p − s1, t1) and the shift value
used on middle page Com(s2, t2), are processed independently by two different
mix-nets M1 and M2. To provide that the commitments can be shuﬄed inde-
pendently while ensuring that they can be matched afterwards, the association
between both inputs must be marked. Furthermore, to ensure receipt-freeness,
this ID should be unknown to single authorities. Thus, for each voter the in-
ternal IDs of both pages, top page and middle page, are publicly added
Com(r1, t
′
1) · Com(r2, t′2) = Com(r1 + r2, t′) = Com(r, t′)
and the resulting ID r marks vote shares coming from the same voter. Af-
terwards, all encoded votes and their IDs are anonymized by performing the
following steps:
1. The public input to mix-net M1 are two sets of commitments
U1 = Com(P − S1, T1)
X1 = Com(R, T
′).
In addition M1 privately receives
V1 = EncM(P − S1)
W1 = EncR(T1)
Y1 = EncR(T ′1)
from K1 and
Y2 = EncR(T ′2)
from K2.
Thus, the private input set of M1 constitutes of the set of encrypted
opening values V1, W1, and the decommitment value
Y ′1 = Y1 · Y2 = EncR(T ′1) · EncR(T ′2) = EncR(T ′)
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2. Analogously, the public input to mix-net M2 is
U2 = Com(−S2, T2)
X2 = Com(R, T
′)
and the private input is
V2 = EncM(−S2)
W2 = EncR(T2)
Y ′2 = Y1 · Y2.
3. Both mix-nets shuﬄe their inputs.
4. The public output of mix M1 is
U∗1 = Com(−S∗1 , T ∗1 )
X∗1 = Com(R
∗
1, T
∗
1
′)
and the private output is
V ∗1 = EncM(−S∗1)
W ∗1 = EncR(T
∗
1 )
Y ∗1 = EncR(T
∗
1
′).
5. Analogous, the public output of mix M2 is
U∗2 = Com(−S∗2 , T ∗2 )
X∗2 = Com(R
∗
2, T
∗
2
′)
and the private output is
V ∗2 = EncM(−S∗2)
W ∗2 = EncR(T
∗
2 )
Y ∗2 = EncR(T
∗
2
′).
6. Using the encrypted decommitment values Y ∗1 and Y
∗
2 , the output is
matched by a special authority Z. It denotes the association by a per-
mutation pi which is published on the bulletin board. Furthermore, Z
proves correct matching in perfect zero-knowledge fashion.
7. The opening values are revealed by calculating:
S∗ = DecM(V ∗1 · pi(V ∗2 )) = DecM(EncM(P ∗ − S∗1 − pi(S∗2)))
T ∗ = DecR(W ∗1 · pi(W ∗2 )) = DecR(EncR(T ∗1 + pi(T ∗2 )))
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8. The set of decoded votes S∗ is published on the bulletin board.
9. The set of decrypted decommitment values T ∗ is published and each voter
and observer can verify correctness of the set of vote S∗ by verifying
whether:
U∗1 · pi(U∗2 ) ?= Com(S∗, T ∗)
6.2.3 Security Properties
Since we only replaced the anonymization procedure with the mixing process pre-
sented in Section 5.3.1, our improved Split-Ballot voting system still fulfills the
requirements correctness, individual verifiability, universal verifiability, and
receipt-freeness.
Furthermore, our improvement provides robustness under the same assumptions
as the standard Split-Ballot voting system. Since a subset of the generated ballots
can be audited prior to the election, the consistency between the commitments and
the encrypted opening values can be ensured with high probability. In addition,
the IDs used to match vote shares are publicly computed, which is why neither
malicious authorities nor voters can submit inconsistent IDs undetected. Thus,
under the assumption that the encrypted data stored in K1 and K2 can be accessed
(Assumption O.12), votes cast can be decoded and tallied.
Similar to the original approach our improvement provides everlasting privacy.
One computational unbounded authority is not enough to reveal the association
between receipt IDs and the corresponding votes cast. But unlike Split-Ballot,
as long as the encryption scheme holds for the key length chosen, the number of
malicious authorities needed to violate voter privacy is scalable. Thus our scheme is
an improvement with respect to computational privacy. Similar to Preˆt a` Voter,
the size of the subset of dishonest authorities needed depends on the parameters
of the threshold cryptosystem, the number of clerks, and the size of the mix-net.
This allows to choose the authorities and their responsibilities in a way that the
probability of a successful attack is low.

7 Everlasting Private Voting Schemes
Using Homomorphic Tallying
There are two widely used approaches how an election outcome can be determined
if votes are recorded in encrypted form. The encrypted votes are either anonymized
by shuﬄing and reencrypting followed by decrypting and tallying, or the election
outcome is generated by homomorphic tallying and decrypted afterwards.
After we described in Chapter 5 how votes can be anonymized providing universal
verifiability and everlasting privacy, in this chapter we focus on the second approach.
We, first, show how the primitives used for mixing, a homomorphic commitment
scheme with matching homomorphic encryption scheme, can be used to build a
homomorphic tallying process that provides universal verifiability and everlasting
privacy. Second, we look at Scratch & Vote, the only poll-site voting system that
uses homomorphic tallying, and describe how this scheme can be improved. The
content of Section 7.1 of this chapter is published in [DGA12].
7.1 Universally Verifiable Homomorphic Tallying
Process
In this section we show how votes can be homomorphically tallied providing universal
verifiability and everlasting privacy. First, we describe how the votes can be encoded,
second how correctness of the encoding can be proven, and third how the votes cast
can be tallied. Finally, we provide an overview of the assumptions made and the
properties achieved.
As shown in [DGA12], this protocol can easily be applied to online voting systems,
like Helios. For legibility, we assume that the voter interacts with a Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Machine (DRE). How this process can be applied to scan based
voting is discussed in Section 7.2.
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7.1.1 Encoding of Votes
We represent the vote for candidate i as a vector 〈s1, ..., sm〉 which is 0 everywhere,
except in the ith position, where it equals 1. Each entry is encoded individually
using the encoding scheme introduced in Section 5.1.1.
More precisely, the commitment u = Com(s, t) encodes the vote s by “blinding” it
with a random number t. Since the used commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, the
vote cannot be determined from the commitment itself. Thus, to provide decoding,
the opening values s and t are encrypted with a matching homomorphic encryption
scheme EncM(s) and EncR(t) and are privately processed.
So the encoding of vote s has three components.
〈u, v, w〉 = 〈Com(s, t),EncM(s),EncR(t)〉
Note that we obtain the following homomorphic properties. If 〈u′, v′, w′〉 =
〈Com(s′, t′),EncM(s′),EncR(t′)〉, then
〈u, v, w〉 · 〈u′, v′, w′〉 = 〈Com(s+ s′, t+ t′),EncM(s+ s′),EncR(t+ t′)〉
Note also that the commitment Com and the encryption scheme EncM must be ad-
ditive homomorphic with respect to the message space M. This allows us to
homomorphically tally the encrypted votes
∏
EncM(s) in private and prove correct-
ness of the result by opening the outcome of the publicly processed commitments∏
Com(s, t).
7.1.2 Proof of correct encoding
To avoid cheating and to provide verifiability and robustness, we need to perform
the following public and private verification processes.
Public Verification Process
The observers and auditors must be able to check that the encoded vector indeed
represents a valid voting decision and that all votes are tallied correctly. More
precisely, it needs to be shown that:
1. Each entry si is either 0 or 1. This can be proven using the “Zero-Knowledge
Proof that a Committed Value is in Z2k” proposed by Moran and Naor for
their Split-Ballot voting system [MN10, Appendix B.3].
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2. If the voter is allowed to choose X candidates per ballot, it must be shown that
at most X entries equal 1. More precisely, it must be proven that
∑n
i=1 si ≤ X.
Using homomorphic commitments, this can be achieved by computing the
product of all commitments
∏n
i=1(Com(si, ti)) = Com(s
′, t′) and showing that
s′ ≤ X using the “Zero-Knowledge Proof that a Committed Value is in Z2k”.
3. The votes were tallied correctly. This can be shown by publicly tallying the
commitments and opening the commitment to the election result afterwards.
This also proves that the opening values, i.e., the number of votes per candi-
date and the sum or product of the decommitment values, were determined
correctly. If this is not the case, then the authorities are not able to open the
commitment due to the computational binding property of the commitment
scheme used.
Note that all proofs have to be perfect zero-knowledge or witness hiding to ensure
voter privacy even in the presence of a computationally unbounded attacker. Fur-
thermore, they must be published to allow any third party to check correctness of
the proofs.
Private Verification Process
The private verification process only addresses the robustness of the election scheme
since correctness must be publicly verifiable. To be able to open the commitments
later on, the same values s and t must be used in the commitment and encryptions.
Therefore, the authority who generates these values must privately prove this fact by
showing knowledge of vote s, the random decommitment value t, and the randomness
used to generate the encryptions. The possible instantiations for this proof depend
on the used encryption and commitment scheme. However, a standard cut-and-
choose based verification protocol, as described in Section 5.1.1 can be used in any
case.
7.1.3 Tallying Protocol
In this section we describe a universally verifiable homomorphic tallying process
that provides everlasting privacy towards the public. Let there be m candidates and
K voters, and let i ∈ [1,m] range over all candidates and j ∈ [1, K] range over all
voters. Then for each candidate i the following steps are performed. An overview
is given in Figure 7.1
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Phase 1: System initialization
1. During the election setup, the system’s parameter for the encryption and com-
mitment scheme are generated by executing GenCom and Gen (see Section
2.2.2 and 2.2.1). The secret keys for the encryption scheme used are shared in
threshold fashion among several persons in authority, while the corresponding
public keys are published.
Phase 2: The voter’s perspective
1. Voter j chooses a candidate.
2. The DRE chooses decommitment values t1, . . . , tm and computes the commit-
ments and encryptions
〈Com(s1, t1),EncM(s1),EncR(t1), . . . ,Com(sm, tm),EncM(sm),EncR(tm)〉
= 〈u(j), v(j), w(j)〉.
3. The DRE shows the commitment u(j) to the voter and he or she can challenge
the encoding. In this case the used decommitment values are revealed and
the voter can verify the correct encoding either by recalculating or by using
software provided by a trusted third party (e.g., a mobile app). An audited
ballot cannot be cast, so he or she is asked to fill out a fresh one.
4. If the voter decides to cast the encoded vote, the DRE sends the commit-
ments and encrypted opening values to the electronic ballot box. Note that
private channels should be used to send the encryptions since they provide
computational privacy only. After the vote cast is stored in the ballot box,
the commitment is printed and handed out to the voter as receipt.
5. The DRE must perform the verification processes as explained in 7.1.2. It
published the commitments u(j) together with a zero-knowledge proof that
this is a valid vote on the bulletin board. Furthermore, the device needs to
privately prove towards the voting system (e.g., the electronic ballot box) that
the encrypted opening values are consistent with the commitments, i.e., s and
t are the same in the encryptions and commitments.
6. (Individual verifiability) As soon as the polling stations closed, the voters
can go to the bulletin board, type in their receipt ID, and verify that the
commitments to their vote u(j) is included in the list of votes cast.
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Figure 7.1: Information published on the bulletin board (left) and the privately processed
data (right).
Phase 3: Tallying and publishing the votes
1. The system computes v∗i =
∏
j vi(j) and w
∗
i =
∏
j wi(j), decrypts v
∗
i to s
∗
i
=̂
∑
j si(j) and w
∗
i to t
∗
i =̂
∑
j ti(j) with the help of the key trustees and
publishes the result on the bulletin board.
2. The system publicly computes u∗i =
∏
j ui(j) =̂ Com(s
∗
i , t
∗
i ).
Phase 4: Verification of the tally – universal verifiability
For each vote cast, the ID of the receipt and the value uj = 〈u1(j), . . . , um(j)〉 must
appear on the bulletin board. After the election, auditors and observers can check
the correctness of the tally, as follows:
1. For each i the verifier checks whether the votes were aggregated correctly by
computing u†i :=
∏
j ui(j) and verifying whether u
†
i
?
= u∗i .
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2. The verifier checks whether u†i
?
= Com(s∗i , t
∗
i ) using the opening values s
∗
i and
t∗i published by the system.
7.1.4 Assumptions and Properties
Our scheme relies on the following assumptions.
1. Assumption (O.4) as defined in Section 6.1.2: The authorities running the
electronic voting system cannot break the computational problem for the pa-
rameters chosen before the elections ends.
2. There exists a private channel that can be used to send encrypted information
(compare to Assumption (O.7) Section 6.1.2).
Based on these assumptions our scheme offers the same properties as standard sys-
tems using homomorphic tallying, but with everlasting privacy towards the public.
Correctness Even if all authorities conspire, correctness of the election outcome is
guaranteed. This is a consequence of the computational binding property of
the commitment scheme used.
Individual Verifiability The voters can verify the correctness of the ballot construc-
tion because of Phase 2.2 in Section 7.1.3, which allows them to challenge
the DRE and to verify the encoding. If each voter verifies one encoding,
then a cheating system has probability of 1
2
of being caught for each wrongly
constructed ballot. Furthermore, all voters are able to verify that their vote
appears on the bulletin board. As presented in Phase 2.4, u(j) is published
and thus each voter can verify that his or her encoded vote is contained in the
tally (Phase 2.5).
Universal Verifiability Any observer can verify that the tally was computed cor-
rectly. This follows immediately from the correctness and from the checks
described in Phase 4.1 and 4.2. Once correctness of u∗i has been verified, and
it has been confirmed that t∗i is the decommitment value of the encoded sum
s∗i , the election result s
∗
i must be correct (under the computational assumption
of the commitment scheme).
Everlasting Privacy Towards the Public The protocol provides everlasting privacy
towards the public, because the commitment scheme used is perfectly hiding.
So an encoded vote published on the bulletin board can be any voting deci-
sion with equal probability. Furthermore, all proofs presented to the voter to
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verify correctness are perfect zero-knowledge, so do not reveal any informa-
tion about the vote cast. To reveal the voting decision submitted by a voter,
an attacker needs additional information besides the data published by the
electronic voting system.
Robustness The sum of the aggregated votes can be decoded as long as the proof
of consistency provided by the DRE has been verified and a threshold number
of authorities attend the decryption process.
Since the opening values, consisting of the vote and the decommitment value, are
processed in encrypted form, this system does not provide everlasting privacy to-
wards authorities. Nevertheless, this property can, similar to the mix-net based
approach, be provided by secret sharing or organizational measures. We will discuss
this in the next section.
7.2 Scan Based Voting System Using Homomorphic
Tallying
There is only one paper based voting system that uses homomorphic tallying to
determine the election result, Scratch & Vote [AR06]. In this section we will first
give an overview of the classic scheme. Afterwards, we show how it can be adapted
such that it provides everlasting privacy and, finally, discuss the properties of the
improved version.
7.2.1 Voting Scheme Providing Everlasting Privacy Towards the
Public
Regarding the ballot layout, Scratch & Vote and Preˆt a` Voter use the same idea to
generate encrypted votes. The voters mark their preference on ballots that contain
the voting options in a random and secret ordering. Consequently, both schemes
have a similar ballot preparation and vote casting process. The main difference lies
in the encoding and tallying of the votes cast16.
In this section we assume that the candidate lists are generated by shifting the
initial candidate ordering. However, similar to Preˆt a` Voter, this process can be
16In addition, in [AR06] the authors propose a better auditing process. The random values used
to generate the encryptions are printed on an audit strip that is covered by a scratch field. This
allows checking the well-formedness of the ballots without having access to the private key.
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generalized to provide arbitrary candidate list17.
The Scratch & Vote Voting Scheme
Vote Encoding Since the candidate ordering differs from ballot to ballot, the posi-
tion marked by the voter does not reveal any information about the candidate
selected. Thus, we cannot apply the protocol presented in Section 7.1. Instead,
the entire ballot must be encrypted in one ciphertext.
The tallying procedure of Scratch & Vote is based on “homomorphic counters”
(formalized by [KMO01]) which works as follows: Suppose an election has
m candidates and K eligible voters. Then the bitspace of the plaintext is
partitioned in m separate counters of size L, {20, 2L, . . . , 2(m−1)L}, such that
K ≤ 2L.
Each candidate i ∈ [0,m− 1] is assigned to a counter 2iL and a bitspace from
bit iL to bit (i + 1)L − 1 of the plaintext. Each time a candidate receives a
vote, his or her corresponding counter is incremented.
Example. Assume we have three candidates Alice #0, Bob #1, and Carl #
2, and each candidate has a bitspace of L = 4. Adding 2 votes for Alice, 3
votes for Bob, and 1 vote for Carl leads to the following operations on the
plaintext.
0000 0000 0001 =̂ 20·4 =̂ Vote for Alice #0
+ 0000 0000 0001 =̂ 20·4 =̂ Vote for Alice #0
+ 0000 0001 0000 =̂ 21·4 =̂ Vote for Bob #1
+ 0000 0001 0000 =̂ 21·4 =̂ Vote for Bob #1
+ 0000 0001 0000 =̂ 21·4 =̂ Vote for Bob #1
+ 0001 0000 0000 =̂ 22·4 =̂ Vote for Carl #2
= 0001︸︷︷︸
1
0011︸︷︷︸
3
0010︸︷︷︸
2
=̂ 1 · 22·4 + 3 · 21·4 + 2 · 20·4
The number of votes cast for each candidate i can be revealed by evaluating
the corresponding bitspace of the plaintext.
Ballot Preparation The ballot consists of two halves which can be separated by
a perforation down the middle. The left hand side contains the permutated
17This can be achieved by choosing a random permutation that leads to one shift value per can-
didate instead of one shift value for the entire list.
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candidate list. The right hand side contains a box against each voting option,
where the voters can mark their choice and the respective encoded counter.
To preserve privacy, each counter is encrypted using an additively homomor-
phic encryption scheme Enc. Alternatively, the encrypted information can be
represented by a 2D barcode or an ID that links to corresponding information
published18. Furthermore, the right hand side contains an audit strip that can
be used to check the well-formedness of the ballot (see Figure 7.2). Each ballot
Figure 7.2: Initial candidate ordering (left), ballot paper (middle), and data published
on the bulletin board (right).
is generated by performing the following steps:
1. For each candidate i ∈ [0,m − 1] an encrypted counter is generated by
computing Enc(2iL).
2. A random shift value s is chosen and the candidate list and the list of
encoded counters are permuted.
3. An ID to the ballot is generated and published together with the en-
crypted counters on the bulletin board.
4. The ballot is printed using the shifted candidate list, the ID, and the
random values used to encrypt the counters.
Example. Assume the initial candidate ordering is (Alice #0, Bob #1, Carl
#2). For each candidate a counter is computed, that is Enc(20L) for Alice,
Enc(21L) for Bob, and Enc(22L) for Carl. The authorities choose a shift value
s = 2 and generate the permuted candidate list (Bob, Carl, Alice) and the list
of encoded counters (Enc(21L),Enc(22L),Enc(20L)).
18To provide receipt-freeness, the link should be hidden by a scratch field.
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Vote Tallying After the polling stations closed, the authorities aggregate all votes
cast into one single encrypted tally. This is performed by publicly multiplying
all ciphertexts associated to the marked bubbles leading to
Enc(a20L + b21L + . . .+ c2(m−1)L),
where a denotes the number of votes cast for candidate #0, b the number
of votes for candidate #1, and c the number of votes for candidate #m − 1
respectively. Finally, the election outcome is decrypted by the key trustees
and published.
Example. Assume L = 4 bits are used per candidate and 3 votes were cast.
Two for Alice, Enc(20L, r) and Enc(20L, r′), and one for Carl Enc(22L, r′′). Af-
terwards, all ciphertexts are multiplied obtaining Enc(2·20·4+1·22·4, r+r′+r′′).
Note that the election outcome can easily be obtained by evaluating the binary
representation of the plaintext, that is (0001︸︷︷︸
1
0000︸︷︷︸
0
0010︸︷︷︸
2
).
Scratch & Vote Providing Everlasting Privacy Towards the Public
The standard Scratch & Vote voting system has two vulnerabilities. First, it does not
provide everlasting privacy, and, second, the ballots are generated by one authority
only allowing the “printer knowledge” attack (see Section 3.1.1). In this section we
discuss possible improvements with respect to the encoding and ballot preparation
procedure. Details to the other election processes, for instance, the ballot printing,
vote casting, and auditing procedure, can be found in Section 6.1.
Everlasting Privacy Scratch & Vote can easily be improved to provide everlasting
privacy towards the public by replacing the published encrypted information with
unconditionally hiding commitments. More precisely, the counter for each candidate
i ∈ K is encoded using a randomly chosen decommiment value ti by computing
Com(2iL, ti). Afterwards, the opening values are encrypted using the encryption
algorithm EncM and EncR. A definition of these cryptographic primitives can be
found in Section 2.2. Note that Com and EncM must be additively homomorphic
with respect to the message space.
It follows that a vote for candidate i is represented by the following three compo-
nents.
〈ui, vi, wi〉 = 〈Com(2iL, ti),EncM(2iL),EncR(ti)〉
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For each ballot, the commitments for each candidate ui are published while the
corresponding encrypted opening values vi and wi are privately stored in a key
server. The auditing strip contains a scratch field that hides the decommitment
values t0, . . . , tm−1. This allows each voter to audit the well-formedness of some
ballots before voting.
After the vote casting process, the commitments associated to the marked posi-
tions are publicly multiplied, leading to
u∗ = Com(a20L + b21L + . . .+ c2(m−1)L, t∗),
where, similar to the classic approach, a constitutes the number of votes for candi-
date #0, b for #1, and c for #m− 1.
The system privately multiplies the corresponding encrypted opening values and
obtains
v∗ = EncM(a20L + b21L + . . .+ c2(m−1)L)
w∗ = EncR(t∗)
By opening the commitment using the decrypted opening values a20L + b21L +
. . . + c2(m−1)L and t∗, the system can prove that the election result was computed
correctly.
Printer Knowledge Both versions of Scratch & Vote, the standard and the im-
proved scheme, can easily be adapted such that ballots can be generated and printed
in distributed fashion. Note that for each additively homomorphic encryption
scheme Enc(s) it holds that
Enc(s)t = Enc(t · s).
Thus, assuming the participation of several clerks, a ballot can be generated in
distributed fashion by performing the following steps.
1. Clerk 1 generates a counter for each candidate by computing {20, 2L, . . . , 2(m−1)L}.
Afterwards, he or she chooses a random seed s1 and shuﬄes the list of candi-
dates and counters correspondingly,
{2(0−s1)·L, 2(1−s1)·L, . . . , 2(m−1−s1)·L}.
Finally, clerk 1 encodes each entry i ∈ [0,m− 1]
〈ui, vi, wi〉 = 〈Com(2(i−s1)L, ti),EncM(2(i−s1)L),EncR(ti)〉,
where ti is a randomly chosen decommitment value and sends this information
together with the encrypted data needed for printing (compare to Section
6.1.2) to the next clerk.
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2. Clerk 2 chooses a second seed s′2 at random. Afterwards, he or she updates
the encrypted data for printing as described in Section 6.1.2. Finally, the clerk
updates the counters by computing for each entry i ∈ [1,m− 1]
〈u′i, v′i, w′i〉 = 〈u2
−s′2L
i , v
2−s
′
2L
i , w
2−s
′
2L
i 〉
= 〈Com(2(i−s1)L, ti)2−s
′
2L ,EncM(2(i−s1)L)2
−s′2L ,EncR(ti)2
−s′2L〉
= 〈Com(2(i−s1−s′2)·L, 2−s′2L · ti),EncM(2(i−s1−s′2)·L),EncR(2−s′2L · ti)〉
= 〈Com(2(i−s2)·L, t′i),EncM(2(i−s2)·L),EncR(t′i)〉
3. All clerks process the data the same way. The final output is a permuted list
of candidates and a permuted set of counters where the knowledge of the shift
value used is shared among a set of clerks.
7.2.2 Properties
With respect to correctness, individual verifiability, universal verifiability,
and robustness this voting system provides the same properties as shown for the
homomorphic tallying protocol in Section 7.1.4. Furthermore, it provides receipt-
freeness if the ID printed on the ballot is hidden by a scratch field. With respect
to computational privacy this scheme improves the standard Scratch & Vote
voting system since it provides a distributed printing and ballot generation process
preventing the “authority knowledge” attack.
Furthermore, it also provides everlasting privacy towards the public because
only unconditionally hiding commitments are published. However, the encrypted
opening values are processed in the back end which is why the same organizational
measures, like for the improved Preˆt a` Voter scheme, are needed to provide ever-
lasting privacy towards the authorities. While the encoding of votes used in
mixing based voting schemes allows for secret sharing, this cannot be applied to ho-
momorphic counters. An authority is able to permute the shift value encrypted by
another authority, as explained for the distributed printing process. However, this is
not possible if both shares that constitute the shift values are available in encrypted
form only. On the one hand an additive encoding scheme is needed because in order
to increase the counters they must be added, i.e.,
Enc(a2s1) · Enc(2s1) = Enc((a+ 1) · 2s1)
On the other hand the shift values of two counters can be aggregated only if an
operation on the encryptions leads to a multiplication of the secret, i.e.,
Enc(2i−s1−s2) = Enc(2i−s1) · Enc(2−s2)
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But since all known primitives are either additively homomorphic or multiplicative
homomorphic another approach, for instance, based on the protocol by [CFSY96]
or by using some publicly verifiable multiparty computation techniques [CDN01,
BDO14] is needed. However, finding a layout and protocol that allows for secret
sharing is out of scope for this work and will be left for future work.

8 Towards a Voting Scheme Provid-
ing Non-Personalized Receipts
To provide verifiability, in many voting systems a receipt is handed out to the voters
containing their vote in encoded form. However, to reveal the votes cast, some
decoding information is needed. Even though the access key to this information
is shared among several persons in authority, the voter has to trust in a subset of
officials. Assumptions frequently made are, for instance, that at least one mix out
of n mixes is honest when using a mix-net for anonymization, or that a subset of
key holders keep their key shares secret. Thus, these schemes assume that voters
are willing to put trust in authorities.
In 2006, two new voting systems were proposed: a verifiable variant of the Farnel
scheme [ACG07] and Twist [RS07]. Both schemes introduce a different approach for
issuing receipts: a voter gets a receipt not of his or her own ballot, but of other ballots
already cast. As a result, voter privacy cannot be violated during the anonymization
and tallying procedure, even if all authorities collaborate. Unfortunately, the ballot
box used in these schemes have some drawbacks regarding correctness and privacy.
The decision which ballots are selected for a receipt depends on the order in which
the votes were cast. Especially the votes that have been submitted later have a lower
chance to be chosen. Usually only a subset of the votes cast is printed on receipts
and verified by voters. Furthermore, since each receipt can contain only votes that
have been submitted by predecessors, an attacker can get additional information by
collecting all receipts.
Thus, first we describe the improved verifiable Farnel scheme proposed by Arau´jo
and Ryan in 2008 [AR08] and summarize the vulnerabilities of the used receipt
generation process. Second, we propose a novel electronic ballot box that generates
receipts in a universal verifiable and efficient manner. Our solution improves the
classic receipt generation process of non-personalized receipts with respect to both
privacy and correctness.
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Figure 8.1: Ballot paper layout of the verifiable Farnel voting system. Top layer (left)
and bottom layer (right) generated with hash function H and random value r.
8.1 The Verifiable Farnel Voting Scheme
In this section we describe and analyze the Farnel voting scheme proposed by Arau´jo
and Ryan [AR08].
8.1.1 Ballot Form
The ballot layout used is composed of two layers. The top layer shows the candidate
names in random order and allows choosing them by marking the corresponding
bubble. In addition, it also includes a hash to the random candidate order and
the respective opening values, both hidden under scratch fields. If the voter fills
out a ballot, the position is recorded by the bottom layer which only contains a
scratch field hiding the hash value. Thus, the top layer shows the marked candidates
while the bottom layer reflects the same vote in encoded form (see Fig. 8.1). The
simultaneously completion of both layers can be provided by carbon paper or wholes
punched in the top layer.
8.1.2 Election Preparation
Prior to the vote casting process, a predefined number of ballot papers is audited.
The authorities reveal the hash and opening values and check their consistency with
respect to the used candidate order. Afterwards, the audited ballots are discarded.
Following, a predefined number, init, of initial votes is cast. The ballots should be
filled out such that each voting option gets the same amount of initial votes to not
give advantage to a particular candidate. The filled out top layers are cast in a
conventional ballot box, while the bottom layers are submitted to the Farnel Box.
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8.1.3 Vote Casting Process
The voter receives a ballot paper that he or she can either use to audit or to vote.
After the voter filled out the ballot, he or she puts it into a special envelope which
just shows the scratch surfaces but not the marked bubbles. Subsequently, he or
she leaves the secret polling booth and the poll workers verify that the layers have
not been separated and that the scratch surfaces are still intact. If the ballot was
filled out properly, the voter cast the top layer into the conventional ballot box.
Furthermore, he or she submits the bottom layer to the Farnel Box which removes
the scratch field, shuﬄes its content, and outputs a receipt that contains a subset
of votes cast by predecessors. Note that the votes printed on the receipt can, but
does not necessarily, include the vote cast by the voter him or herself.
8.1.4 Tallying Process
To determine the election result, both ballot boxes, the conventional box and the
Farnel Box, publish their content. More precisely, the scratch fields of all ballots
cast in the conventional box are revealed and it is checked whether the commitments
and opening values match the corresponding candidate list and whether the same
position has been marked on both layers. From the information published, each
voter can verify that the codes printed on his or her receipt are included in the
tally. Finally, the votes cast during the initialization process are subtracted and the
remaining votes are publicly tallied.
8.1.5 Drawbacks and Vulnerabilities
Compared to voting systems using personalized receipts, this scheme has some draw-
backs regarding correctness and privacy.
Correctness One drawback of the verifiable Farnel scheme is that the probability
of an encrypted vote to appear on a receipt depends on the time when the vote
was cast. Thus, votes that were submitted at the end of the vote casting process
have less chance being verified by other voters and can be replaced more easily (see
[Ara08]).
Privacy The fact that early cast votes have a higher chance of being selected than
the votes cast by the last voters leads to another drawback of the verifiable Farnel
scheme. The frequency of votes appearing on receipts might allow conclusions re-
garding the time when the votes were submitted (see [Ara08]). Having, for instance,
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K voters and correspondingly K receipts, the vote cast by the first voter may ap-
pear on K receipts while the vote cast by the last voter can be selected for the last
receipt only.
Another vulnerability is that this scheme is prone to vote clustering (see Section
3.1.2). The vote of the last voter, for instance, cannot be printed on receipts before
he or she submitted his or her vote. Thus, this voter can be mapped to a subset
of votes cast: all that have not been printed before the last voter cast his or her
vote. During the tallying process these votes become public and if this set does not
include at least one vote for each candidate, a coercer knows whom the last voter
did not vote for. More precisely, suppose we run an election with four candidates:
Alice, Bob, Carl, and Dave. The last voter votes and receives a ballot containing five
hashes. Two hashes link to votes for Alice and three to votes for Carl. In addition
a subset of hashes contained in the Farnel Box has not been printed on receipts.
If this subset contains only votes for Alice, Bob, and Carl, an attacker knows that
the last voter did not vote for Dave. Note that if a coercer wants to verify whether
bribed voters followed the instructions, it might be sufficient to know whom they
did not vote for.
This weakness has gone unnoticed so far and is not just a vulnerability with
respect to the privacy of the last voter. Assume the following situation: We have K
voters and voter number i ≤ K received a receipt containing his or her own vote.
In addition all votes, 1 to i− 1, that have been cast before and all votes cast during
the initialization process were chosen for at least one receipt. In this case we have
an “unintended intermediate result”. All votes contained in the Farnel Box were
printed. It follows that all initial votes and all votes cast by voter 1 to i are in this
subset, determined by the first i receipts. After the vote casting process, the receipts
are publicly decrypted. Therefore, an attacker can determine the intermediate result
after the first i voters cast their vote. He or she counts the values associated to the
hashes printed on the first i receipts and subtracts the votes cast in the initialization
phase. If this set does not include a vote for Alice the attacker knows that none of
the first i voters cast a vote for her. Note that this also allows conclusions regarding
the votes cast by the last K − i voters, for instance, if none of them voted for Bob.
8.2 Technical Details of an Electronic Ballot Box
To address the issues identified in the last section, we introduce a novel electronic
ballot box that generates receipts by weighted random sampling. Our solution can be
applied to voting systems that use a homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt the
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votes cast. Regarding correctness this approach provides a similar probability for all
votes cast being printed on receipts. Furthermore, the weights of votes submitted in
the initialization phase range between a low value  and 1 and are equally distributed
for all candidates. Thus, not all initial votes are selected at the beginning of the vote
casting process. Furthermore, some of them are not printed on receipts handed out
to voters, which is why the set of votes that do not show up on receipts contain votes
for all candidates. This addresses the privacy vulnerabilities described in Section
8.1.5 and allows voters to pass their receipt to helping organizations without risking
that an attacker is able to collect enough information to violate voter privacy.
In this section the technical details of the setup, vote casting, closing, and tallying
process are described.
8.2.1 Encoding of Votes
The input to the electronic ballot box are votes encrypted with a homomorphic
public-key encryption scheme as described in Section 2.2.1. This can, for instance,
be achieved by using the standard Preˆt a` Voter ballot which allows generating an
encrypted vote by filling out a paper ballot19.
8.2.2 Setup
In the following section we will describe the setup process for m candidates and K
ballots. For each position on each ballot an encryption is generated that reflects a
vote for the corresponding candidate. In addition to the stack of printed ballots,
each polling station receives a USB stick or CD containing these m ·K ciphertexts.
Then the device initializes itself by performing the following steps:
1. An input table is generated which contains all possible voting decisions for
each ballot in encrypted form
{Enc(vi,j, ti,j)}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤K ,
where j ∈ [1, K] denotes the ballot, i ∈ [1,m] the position, and ti,j the random
value20. Each row corresponds to one position on one ballot paper and records
the encrypted vote and a flag that is set when the position has been marked
by a voter.
19In this case the used public-key encryption scheme must be additive homomorphic. The correct
encryption can be verified by revealing the randomness used as “opening value”, similar to the
Benaloh Challenge [Ben07].
20Note that the paper ballots must be shuﬄed to prevent that voter j fills our ballot j.
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2. An output table is generated, similar to the mixing process described in Section
4.1, containing
• the reencrypted and shuﬄed ciphertexts of the input table,
pi{Enc(vi,j, t′i,j)}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤K where
Enc(vi,j, t
′
i,j) = Enc(vi,j, ti,j) · Enc(0),
• a flag that is set when the corresponding position on the scanned ballot
has been marked and
• a column that records a weight for each flagged entry initialized by 0 (see
Fig. 8.2).
3. Both tables, the input and the output table, are published together with
a proof of correct shuﬄing (see Section 2.2.3) on the public accessible bul-
letin board. It follows that any interested party can verify that the set of
anonymized encrypted votes,
pi{Enc(vi,j, t′i,j)}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤K
is a correct reencryption and shuﬄing of
{Enc(vi,j, ti,j)}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤K
such that both sets encrypt the same batch of voting decisions
{vi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤K .
Note that, to provide voter privacy, the electronic ballot box keeps the per-
mutation pi and the values used to reencrypt the input table secret.
4. A predefined number of initial votes are cast. Having ballots with m candi-
dates, then the weight, wi, for initial vote i is calculated by a function
f(i,m) ∈ [, 1]
which returns a weight that ranges between  ≥ 0 and 1. This function
must ensure equal probability of all candidates to be chosen during the receipt
generation process.
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Figure 8.2: The input and output table for three ballots and three candidates after the
setup phase.
8.2.3 Vote Recording
The filled out bottom layer is scanned and the ciphertext is sent to the electronic
ballot box.
1. The electronic ballot box records the vote cast by setting the corresponding
flags in both tables21.
2. The corresponding weight is set to a predefined value w, where 0 < w ≤ 1 (see
Fig. 8.3).
3. The electronic ballot box generates the data for the receipt using the accep-
tance/rejection method [Rub81]:
a) It randomly selects a row j with weight wj out of all flagged entries.
b) Then a value p between 0 and 1 is chosen uniformly at random. If p < wj
the vote is marked to be printed on the receipt and the weight is reduced
by factor q by calculating wj := wj · 1q . Otherwise the row is not marked.
c) Step 3(a) and 3(b) are repeated until l entries have been found, where l
denotes the number of votes printed on each receipt.
21Due to the proposed shuﬄing procedure the information which candidates have been marked
together on one ballot is lost. However, if needed, the process can easily be adapted, for instance,
by shuﬄing tuples that represent the entire ballot. The candidates chosen on each ballots can still
be marked by setting flags, which prevents an enlargement of the tables stored in the electronic
ballot box.
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Figure 8.3: The input and output table after three votes were cast.
Figure 8.4: Receipt generation
4. The electronic ballot box sends the set of l anonymous votes to the printer
that generates the receipt (see Fig. 8.4).
8.2.4 Closing
After the vote casting process, the correct functioning of the electronic ballot box
must be verified and all information have to be deleted.
1. After the last voter cast his or her vote, a batch of receipts is printed that is
verified by the authorities and/or helping organizations.
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2. The electronic ballot box publishes the input and output table on the bulletin
board. The set of recorded anonymized votes is
{Enc(vl)}Ll=1 := pi{Enc(vi,j, t′i,j)}(i,j)∈G,
where L = |G| is the number of votes cast and G consists of all tuples (i, j)
where position i has been marked on ballot j.
3. The electronic ballot box publicly proves that the subset of votes flagged in
the output table
pi{Enc(vi,j, t′i,j)}(i,j)∈G
is a correct reencryption and mixing of the set of scanned inputs, marked in
the input table
{Enc(vi,j, ti,j)}(i,j)∈G.
4. As in the Farnel scheme described in Section 8.1, the poll workers publish the
content of the electronic and classic ballot box.
5. If both sets are consistent and the proofs of correct shuﬄing hold, then all
information stored in the electronic ballot box is deleted.
Assuming that all information recorded by the electronic devices, such as the scanner
and the electronic ballot box, is irretrievably erased the link between voters and their
vote is destroyed.
8.2.5 Tallying
To tally the votes cast, the key holders jointly decrypt the published votes. Subse-
quently, the amount of votes cast during the initialization step is subtracted, followed
by publicly determining the election result.
8.2.6 Organizational and Technical Security Policies
The whole procedure, from setting up the electronic ballot box to verifying and
deleting the stored information, should be carried out in public. This allows any
interested party to observe that no data stored in the device is leaked. In addition,
the electronic ballot box should be protected from unauthorized access by imple-
menting an access control mechanism, where the access key is shared among several
persons in authority22. Authorized poll workers should be able to call functions and
22A hardware security model, for instance, could be used to provide these security requirements.
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insert challenges for the verification process but they must not have access to the
permutation and random values used. Furthermore, all hardware components, for
instance, the electronic ballot box, scanners, and printers, should not contain any
permanent memory and must be protected against side channel attacks.
8.3 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we summarize and discuss the results of our prototypical realiza-
tion with respect to correctness, verifiability, privacy, and efficiency. We only
implemented the receipt generation process since for the setup, shuﬄing, and ver-
ification process standard mix-net software can be used. Furthermore, we do not
discuss the requirements with respect to the ballot preparation and vote casting
process, like receipt-freeness, because this depends on the voting system used.
8.3.1 Correctness and Verifiability
Arau´jo performed several experiments to identify optimal parameters for the Farnel
Box [Ara08]. He used a constant number of 500 voters who cast one vote each,
a receipt size that varies between l = 1 and l = 5, and an initialization set, init,
of 100, 500, 800, and 1000 votes. To simplify the comparison, we used the same
parameters and set the number of candidate to 5. To get significant results, each
test was performed 10,000 times23.
The simulations by Arau´jo showed that the highest probability to detect a modi-
fied vote is 83.41%, which is achieved for an initialization set of 100 votes and 5 votes
printed on each receipt [Ara08, Fig. 3.5(b)]. Furthermore, his simulation showed
that the votes cast by the first 138 voters have a 99% chance of being selected for
at least one receipt, afterwards the probability falls exponentially.
To be able to compare our results, we first have to identify the optimal parameters
for weighted random selection for an initialization set of 100 votes. To determine
this we ran several tests and obtained the best results for the following values:
• Cast votes are initialized with weight w = 1.
• Votes chosen for a receipt are adapted with a reduction factor of q = 2.
• The minimum weight is  = 0.0002.
23We run tests with 10,000 iterations two times for the same parameters and the results only
slightly differed.
8.3 Implementation and Evaluation 113
• The weights for the votes cast in the initialization phase are calculated with
the function
f(1,m) = min(1,  · pb im c),
where m = 5 is the number of candidates per ballot, p = 3 a second reduction
factor, and i ∈ [1, 100] the index of the initial vote.
Note that by using a reduction factor p in the function f(1,m) we simulate the state
of the electronic ballot box after i votes have been cast and approximately i receipts
have been generated. The weight is set in a way that all candidates have the same
chance to be selected (see Tab. 8.1).
Table 8.1: Weights for the votes cast in the initialization phase
Initial Vote i Candidate Weight wi
1 1 0.0002
2 2 0.0002
3 3 0.0002
4 4 0.0002
5 5 0.0002
5 1 0.0004
6 2 0.0004
. . . . . . . . .
11 1 0.0008
. . . . . . . . .
61 1 0.8192
. . . . . . . . .
66 1 1
. . . . . . . . .
100 5 1
With weighted random selection votes that have not been printed on receipts so
far are preferentially selected. Our simulations show that, on average, the votes of
the first 452 voters appear with a probability of 99% using the same parameters
as Arau´jo. Only 30.1085 votes cast by voters were not printed on receipts. Thus,
weighted random selection also increases the probability to detect modified votes to
93.9783%. Note that for correctness we do not take into account that after the vote
casting process has ended, additional receipts are printed and verified, since this is
not carried out by voters. Nevertheless, auditors will do some additional tests and
thus, in practice, the probability of detecting manipulations is higher.
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8.3.2 Privacy
Our proposal is not only an improvement with respect to correctness, but also with
respect to privacy. Using weighted random selection early cast votes do not appear
more often on receipts than votes that were cast later. This prevents statistical
attacks on receipts. Furthermore, we ran experiments to check whether
1. an “unintended intermediate result” can be computed; and
2. voters can be mapped to a subset of votes cast.
We ran 10,000 simulations with the parameters determined for 5 candidates and
the event of an “unintended intermediate result” never occurred. Furthermore, on
the average 3.955 initial votes per candidate were not printed on receipts. This
sufficiently hides the voting decisions cast by the last voters. Furthermore, tests
carried out with a prototypical implementation also showed that the number of
initial votes can be lowered with respect to the number of candidates while still
getting satisfying results regarding privacy.
However, for voter privacy it is essential that the data stored in the electronic
ballot box is not leaked. Thus, the device should be observed during the whole
duration of use. This is possible because the ballot box is set up and ran in the
polling station. After the vote casting process, before the votes are decrypted, all
information stored on the electronic ballot box is publicly deleted. Under the as-
sumption that the tables are irrevocably erased, the link between the votes contained
in the tally and the scanned information is destroyed and voter privacy is ensured.
This allows a higher level of privacy compared to voting systems with personalized
receipts because the voters do not have to put trust in officials keeping their key
shares secret.
8.3.3 Efficiency
The large number of initial votes that were not printed on receipts allowed us to re-
duce the size of the initialization set needed to ensure voter privacy. We ran several
tests to determine the number of initial votes. All tests measured correctness, i.e.,
the probability of detecting a modified vote, the number of initial votes per candi-
date that remain in the electronic ballot box, and checked whether an “unintended
intermediate result” can be computed. We summarized our results for 5, 10, and 20
candidates in Table 8.2.
For ballots that contain less than 10 candidates we could reduce the number of
votes that have to be cast in the initialization phase. Such a smaller number of
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Table 8.2: Size of the initialization set for elections with 5, 10, and 20 candidates having
500 voters and 5 votes per receipt
Candidates m 5 10 20
Initial Votes init 50 100 140
Weight w 1 1 1
Reduction Factor q 2 2 2
Initialization
Function f(1,m) min(1, 0.002 · 3b i5 c) min(1, 0.002 · 4b i10 c) min(1, 0.002 · 4b i20 c)
Correctness 96.8538 94.7801 91.3626
Unpublished Initial
Votes per Candidate 1.4677 1.5849 1.625
Unpublished Votes Cast 15.7310 26.0995 43.1869
initial votes is an improvement with respect to two aspects. First, this means less
work for officials and, second, a small initialization set increases the probability that
all votes cast are chosen at least once. For 5 candidates the probability of detecting
a modification could be increased from 93.9783% to 96.8538%. Furthermore, on the
average, the number of votes cast in the initialization step that were not printed on
receipts is 1.4677. This makes it impossible for an attacker to distinguish from the
published information which votes were cast by the last voters and which were cast
during the initialization phase.
To analyze the efficiency for 500 voters, 20 candidates, and a receipt size of 5,
we built a table for 1,500 ballots. The table consists of 30,000 rows, 20 rows per
ballot. The execution times for the receipt generation were measured on an Intel(R)
Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU T7500 at 2.20GHz. We run 10,000 tests and the average
time was 91,254 ns while 836,070 ns was the maximum time needed to select 5 votes
for a receipt.
8.3.4 Verifiability
To verify that the votes were processed correctly, we have to check that all votes are
recorded as intended and tallied as recorded.
Recorded as Intended
As in the verifiable Farnel scheme, during the vote casting process, the set of filled
out ballots is collected in a conventional ballot box. After the vote casting process
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has ended this batch is scanned and compared with the batch of scanned ballots
marked by the electronic ballot box. This ensures that the device sets the flags
for the correct entries in the input table. Instead of checking the consistency of all
ballots, alternatively, spot tests can be carried out.
Subsequently, after the vote casting process has ended, the electronic ballot box
publishes the set of votes marked in the input table and the set of anonymized votes
printed on receipts. Then it uses a proof of correct shuﬄing to publicly prove that
both sets encrypt the same batch of votes cast. This ensures consistency between
the input and output table with respect to the rows marked.
Tallied as Recorded
During the vote casting process, each voter receives a receipt containing a subset
of anonymized votes cast by predecessors. This allows him or her to verify that
the ciphertexts printed on their receipt are included in the tally. Thus, if the elec-
tronic ballot box during the vote casting process or authorities afterwards modified,
deleted, or replaced votes this will be detected under the assumption that a sufficient
number of voters check their receipt.
The size of the initialization set, the number of votes printed on each receipt and
the number of receipts printed after the last voter cast his or her vote is chosen so
that each vote cast is printed on at least one receipt with high probability.
Robustness
The system provides robustness because the filled-out top layers are collected in a
conventional ballot box. This allows recounting in case of a malfunction or break-
down.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we analyzed and improved verifiable voting systems with respect to
privacy. First, we introduced a generic verification process that allows verifying the
correctness of the anonymization process used in mixing based voting systems. In
contrast to other efficient approaches, this process prevents that encoded votes can
be linked to a subset of possible voting options, even if only one mix acts honestly.
Furthermore, our solution is competitive with respect to correctness and efficiency.
Furthermore, we introduced two novel universally verifiable mix-nets: one that
provides everlasting privacy with respect to the information published and one that
provides everlasting privacy towards both the public and the authorities. A very
important property of these mixing protocols is that they can be applied to exist-
ing voting schemes without significant changes to the classic implementation. We
showed how the first mix-net can be used to introduce everlasting privacy to Preˆt
a` Voter and described how the second protocol improves the Split-Ballot voting
system.
Subsequently, we proposed a homomorphic tallying procedure that provides verifi-
ability and everlasting privacy. This protocol can be used to improve poll-site voting
systems where the votes are homomorphically tallied, such as Scratch & Vote.
Finally, we analyzed how non-personalized receipts can be generated using the
example of the Farnel voting scheme. We introduced an improved electronic ballot
box which allows generating receipts in an efficient and universally verifiable manner.
Due to a weighted random sampling when choosing the votes for receipts, the classic
approach was improved regarding correctness and privacy. The set of votes cast that
are printed at least on one receipt was increased, raising the probability of detecting
modified votes. Furthermore, by collecting all receipts, an attacker cannot reduce
the set of recorded voting options containing the votes cast by the last voters.
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Comparison
In this work we improved four voting systems, Preˆt a` Voter, Split-Ballot, Scratch
& Vote, and Farnel with respect to privacy. All these schemes have their advan-
tages and disadvantages. The new version of Preˆt a` Voter, for instance, provides
everlasting privacy towards the public. However, to ensure everlasting privacy to-
wards the authorities certain organizational measures are needed since one malicious
computationally unbounded authority is enough to violate voter privacy.
By contrast, Split-Ballot has no single point of failure with respect to everlasting
privacy but a more complex vote casting process because the ballot consists of three
layers and two mix-nets are used that must be verified by auditors and observers.
Furthermore, it is not clear how the ballot layout can be modified to provide an
arbitrary candidate order. Thus, the candidate lists can only be shifted cyclicly and
privacy is not provided if each voter cast more than one vote. Thus, this scheme is
not suitable for all elections.
In Scratch & Vote, the votes are tallied homomorphically. Compared to Preˆt a`
Voter and Split-Ballot, no mix-net needs to be used and verified which is why this
scheme demands less work for authorities and voters. However, Scratch & Vote can
only be used for elections where the outcome can be determined by homomorphic
tallying. If a ballot has certain restrictions, for instance, two choices may not be
marked together on one ballot, it must be possible to evaluate the filled-out ballot.
More precisely, suppose the ballot papers have a “spoil” option and each voter is
allowed to either cast two votes or to spoil the ballot. If he or she marked the bubble
associated to “spoil” and selected a further candidate, the vote for the candidate
does not count. In this case the votes cannot be tallied homomorphically. To check
whether the voters followed this restriction, all ballots must be evaluated prior to
the tallying process. Furthermore, similar to Preˆt a` Voter the improved version of
Scratch & Vote does not allow for secret sharing and provides everlasting privacy
towards the authorities only under certain organizational measures.
Farnel differs significantly from the other schemes with respect to correctness,
verifiability, and privacy. Correctness and verifiability depend on the number of
votes cast that appear at least once on a receipt. This puts the last voters at a
disadvantage, because their votes have a lower change to be chosen. Furthermore,
privacy is provided only if all information recorded by the electronic Farnel box is
destroyed before the votes are decrypted and tallied. However, this approach is the
first step in the direction of verifiable voting systems where not only the correctness
of the tallying process can be verified but also voter privacy becomes observable,
similar to a traditional voting system. If no information is leaked during the use
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of the Farnel Box in the polling station and if all data stored on the memory is
destroyed in public, voters can have confidence that the used voting system protects
their privacy. In all other schemes, Preˆt a` Voter, Split-Ballot, and Scratch & Vote,
they must put trust in a subset of key holders.
Which of those systems fits best for an election depends on the electoral sys-
tem and its legal regulation. In some cases, organizational measures might be not
sufficient to preserve everlasting privacy. In other cases, procedural controls are ac-
ceptable but the ballot layout should be as simple as possible. Furthermore, in some
elections each voter selects only one candidate while in other elections he or she has
more than one vote or several races on one ballot. Also with respect to verifiability
the requirements may differ. While some legal regulations might enforce that each
voter should be allowed to verify that his or her own vote is contained in the tally,
other regulations may prefer that the link between a voter and his or her vote is
broken during the vote casting process. Thus, the decision which voting system
should be used needs to be discussed for each election individually.
Future Work
Before an electronic voting system can be applied to a particular legally binding elec-
tion, further research with respect to all electoral principles is necessary. Further-
more, it needs to be analyzed to which extent the scheme meets other requirements
of the electoral system, like scalability, usability, efficiency, and election versatil-
ity. Ballots using a random candidate ordering, for instance, are not well-suited for
elections with a large number of candidates.
Especially with respect to impersonalized receipts further research is necessary.
The receipt generation process presented in this work has been only experimentally
tested. To determine optimal parameters for different elections, another more an-
alytical analysis should follow. But also other schemes parented here need to be
further elaborated. The layout of Split-Ballot, for instance, should be improved
such that it provides arbitrary candidate lists and not only shifted ones. Further-
more, a scan-based voting system that allows for homomorphic tallying and secret
sharing should be developed. Using Scratch & Vote everlasting privacy towards the
authorities can be provided by organizational measures only.
The contribution of this work with respect to everlasting privacy, the mixing and
tallying process, are generic in the sense that they can be applied to other protocols
that use homomorphic tallying and/or mix-nets. With respect to online voting, for
instance, everlasting privacy has so far only be introduced to Helios. But there
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are other systems and we think that by applying our ideas it might be possible to
transform them as well. Furthermore, especially the mixing process can be applied
to many other applications. Mix-nets are widely used, for instance, in electronic
auctions [HGP09, BMC04] and electronic exam systems [HP10]. Furthermore, they
may be of particular interest for invitations to bid and online surveys.
With respect to privacy usually only computationally bounded attackers are con-
sidered. However, this work shows that only minor changes are needed to guarantee
privacy unconditionally. We hope that this becomes a common goal not only in the
field of electronic voting but also for other applications where privacy of users is of
special importance.
Bibliography
[AC10] Jordi Puiggal´ı Allepuz and Sandra Guasch Castello´. Universally verifi-
able efficient re-encryption mixnet. In Electronic Voting, pages 241–254,
2010. Cited on pages 37 and 38.
[ACG07] Roberto Arau´jo, Ricardo Felipe Custo´dio, and Jeroen van de Graaf. A
verifiable voting protocol based on Farnel. In Workshop On Trustworthy
Elections (WOTE), June 2007. Cited on pages 7, 12, and 103.
[ACG10] Roberto Arau´jo, Ricardo Felipe Custo´dio, and Jeroen van de Graaf.
A verifiable voting protocol based on Farnel. In Towards Trustworthy
Elections, pages 274–288, 2010. Cited on page 28.
[AI03] Masayuki Abe and Hideki Imai. Flaws in some robust optimistic mix-
nets. In ACISP, pages 39–50, 2003. Cited on page 35.
[AR06] Ben Adida and Ronald L. Rivest. Scratch & Vote: self-contained paper-
based cryptographic voting. In Workshop on Privacy in Electronic So-
ciety (WPES), pages 29–40, 2006. Cited on pages 3 and 95.
[AR08] Roberto Arau´jo and Peter Y. A. Ryan. Improving the Farnel voting
scheme. In Electronic Voting, pages 169–184, 2008. Cited on pages 12,
103, and 104.
[Ara08] Roberto Samarone dos Santos Arau´jo. On Remote and Voter-Verifiable
Voting. PhD thesis, TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Dezember 2008. Cited
on pages 105 and 112.
[BBE+13] Josh Benaloh, Michael D. Byrne, Bryce Eakin, Philip T. Kortum, Neal
McBurnett, Olivier Pereira, Philip B. Stark, Dan S. Wallach, Gail
Fisher, Julian Montoya, Michelle Parker, and Michael Winn. Star-
vote: A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system. In
EVT/WOTE, 2013. Cited on page 3.
122 Bibliography
[BCD+09] Michael Backes, Tongbo Chen, Markus Du¨rmuth, Hendrik P. A. Lensch,
and Martin Welk. Tempest in a teapot: Compromising reflections re-
visited. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 315–327,
2009. Cited on page 23.
[BCH+12a] Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Thea Peacock, Pe-
ter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan, Vanessa
Teague, Roland Wen, and Zhe Xia. A supervised verifiable voting pro-
tocol for the victorian electoral commission. In Electronic Voting, pages
81–94, 2012. Cited on page 59.
[BCH+12b] Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Thea Peacock, Peter
Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Vanessa Teague, Roland Wen, Zhe (Jo-
son) Xia, and Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan. Using Preˆt a` Voter in Victoria
State Elections. In Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trust-
worthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), 2012. Cited on pages 59 and 60.
[BDG+10] Michael Backes, Markus Du¨rmuth, Sebastian Gerling, Manfred Pinkal,
and Caroline Sporleder. Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers. In
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 307–322, 2010. Cited on page 23.
[BDG13] Johannes Buchmann, Denise Demirel, and Jeroen van de Graaf. To-
wards a publicly-verifiable mix-net providing everlasting privacy. In
Financial Cryptography, pages 197–204, 2013. Cited on page 45.
[BDO14] Carsten Baum, Ivan Damg˚ard, and Claudio Orlandi. Publicly auditable
secure multi-party computation. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2014:75, 2014. Cited on page 101.
[Ben07] Josh Benaloh. Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station
auditing. In Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT), pages 14–
14, 2007. Cited on page 107.
[BG02] Dan Boneh and Philippe Golle. Almost entirely correct mixing with
applications to voting. In ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, pages 68–77, 2002. Cited on page 35.
[BL11] Josh Benaloh and Eric Lazarus. The trash attack: An attack on veri-
fiable voting systems and a simple mitigation. Technical Report MSR-
TR-2011-115, Microsoft, 2011. Cited on page 13.
Bibliography 123
[BMC04] Mike Burmester, Emmanouil Magkos, and Vassilios Chrissikopoulos.
Uncoercible e-bidding games. Electronic Commerce Research, 4(1-
2):113–125, 2004. Cited on page 120.
[BMQR07] Jens-Matthias Bohli, Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade, and Stefan Ro¨hrich. Bingo
Voting: secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number
generator. In VOTE-ID, pages 111–124, 2007. Cited on page 7.
[BT94] Josh Cohen Benaloh and Dwight Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot
elections (extended abstract). In STOC, pages 544–553, 1994. Cited
on pages 3 and 16.
[CCC+09] David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Ste-
fan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen,
Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora. Scantegrity II: end-to-end veri-
fiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes.
IEEE TransIFS, 4(4):611–627, 2009. Cited on page 6.
[CCM08] Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew C. Myers. Civitas:
Toward a secure voting system. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 354–368, 2008. Cited on page 4.
[CDN01] Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damg˚ard, and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Multi-
party computation from threshold homomorphic encryption. In EU-
ROCRYPT, pages 280–299, 2001. Cited on page 101.
[CEC+08] David Chaum, Aleksander Essex, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Ste-
fan Popoveniuc, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora. Scantegrity:
End-to-end voter-verifiable optical-scan voting. IEEE Security & Pri-
vacy, 6(3):40–46, 2008. Cited on page 3.
[CFSY96] Ronald Cramer, Matthew K. Franklin, Berry Schoenmakers, and Moti
Yung. Multi-autority secret-ballot elections with linear work. In EU-
ROCRYPT, pages 72–83, 1996. Cited on pages 7, 12, and 101.
[CGS97] Ronald Cramer, Rosario Gennaro, and Berry Schoenmakers. A se-
cure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In EU-
ROCRYPT, pages 103–118, 1997. Cited on page 3.
[Cha81] David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Commun. ACM, 24(2):pp. 84–88, 1981. Cited on page
19.
124 Bibliography
[Cha85] David Chaum. Showing credentials without identification: Signatures
transferred between unconditionally unlinkable pseudonyms. In EURO-
CRYPT, pages 241–244, 1985. Cited on page 27.
[Cha88] David Chaum. Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and dis-
ruption equivalent to breaking RSA. In EUROCRYPT, pages 177–182,
1988. Cited on page 7.
[Cha02] David Chaum. Secret-ballot receipts and transparent integrity – im-
proving voter confidence and electronic voting at polling places, 2002.
Cited on pages 25, 37, and 38.
[Cha04] David Chaum. Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(1):38–47, 2004. Cited on page 3.
[CP92] David Chaum and Torben P. Pedersen. Wallet databases with observers.
In CRYPTO, pages 89–105, 1992. Cited on page 40.
[CP07] Danny De Cock and Bart Preneel. Electronic voting in Belgium: Past
and future. In VOTE-ID, pages 76–87, 2007. Cited on page 1.
[CPP13] Edouard Cuvelier, Olivier Pereira, and Thomas Peters. Election verifi-
ability or ballot privacy: Do we need to choose? In ESORICS, pages
481–498, 2013. Cited on page 47.
[CRS05] David Chaum, Peter Y. A. Ryan, and Steve A. Schneider. A practical
voter-verifiable election scheme. In ESORICS, pages 118–139, 2005.
Cited on pages 3 and 63.
[Cus01] Ricardo Custo´dio. Farnel: um protocolo de votac¸a˜o papel com verifi-
cabilidade parcial. Invited Talk at Simpo´sio Seguranc¸a em Informa´tica
(SSI), November 2001. Cited on page 12.
[DGA12] Denise Demirel, Jeroen van de Graaf, and Roberto Arau`jo. Improv-
ing Helios with everlasting privacy towards the public. In Electronic
Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE),
August 2012. Cited on pages 12 and 89.
[DH12] Denise Demirel and Maria Henning. Legal analysis of privacy weak-
nesses in poll-site evoting systems. Jusletter IT - Die Zeitschrift fu¨r IT
und Recht, 2012. Cited on pages 21 and 28.
Bibliography 125
[DHG+13] Denise Demirel, Maria Henning, Jeroen van de Graaf, Peter Y. A. Ryan,
and Johannes Buchmann. Preˆt a` voter providing everlasting privacy.
In VOTE-ID, pages 156–175, 2013. Cited on pages 59, 74, 76, and 83.
[DHR+11] Denise Demirel, Maria Henning, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider,
and Melanie Volkamer. Feasibility analysis of Preˆt a` Voter for German
Federal Elections. In VOTE-ID, pages 158–173, 2011. Cited on pages
4, 21, 59, and 68.
[DJV12] Denise Demirel, Hugo Jonker, and Melanie Volkamer. Random block
verification: Improving the Norwegian electoral mix-net. In Electronic
Voting, pages 65–78, 2012. Cited on page 31.
[DK01] Ivan Damg˚ard and Maciej Koprowski. Practical threshold RSA signa-
tures without a trusted dealer. In EUROCRYPT, pages 152–165, 2001.
Cited on page 18.
[ECA10] Aleksander Essex, Jeremy Clark, and Carlisle Adams. Aperio: High
integrity elections for developing countries. In Towards Trustworthy
Elections, pages 388–401, 2010. Cited on page 7.
[ECHA10] Aleksander Essex, Jeremy Clark, Urs Hengartner, and Carlisle Adams.
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election ver-
ification. In Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections (EVT/WOTE), pages 1–16, 2010. Cited on page 8.
[FCS06] Kevin Fisher, Richard Carback, and Alan T. Sherman. Punchscan:
Introduction and system definition of a high-integrity election system.
In Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE), 2006. Cited on page
71.
[Fed09] Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. Voting computer judgement.
(BVerfGE) - Judicial decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany, 123:39, 2009. Cited on pages 1 and 31.
[FS86] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions
to identification and signature problems. In CRYPTO, pages 186–194,
1986. Cited on page 48.
[FS01] Pierre-Alain Fouque and Jacques Stern. Fully distributed threshold
RSA under standard assumptions. In ASIACRYPT, pages 310–330,
2001. Cited on page 18.
126 Bibliography
[FS03] Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier. Practical cryptography. Wiley, 2003.
Cited on page 27.
[GHB+06] Rop Gonggrijp, Willem-Jan Hengeveld, Andreas Bogk, Dirk Engling,
Hannes Mehnert, Frank Rieger, Pascal Scheffers, and Barry Wels.
Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer; a security analysis, 2006.
Cited on page 23.
[GJKR99] Rosario Gennaro, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, and Tal Rabin.
Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems.
In EUROCRYPT, pages 295–310, 1999. Cited on page 18.
[Gov] Ministry of local government and modernisation - the e-vote
trial. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/krd/prosjekter/
e-vote-trial.html?id=597658. Accessed: 2014-05-23. Cited on
pages 6 and 37.
[Gra09] Jeroen van de Graaf. Voting with unconditional privacy by merging Preˆt
a` voter and PunchScan. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 4(4):674–684, 2009. Cited on page 8.
[Gro10] Jens Groth. Short pairing-based non-interactive zero-knowledge argu-
ments. In ASIACRYPT, pages 321–340, 2010. Cited on pages 4, 20,
47, and 62.
[GZB+02] Philippe Golle, Sheng Zhong, Dan Boneh, Markus Jakobsson, and Ari
Juels. Optimistic mixing for exit-polls. In ASIACRYPT, pages 451–465,
2002. Cited on pages 5 and 35.
[HDV12] Maria Henning, Denise Demirel, and Melanie Volkamer. O¨ffentlichkeit
vs. Verifizierbarkeit - Inwieweit erfu¨llt mathematische Verifizierbarkeit
den Grundsatz der O¨ffentlichkeit der Wahl. Internationalen Rechtsin-
formatik Symposiums, IRIS 2012, pages 213–220, 2012. Cited on page
2.
[Hea07] James Heather. Implementing STV securely in Preˆt a` Voter. In CSF,
pages 157–169, 2007. Cited on page 63.
[HGP09] Jaydeep Howlader, Anushma Ghosh, and Tandra DebRoy Pal. Secure
Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Electronic Auction, pages 228–239. 2009. Cited
on page 120.
Bibliography 127
[HL08] James Heather and David Lundin. The append-only web bulletin board.
In Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, pages 242–256, 2008. Cited
on page 32.
[HP10] Andrea Huszti and Attila Petho¨. A secure electronic exam system.
Publicationes Mathematicae Debrecen, 77/3.-4.:299–312, 2010. Cited
on page 120.
[JFR13] Rui Joaquim, Paulo Ferreira, and Carlos Ribeiro. Eviv: An end-to-end
verifiable internet voting system. Computers & Security, 32:170–191,
2013. Cited on page 3.
[JJR02] Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels, and Ronald L. Rivest. Making mix nets
robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 339–353, 2002. Cited on pages 20, 25, 31,
and 37.
[Jon03] Douglas W. Jones. A brief illustrated history of voting. 2003. Cited
on page 1.
[JRF09] Rui Joaquim, Carlos Ribeiro, and Paulo Ferreira. Veryvote: A voter
verifiable code voting system. In VOTE-ID, pages 106–121, 2009. Cited
on page 3.
[Kal03] Burt Kaliski. RSA laboratories - TWIRL and RSA key size, May 2003.
Cited on page 27.
[KMHU04] Arthur M. Keller, David Mertz, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, and Arnold B.
Urken. Privacy issues in an electronic voting machine. In WPES, pages
33–34, 2004. Cited on page 23.
[KMO01] Jonathan Katz, Steven Myers, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Cryptographic
counters and applications to electronic voting, 2001. Cited on page 96.
[KSW05] Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner. Cryptographic voting
protocols: A systems perspective. In USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 33–50, August 2005. Cited on page 23.
[KTW12] Shahram Khazaei, Bjo¨rn Terelius, and Douglas Wikstro¨m. Cryptanal-
ysis of a universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2012:100, 2012. Cited on pages 6 and 38.
128 Bibliography
[Kuh04] Markus G. Kuhn. Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel
displays. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 88–107, 2004. Cited
on page 23.
[Kuh07] Dr. Markus Kuhn. Bericht u¨ber eine Kurzuntersuchung zur Ein-
scha¨tzung des Risikos kompromittierender RF Abstrahlungen eines dig-
italen Wahlstifts, 2007. Cited on page 23.
[KW13] Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikstro¨m. Randomized partial checking
revisited. In CT-RSA, pages 115–128, 2013. Cited on page 37.
[LZ12] Helger Lipmaa and Bingsheng Zhang. A more efficient computationally
sound non-interactive zero-knowledge shuﬄe argument. In SCN, pages
477–502, 2012. Cited on pages 4, 20, 47, and 62.
[MN06] Tal Moran and Moni Naor. Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting
with everlasting privacy. In CRYPTO, pages 373–392, 2006. Cited on
pages 3, 7, and 15.
[MN07] Tal Moran and Moni Naor. Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with
distributed trust. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, pages 246–255, 2007. Cited on pages 7 and 24.
[MN10] Tal Moran and Moni Naor. Split-ballot voting: Everlasting privacy with
distributed trust. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 13(2), 2010. Cited on
pages 7, 32, 47, 82, and 90.
[Nef04] C. Andrew Neff. Practical high certainty intent verification for en-
crypted votes. 2004. Cited on page 3.
[Ped91] Torben P. Pedersen. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
(extended abstract). In EUROCRYPT, pages 522–526, 1991. Cited on
page 18.
[PH06] Stefan Popoveniuc and Ben Hosp. An introduction to punchscan. In
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE), 2006. Cited on page 3.
[Pie08] Wolter Pieters. La volonte machinale: understanding the electronic
voting controversy. UB Nijmegen [Host], 2008. Cited on page 16.
[Pie09] Wolter Pieters. Combatting electoral traces: The dutch tempest dis-
cussion and beyond. In VOTE-ID, pages 172–190, 2009. Cited on page
23.
Bibliography 129
[PIK93] Choonsik Park, Kazutomo Itoh, and Kaoru Kurosawa. Efficient anony-
mous channel and all/nothing election scheme. In EUROCRYPT, pages
248–259, 1993. Cited on pages 4 and 20.
[RB04] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Jeremy Bryans. A simplified version of the chaum
voting scheme. Technical Report CS-TR 843, University of Newcastle
upon Tyne, May 2004. Cited on page 59.
[RBH+09] Peter Y. A. Ryan, David Bismark, James Heather, Steve Schneider, and
Zhe Xia. Preˆt a` Voter: a voter-verifiable voting system. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, 4(4):662–673, 2009. Cited on pages 3, 16, 17,
and 59.
[Riv06] Ronald L. Rivest. The ThreeBallot voting system, 2006. Cited on page
7.
[RP05] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Thea Peacock. Preˆt a` Voter: a systems perspec-
tive. Technical report, 2005. Cited on page 29.
[RP10] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Thea Peacock. A threat analysis of Preˆt a` Voter.
In Towards Trustworthy Elections, pages 200–215, 2010. Cited on pages
22, 28, 59, 60, and 68.
[RS06] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Steve A. Schneider. Preˆt a` Voter with re-
encryption mixes. In ESORICS, pages 313–326, 2006. Cited on page
63.
[RS07] Ronald L. Rivest and Warren D. Smith. Three voting protocols: Three-
ballot, VAV, and Twin. In Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
(EVT), pages 16–16, 2007. Cited on pages 12, 28, and 103.
[Rub81] Reuven Y. Rubinstein. Simulation and the Monte Carlo Method. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 1981. Cited on
page 109.
[Sch91] Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. J.
Cryptology, 4(3):161–174, 1991. Cited on page 40.
[Sek10] Hidenori Sekiguchi. Information leakage of input operation on touch
screen monitors caused by electromagnetic noise. In IEEE International
Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), pages 127–131,
2010. Cited on page 23.
130 Bibliography
[SFCC11] Alan T. Sherman, Russell A. Fink, Richard Carback, and David
Chaum. Scantegrity III: automatic trustworthy receipts, highlighting
over/under votes, and full voter verifiability. In Electronic Voting Tech-
nology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), pages 7–23,
2011. Cited on page 3.
[SK95] Kazue Sako and Joe Kilian. Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme - a
practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth. In EURO-
CRYPT, pages 393–403, 1995. Cited on pages 4, 31, 35, and 36.
[Smu90] Peter Smulders. The threat of information theft by reception of electro-
magnetic radiation from RS-232 cables. Computers & Security, 9(1):53–
58, 1990. Cited on page 23.
[SSC+11] Steve Schneider, Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan, Chris Culnane, James
Heather, and Zhe Xia. Preˆt a` Voter with write-ins. In VOTE-ID,
pages 174–189, 2011. Cited on page 63.
[Str06] Charlie E. M. Strauss. A critical review of the triple ballot voting
system. part2: Cracking the triple ballot encryption. Draft Version 1.5,
Verified Voting New Mexico, 2006. Cited on page 7.
[TW10] Bjo¨rn Terelius and Douglas Wikstro¨m. Proofs of restricted shuﬄes. In
AFRICACRYPT, pages 100–113, 2010. Cited on page 4.
[VP09] Martin Vuagnoux and Sylvain Pasini. Compromising electromagnetic
emanations of wired and wireless keyboards. In USENIX Security Sym-
posium, pages 1–16, 2009. Cited on page 23.
[Wik03] Douglas Wikstro¨m. Five practical attacks for ”optimistic mixing for
exit-polls”. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, pages 160–175, 2003.
Cited on page 35.
[XCH+10] Zhe Xia, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Hugo Jonker, Peter Y. A.
Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, and Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan. Versatile
Preˆt a` Voter: Handling multiple election methods with a unified in-
terface. In INDOCRYPT, pages 98–114, 2010. Cited on pages 4, 59,
and 63.
[XSH+07] Zhe Xia, Steve A. Schneider, James Heather, Peter Y. A. Ryan, David
Lundin, Roger Peel, and P. Howard. Preˆt a` Voter: All-in-one. In
Bibliography 131
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE), pages 47–56, 2007. Cited
on page 63.
[XSHT08] Zhe Xia, Steve A. Schneider, James Heather, and Jacques Traore´. Anal-
ysis, improvement, and simplification of Preˆt a` Voter with Paillier
encryption. In Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT), 2008.
Cited on page 63.

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang
November 2010 - November 2013 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin und Dok-
torandin bei Prof. Johannes Buchmann am Lehrstuhl fu¨r Kryptographie und Com-
puteralgebra an der Technischen Universita¨t Darmstadt.
Oktober 2003 - November 2010 Studium der Informatik an der Technischen
Universita¨t Darmstadt
Oktober 2002 - Oktober 2003 Ausbildung zur mathematisch- technischen Assis-
tentin an der Georg - Kerschensteiner - Schule in Bad Homburg

Erkla¨rung
Hiermit erkla¨re ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit – abgesehen von den in ihr
ausdru¨cklich genannten Hilfen – selbsta¨ndig verfasst habe.
Darmstadt,
